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Overview
0.1 Introduction
The study of the conditions, which sustain mutual cooperation over the
redistribution of public resources among di¤erent generations, embeds in-
teresting theoretical challenges from both economic and political points of
view. Politicians, in order to be elected, promise future transfers in favor of
current voters, anticipating that they would probably not be in their posts
when the bill will become due. Furthermore, intergenerational redistribu-
tion promises involve transfers from one generation to another, in some cases
even when one of those generations is too young to vote. Consequently, in-
tergenerational redistribution turns to a battleground, pitting young against
old and taxpayers against recipients, especially when balanced budget con-
ditions are required to be met.
In a dynamic politico-economic environment characterized by no com-
mitment technology, the deep understanding of the implementation and sus-
tainability of implicit intergenerational contracts requires the identication
of appropriate enforceability mechanisms. In a repeated setting the litera-
ture distinguishes between reputational (non-Markov) and non reputational
(Markov) enforceability mechanisms. While the latter do not require play-
ers to trigger punishment in the case of defection from the equilibrium path,
the former requires either the victimized agents to make retaliation against
the cheater (personal punishment) or, alternatively, other agents, who are
not directly involved in the bilateral negotiation, to exert the punishment
against a deviator (community punishment). The following table resumes
the main enforceability mechanisms in repeated non-cooperative games:
viii
Description
Non Reputational (Markov) Strategies contingent on payo¤-relevant-state variable
Reputational (Non Markov) Trigger strategies
Both mechanisms are characterized by drawbacks and advantages, which
are basically resumed in the trade-o¤between renegotiation proof-robustness
and e¢ ciency. On one hand, reputational equilibria require coordination
among agents, but the threat of long punishment phase can sustain good
equilibria. On the other hand, Markov equilibria avoid coordination failures
because they restrict the required information space to the payo¤-relevant
state variables, but eventually selecting bad equilibria.
The main idea defended in this work is that reputational mechanisms
hardly work in overlapping generation (OLG) games. Due to the particu-
lar structure of the game, the informational requirements necessary to im-
plement reputational equilibria are challenging to meet and coordination
failures among di¤erent generations are likely to arise. Thus, the main the-
oretical challenge we deal with concerns how to enhance e¢ ciency when:
i) We focus on Markov equilibria (Chapter 1 and 2), and ii) we allow for
non-Markov equilibria when personal or community punishments are not
e¤ective (Chapter 3). We provide the following solutions for each of the
above cases:
i) Markov Equilibria: Forward intergenerational transfers;
ii) Reputational Equilibria: Self-Commitment Institution.
0.2 General Framework
We present the simplied version of the intergenerational game we will
analyze in the following chapters. Time is discrete and indexed by t =
0; 1; :::. At each time t the economy is populated by three generations
(Young, Adults and Old), who prefer to smooth consumption over time.
Each generation has specic property rights over the total economy en-
dowment. Only Adults and Old are represented by political parties, which
compete on proposing electoral platforms requiring agents to transfer their
ix
property rights to other generations. Let yt be the total economic endow-
ment. After electoral competition and intergenerational redistribution, 1 qt
turns out to be the share of Adultsproperty rights and qt the share of el-
derly property rights. Thus, the individual budget constraints at each time
require:
cyt = 0
cat = (1  qt)yt
cot = qtyt
In equilibrium intergenerational cooperation arises if cat and c
o
t are dif-
ferent from zero. Furthermore, e¢ ciency is attained if an alternative inter-
generational redistribution scheme, q0t 6= qt, which improves further welfare,
does not exist. According to the rules governing the political voting process,
a self-enforcing (implicit) intergenerational contract requires agents to have
incentives not to defect the agreement without assuming the existence of
a court to enforce the contract. Thus, the politico-economic equilibrium is
represented by the innite sequence fyt; qtg1t=0.
In the case of Markov equilibrium, an intergenerational contract is rep-
resented by the following mapping:
qt : S ! [0; 1]
where S is the space of relevant payo¤ state variables. Previous studies have
mainly focused on private savings as the main state variable in a median
voter framework to consider how e¢ cient intergenerational contracts may
be self-sustained in equilibrium. We study how the introduction of bidi-
mensional redistribution programs, characterized by simultaneous transfers
to young and old from middle age class, and human capital, as an addi-
tional relevant state variable in probabilistic voting environment, alter the
self-enforcing conditions to make the intergenerational contracts emerge.
In the case of non-Markov equilibrium, intergenerational contract is rep-
resented by the following mapping:
qt : Ht ! [0; 1]
where Ht is the set of observable histories till time t. Previous studies have
xanalyzed how personal or community punishment may deter deviation from
the equilibrium strategy sustaining good equilibria if the deterrence power is
high enough. We study how self-punishment, in the form of wasted resources
in equilibrium, sustains higher e¢ ciency in games in which traditional pun-
ishment mechanisms have low deterrence power.
0.3 Overview of the Chapters
Focusing on intergenerational conicts and the interaction between economic
and political institutions, this work is divided in three chapters. Chapter
1 presents A Dynamic Politico-Economic Model of Intergenerational Con-
tracts. This model investigates the conditions for the emergence of implicit
intergenerational contracts without assuming reputation mechanisms, com-
mitment technology and altruism in a context of small open economy. We
present a tractable dynamic politico-economic model in overlapping gener-
ation environment where politicians play Markovian strategies in a proba-
bilistic voting environment, setting multidimensional political agenda. Both
backward and forward intergenerational transfers, respectively in the form of
pension benets and higher education investments, are simultaneously con-
sidered in an endogenous human capital setting with labor income taxation.
Building on Boldrin and Montesidea (2005),1 who provide normative pre-
scriptions for optimal intergenerational redistribution, we show that e¢ cient
intergenerational transfer schemes can be supported as a politico-economic
equilibrium in an intergenerational game. We discuss dynamic properties,
uniqueness and optimality of the solution, providing also comparative sta-
tics in terms of both demographic and political aging. Specically, we nd
that in a dynamic e¢ cient economy both forward and backward intergen-
erational transfers simultaneously arise. Social security sustains investment
in public education and investment in education creates a dynamic linkage
across periods through both human and physical capital driving the econ-
omy toward di¤erent Welfare State Regimes. The equilibrium allocation
turns out to be education e¢ cient, but, due to political overrepresentation
of elderly agents, the electoral competition process induces overtaxation
compared with a Benevolent Government solution with balanced welfare
1Boldrin, M. and Montes, A., 2005, "The Intergenerational State Education and Pen-
sion", Review of Economic Studies, 72, 651-664.
xi
weights.
Chapter 2, entitled Politicians, Redistribution and Intergenerational
Conicts, extends the basic setup presented in Chapter 1. We account
for general equilibrium e¤ects generated by policy changes on income and
potentially endogenous growth. The main objective of this work concerns
the study of how political disagreement over the redistribution of public re-
sources among di¤erent age-cohorts a¤ects e¢ ciency. In a dynamic politico-
economic context characterized by no distortions we nd that the stronger
the political power to elderly, and consequently the stronger the political
disagreement, the better is the dynamic e¢ ciency. Furthermore, we intro-
duce distortionary taxation on capital, explicitly considering political distor-
tions, which arise in the electoral competition stage when forward looking
politician internalize how political decisions a¤ect their probability of win-
ning elections. We characterize the time-consistent Markov perfect politico-
economic equilibrium in terms of Generalized Euler Conditions (GEEs), dis-
cussing how economic and political distortions alter the main nding about
the positive correlation between intergenerational political disagreement and
e¢ ciency.
Finally, Chapter 3 presents Self-Commitment Institutions and Coop-
eration in Overlapping Generation Games. This model investigates the
existence of an alternative mechanism, out of personal and community en-
forcement, we refer to as Self-Commitment Institution (SCI), which sustains
cooperation when: i) Agents are nite-living periods overlapping genera-
tions, and ii) imperfectly observe past history. We characterize social norms
with and without SCI. If agents adopt social norms with SCI they might
decide to partially self-expropriate their own endowment employing it as
self-commitment device. The punishment decisions are contingent on the
self-expropriation choices of previous players. Under quite general condi-
tions we nd that, even if individual strategies are still characterized by
behavioral uncertainty, the introduction of SCI relaxes the inclination to-
ward opportunistic behavior and sustains higher e¢ ciency compared to so-
cial norms without SCI. Finally, we extend the analyses to productive SCI
and provide a new explanation for the role of education provision regarding
the sustainability of intergenerational contracts.
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Chapter 1
A Dynamic
Politico-Economic Model of
Intergenerational Contracts
Why should I care about future generations? What have they done for me?"
(Groucho Marx)
1.1 Introduction
The implementation and sustainability of public intergenerational redistrib-
utive programs are crucial issues in the current political debate. On one
hand, the shift of the balance between di¤erent age-cohorts in favor of the
elderly alters the economic nature underlying the enforcement of redistrib-
utive welfare programs. On the other hand, the increasing age of median
voter makes the political choices to be more responsive to the need of the
crucial group of voters - the old.1 The demographic changes and the political
power reassessments suggest that past intergenerational transfers promises,
especially in the form of pensions, become more and more una¤ordable over
time. Furthermore, the sustainability problem of redistributive programs
in favor of the elderly appears exacerbated by the dynamically e¢ cient
growth path experienced by developed countries since the Second World
1As reported by OECD (2007), between 1975 and 2005 the average age of median voter
increased three times faster than it had in the preceding 30 years. At the some time, the
dependency ratio - the ratio of workers to pensioners - has steadily deteriorated in all rich
countries. It is expected to shift from 4 points in 1970 to around 2 in 2050.
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War (Abel et al., 1989).2
Fig. 1: Source: Comparative Welfare State (2004)
Although in the last decades political debates have often concerned re-
forms of current pension systems based on retributive schemes in favor of
private contributive schemes; nonetheless in most developed countries the
bulk of retirement income comes mostly from the state, around 60%. As
shown in Figure 1, the share of GDP per-capita devoted to nance social
security in OECD countries has increased over time.
One of the main implications of this trend is that the intergenerational
disagreement over the allocation of public resources turns to be a battle-
ground, pitting young against old and taxpayers against recipients, espe-
cially when balanced budget conditions are required to be met. For this
reason, it becomes critical to explore the conditions under which intergen-
erational transfers, as an outcome of a political voting game, can be imple-
mented and why the welfare system developed so far has became a stable
institution of modern society. The main objective of this work is to provide
a tractable dynamic politico-economic theory to analyze how intergenera-
tional conicts a¤ect, through the political mechanism in the form of demo-
cratic vote, the size and composition of public expenditure in a context of
2There are many explanations in the literature on why pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social
security has been introduced and then expanded (see Galasso and Profeta, 2002). The
classical solution on the puzzle is that, if the economy is on a dynamically ine¢ cient
path, then the introduction of a PAYG social security system is Pareto improving since it
reduces the capital deepening.
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population aging.
Fig. 2: Source Lee (2007)
Figure 2 reports the scal policy pattern for the USA in 2001. The
plot suggests that the intergenerational redistribution scheme matches the
self-enforcing requirements when the working-age class collects taxes and
both elderly and young enjoy benets in the form of backward and forward
transfers, respectively. Building on the idea of Boldrin and Montes (2005),
who provide normative prescriptions for the optimal intergenerational redis-
tribution, we show that multidimensional e¢ cient intergenerational transfer
schemes in the form of PAYG and public education transfers can also be
supported as a politico-economic equilibrium of an intergenerational game.
We consider a three period OLG economy populated by ideological het-
erogeneous agents who participate to repeated political elections. When
young, agents acquire skills if education transfers are publicly provided with-
out having access to private credit markets. When adult, the individuals
o¤er inelastically labor and pay taxes, while when old, agents retire and
receive unproductive transfers to sustain their consumption. The presence
of a political system is justied by the need to nance the provision of the
public spending under credit market constraint. The electoral competition
takes place in a majoritarian probabilistic environment, where politicians
compete by proposing multidimensional scal platforms under uncertainty
(i.e. before the realization of ideological shock) subject to intra-period bal-
anced budget. We assume away the provision of public goods - a key element
in the political economy of scal policy - to pick out the impact of political
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institutions on intergenerational transfers.3 We introduce two restrictions to
the neoclassical growth environment in order to isolate the basic mechanism
at work. We rule out altruism and we consider a small open economy where
the wage per e¢ cient unit and the return on saving are xed.4
Technically, this paper highlights two main features concerning scal
policies. Firstly, several political choices have to be set simultaneously, so
the political space cannot be reduced to a mere unidimensional problem.
Secondly, political decisions and private intertemporal choices are mutually
a¤ected over time. Forward-looking selsh agents internalize how current
political choices inuence the evolution of the economy and the implemen-
tation of future policies. To fully describe the endogenous feedback e¤ects,
we embody the minor causes should have minor e¤ect principle to imple-
ment di¤erentiable Stationary Markov subgame Perfect Equilibria (SMPE),
where the policies are conditioned on the two payo¤-relevant state variables
of the economy: Physical and human capital. We characterize the policy
rules as an equilibrium outcome in a nite horizon environment when time
goes to innity. As a result, we overcome the main limit of earlier literature,
related to the adoption of trigger strategies equilibria, which are not robust
to this renement.
We argue that selsh adults buy insurance for their future old age by
paying productive education transfers to their children in order to raise the
labor productivity of the next period. When old, they partially grab the
bigger output, in the form of PAYG transfers, by exerting political power
in a probabilistic voting environment. Obviously, the redistributive scheme
works only if the cost of providing a productive transfer is low with respect to
the value of receiving a pork-barrel transfer when old. Therefore, if a PAYG
pension scheme is introduced, its future beneciaries may become supportive
of higher funding in public education via taxes. In other words, the existence
of a retributive social security system provides incentives to invest optimally
in human capital and, as a consequence, it becomes growth-enhancing for
the economic system.5 Thus, the two age-specic redistributive programs
3This issue is well investigated by Tabellini (1991), Lizzeri and Persico (2001), Hassler
et al. (2005) and Bassetto (2008).
4Focusing on a small open economy we avoid the crowding out e¤ect, then the conict
between age-classes arise not only because of di¤erent life span but also for the di¤erence
in ownership of productive factors as well as in the source of income.
5PAYG pension schemes in which pensions are nanced by contributions from current
workers have often been criticized as being detrimental to growth. According to Feldstein
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may self-sustain reaching optimality.
Despite the simple structure of the game, we reach several interesting
results, consistent with the empirical correlations. We nd a closed form
solution for the intergenerational contract, which is robust to nite horizon
restrictions. Both physical capital and human capital play a relevant role
in shaping the politico-economic equilibrium and in a¤ecting the transition
dynamics. Due to politiciansopportunistic behavior, strategic persistency
drives the setting of the income tax. The equilibrium predicts that the
higher the physical capital, the lower the income tax rate, consistently with
previous literature.6 Furthermore, human capital plays a crucial role in two
di¤erent ways. On one hand it mitigates the politiciansstrategic behavior.
Precisely, the higher the level of human capital, the atter the equilibrium
policy function and the lower responsiveness of taxation policy decisions on
the level of private savings, weakening the strategic channel through which
politicians can increase the probability to win elections. On the other hand,
human capital perturbs the political choice concerning the size of govern-
ment, driving the economy towards di¤erent Welfare State Regimes (WSR)
and long-run convergence dynamics. Specically, the presence of endogenous
human capital formation generates two WSR. A complementarity regime,
in which higher the human capital and, consequently, larger the tax base,
higher the tax rate, and a substitutability regime, in which the opposite
relation holds.
The sustainability conditions of the intergenerational contract strongly
rely on both the dynamic e¢ ciency condition and the ideological hetero-
geneity of voters. The dynamic e¢ ciency requirement is necessary for the
simultaneous existence of PAYG and public education programs. As long
as the implicit net return of pensions is higher than the capital rental price,
(1974) such pension schemes have a negative e¤ect on capital accumulation, since they
discourage private saving and, unlike in the case of a funded pension system, the payments
into the PAYG scheme do not contribute to national saving. Moreover, the implicit rate
of return on contributions to a PAYG scheme typically falls short of the interest rate.
According to this line of analysis, PAYG pension systems reduce per capita income. This
standard argument is focused on physical capital accumulation and fails to take notice of
the e¤ect of PAYG pension systems have on the accumulation of human capital, particu-
larly through public education. Primary and secondary education is now overwhelmingly
publicly nanced in all OECD countries, and universities also receive substantial funding
from public sources.
6See among others Grossman and Helpman (1998), Azariadis and Galasso (2002), Forni
(2005) and Bassetto (2008).
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incentives in spending simultaneously on both sides of the redistribution pro-
grams arise. As soon as the interest rate falls below the economic growth
rate, than no incentives for the adults to reduce current consumption in
order to sustain forward transfers would emerge. As a result, in equilibrium
only backward transfer would be provided. The ideological heterogeneity
plays a relevant role for the sustainability of the contract. Suppose the
agents are ideologically homogeneous and decisions are taken through a de-
terministic majoritarian voting system. If adults detain power at each time,
then forward transfers cannot be sustained as SMPE of the intergenerational
game. When adult if agents anticipate that when old they will be prevented
to extract rent by being in power and to benet from higher return to
physical capital, they never reduce their current consumption by transfer-
ring resources forward. Whereas, they still decide to optimally self-sustain
backward transfers under dynamic ine¢ ciency. Equivalently, if the political
power is assigned to elderly, then old would act myopically by expropriating
adults and by transferring the collected resources backward.
To conclude the existence of PAYG social security programs supports
public investment in education even in absence of altruism and general
equilibrium price e¤ects. At the same time in equilibrium the impact of
education spending on the social security transfers is always positive. By
supporting a higher education cost today, the adults internalize that it will
generate a higher taxable income, guaranteeing a higher level of pension
benets when they will be old. Furthermore, demographic aging increases
the equilibrium per-capita level of forward transfers, whereas the political
aging has a positive impact on taxation.
Compared with a Benevolent Government solution with balanced welfare
weights, the equilibrium allocation is education e¢ cient, but, due to polit-
ical overrepresentation of elderly agents, the electoral competition process
induces overtaxation. These distortions come from the politiciansstrategic
behavior. In setting taxation rules, short-lived politicians take into account
that future representatives will compensate the scal cost of current adults
by paying the pensions in their old age. Thus, the expected policy response
of future politicians reduces the current cost of transferring resources to the
elderly and leads to overspending, unless the adult enjoy an unusually large
political power. Consequently, by transferring too many resources to old,
the politicians fail to provide the optimal income tax rate policy.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 1:2 provides the review of lit-
erature. In section 1:3 we present the model characterizing the economic and
political environment. Section 1:4 describes the politico-economic equilib-
rium in the perfect forward-looking scenario and provides a complete char-
acterization of both the transition dynamics and the long run economy. In
section 1:5 we discuss the main results of the model. Section 1:6 introduces
the Government problem without commitment, comparing the results with
the decentralized one. Section 1:7 concludes. All proofs are contained in the
Appendix.
1.2 Literature Review
This paper relies on the dynamic political-economy literature that incor-
porates forward-looking decision makers in a multidimensional policy space
(Krusell et al., 1997). Recent works (Forni, 2005, and Gonzales-Eiras and
Niepelt, 2008) present models on social security in a repeated voting en-
vironment. We depart from these studies by supporting and giving new
theoretic fundamentals to the existing literature, which recognizes the link
between productive and redistributive public spending. Among the existing
theoretical contributions, from a purely economic point of view, Boldrin and
Montes (2005) formalize public education and PAYG system as two parts
of an intergenerational contract where public pension is the return on the
investment into the human capital of the next generation. The authors show
how an interconnected pension and public education system can replicate
the allocation achieved by a complete market. Allowing issue-by-issue vot-
ing, Rangel (2003) studies the ability of non-market institutions to optimally
invest in forward and backward intergenerational goods. Bellettini and Berti
Ceroni (1999) incorporate politics in an economic model to analyze how so-
cieties might sustain public investments (i.e. education) even if the interests
of those benetting from the investment are not represented in the political
process. Restricting voting to a binary choice of tax rate and education, the
authors study whether a given system can be maintained but they do not
determine the level of investments in education or social security. As main
shortcoming the earlier studies have assumed that voters play trigger strate-
gies. Although trigger strategies may be analytically convenient, they lead
to multiplicity of equilibria. Furthermore, they require coordination among
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agents and costly enforcement of a punishment technology, which may not
work when agents are not su¢ ciently patient. Finally, they are not robust
to renement such as backward induction in a nite horizon economy when
time the tends to innity. Departing from the existing literature, instead
of emphasizing that the complementarity between education and pension
payments is mainly sustained because of reputation mechanisms, our model
adopts a di¤erent perspective. We focus on the resolution of the intergen-
erational conicts over the determination of the amount of the two public
spending components by adopting Markovian strategies. Closer in the spirit
of our work is Gonzales-Eiras and Niepelt (2011). The authors study how
demographic ageing a¤ects the per-capita long run endogenous growth in a
two period OLG economy. Di¤erently from them, our theory put emphasis
on the analyses of the intergenerational scal sustainability during the tran-
sition path, in a context in which positive spillover from general equilibrium
price e¤ects and endogenous growth are ruled out.
Many recent studies have identied the public good provision as the
critical variable that allows the emergence of an intergenerational redistrib-
utive scheme. Bassetto (2008) studies how intergenerational conicts shape
government policies when taxes, transfers and public good are jointly de-
termined. Without public good provision the government would be running
a purely redistribution scheme, to which any household that is a net loser
would object: Hence, the only possible equilibrium would entail no taxes
and no transfers. In a simpler underlying economic environment of majority
voting Hassler et al. (2007) develop an OLG model of welfare state where
tax revenues are used to nance public goods and age-dependent transfers.
Studying a linear quadratic economy, they provide analytical solution, but
the voting strategies equilibrium turns out to be either constant or indepen-
dent of fundamentals. Unlike these models we exclude public good provision.
Finally, some studies have analyzed the interaction between education
and social security by adopting an altruistic motive. Kaganovich and Zilcha
(1999) study a model where altruistically-motivated parents invest in the
human capital of their children. When parents retire, the labor income of
their children is taxed to nance their social security benets. The link
between the human capital of children and the parentsretirement benets
is disregarded in each parental educational decision, but it is captured by
the government. In Ehrlich and Lui (1998) children provide support to
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parents in old age, so that parents have an interest in the education of
their children due to pure altruistic motives. Despite the usefulness of these
studies, they adopt a centralized point of view to justify the simultaneous
investment in both redistributive programs. In contrast to these studies, as
a device to bring out incentives to pay tax, we allow for productive and long-
lasting impact transfers to the future generation of workers. The dynamic
intertemporal linkage occurs by a¤ecting the benets of adults, which expect
to grab future output by exerting political power when old.
1.3 The Model
Consider a discrete-time OLG economy populated by an innite number of
overlapping generations of ideologically heterogeneous agents, living up to
three-periods: Young, Adult and Old. Every agent born at time t survives
with probability one until old age. Population grows at a constant rate
n >  1, thus the mass of a generation born at time  and living at time t is
equal to N t = N0 (1 + n)
.
1.3.1 Households
Agents born at time t  1 evaluate consumption according to the following
intertemporal non altruistic utility function:
Ut 1 = u
 
c1t

+ u
 
c2t+1

(1.1)
where u (c) = log c and  2 (0; 1) is the individual discount factor. c1t repre-
sents the consumption at time t when adult and c2t+1 is the consumption at
time t+1 when old. In the rst period of life (i.e. childhood), the individual
does not consume.
When young, agents spend all their time endowment in acquiring skills
if education transfers, et, are publicly provided without having access to
private credit markets.7 When adult, the individuals work and consume
their labor income, wt, net of the proportional labor income taxes, t, and
individual savings, st. When old, the individuals retire and consume their
total income, equal to the sum of pension benets that their children pass
7For a recent discussion on the missing credit markets to nance education, see Kehoe
and Levine (2000).
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to them in the form of PAYG transfers, pt+1, and the capitalized savings at
a xed interest rate R. Then, the individual budget constrains for adults
and old are, respectively:
c1t = wt (1  t)  st (1.2)
c2t+1 = Rst + pt+1 (1.3)
The net present value at time t of the lifetime wealth of an agent born
at time t  1 is given by:
It = wt (1  t) + pt+1
R
1.3.2 Production
At each time t the homogenous private good, Yt, is produced by a linear tech-
nology that uses labor, Lt, inelastically supplied by the adults, and physical
capital, Kt. The linearity of the production function can be derived as an
equilibrium outcome in a context of perfect international capital mobility
and factor price equalization in the presence of goods trade. It emphasizes
the intergenerational conicts due to divergent economic interests between
the two productive classes: workers (adults) and capitalists (old). Then, the
production function at time t is:
Yt = wtLt +RKt (1.4)
where the wage rate, wt = ! (1 + ht), and the gross rental price to capital,
R, are determined by the marginal productivity conditions for factor prices.
The wage per e¢ ciency unit, !, is augmented by the level of human capital
acquired the period before, ht. Without loss of generality we normalize
! = 1.
The human capital of an agent born at time t in his working age is
an increasing function of the government real expenditure on education
and the parental education.8 Public education transfers are supplied in
an egalitarian way. The following Cobb-Douglas human capital technology,
8The importance and the empirical relevance of both the public spending in schooling
and the parental education input in the formation of the human capital of the young
people has been explored theoretically, as well as empirically. For a comprehensive survey
of the related literature see Becker and Tomes (1986).
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ht+1 = H (ht; et), is adopted:
ht+1 =

ht + (1  ) h
1 + n

e1 t (1.5)
where  2 (0; 1). ht is the dynastys human capital at time t and h is the
constant society endowment of human capital.9 If  = 1, then no externality
generated by h appears in the economy. Contrarily, if  2 [0; 1), then
externality takes the form of positive spillover from the society endowment
of human capital to the formation of future skills.
Physical capital fully depreciates each period. Consequently, the level of
saving determines the dynamics of per-capita physical capital accumulation.
The capital market clears when:
(1 + n) kt+1 = st (1.6)
1.3.3 Fiscal Constitution
In order to provide the intergenerational transfers, the agents in the economy
have to devise a politician. In each period, the politician raises revenues
through labor income taxes and uses the proceeds to purchase consumption
goods to pay transfers to the young and old generation. We assume that
the politician is prevented from borrowing, then the public balance must
hold in every period. This implies that total benets paid to elderly and
young equalize total contributions collected from working generations. The
balanced budget constraint requires:
(1 + ht) t = (1 + n) et +
1
1 + n
pt (1.7)
Ceteris paribus, the more the population ages, the higher the aggregate
pension benets for elderly agents and the lower the aggregate education
transfers for the youth.
The condition (1.7) reduces the multidimensionality of political platform
9The constant society endowment, h, is the country-specic human capital endowment,
which imperfectly substitutes the dynastys human capital. It may be also interpreted as
the country specic civic capital. It is introduced to appropriately perform cross-countries
analyses and for analytically convenience. Indeed, by simultaneously adopting the nal
good technology given by Eq. (1.4) and the human capital technology given by Eq. (1.5),
we rule out the e¤ects generated by endogenous growth, at the same time enabling the
economy to reach a stable steady state di¤erent from autarchy.
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to a bidimensional plan ft = fet; tg where t 2 (0; 1) and et 2 (0; e^t) at
each time t, with e^t equal to the maximum feasible level of public education
provision.
1.4 Maximization and Equilibrium
As in Krusell et al. (1997), we describe the equilibrium of the economy as a
dynamic politico-economic equilibrium. Within each period t, the detailed
timing of moves is as follows:
i. a new generation of young people is born;
ii. electoral competition takes place to select the policy to implement;10
iii. agents vote;
iv. the rms hire workers and rent capital;
v. the adults receive the proceeds from labor, pay taxes and consume;
old receive the capitalized saving and transfer, and consume; young
receive productive transfers;
vi. the older generation dies; the young and adult generations age and
become adult and old, respectively.
Due to the sequential nature of the timing of the game we solve backward.
First, the agents determine the individual level of saving and rms produce
the homogenous nal good given the scal stance (Competitive Economic
Equilibrium). Second, short-lived o¢ ce-seeking-politicians determine both
the level of taxation and the amount of backward and forward transfers in
order to win elections (Politico-Economic Equilibrium).
1.4.1 Competitive Economic Equilibrium
In a competitive equilibrium, each adult chooses her lifetime consumption
taking scal and redistributive policies as given. Maximizing Eq. (1.1)
subject to the individual budget constraints (1.2) and (1.3), and feasibility
10 In turn the electoral competition is characterized by two sub-phases: i) In the Taxation
Stage parties compete proposing their political scal platforms under uncertainty, i.e.
before the realization of the ideological shock among voters, and ii) in the Electoral Stage
agents vote for their preferred candidate.
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constraints c1t > 0 and c
2
t+1 > 0, the following rst order condition for
interior solutions must hold:
0 =  ()  uc
 
c1t
 Ruc  c2t+1 (1.8)
In equilibrium by implicit function theorem there exists a unique saving
function, st = K (ht; t; t+1; et+1), which satises the condition (1.8). Then,
using Eq. (1.6) we have:
(1 + n) kt+1 = K (ht; t; t+1; et+1) (1.9)
After plugging Eq. (1.9) into Eq. (1.2) and (1.3) the following individual
consumption levels are attained:
c1t  C1t (t; ht; kt+1) (1.10)
c2t+1  C2t+1 (et+1; t+1; kt+1) (1.11)
Denition 1 (Competitive Economic Equilibrium) Given the initial
conditions fh0; k0g and the sequence of policies fftg1t=0, a competitive eco-
nomic equilibrium is dened as a sequence of allocations

c1t ; c
2
t+1; ht+1; kt+1
	1
t=0
such that the allocation solves the maximization problem of adults, i.e. it sat-
ises Eq. (1.9), (1.10) and (1.11), the market for production inputs clears
in period t, i.e. (1.5) and (1.6) hold at each time.
At time t the indirect intertemporal utility of an adult born a time t 1,
W1t , is equal to:
W1t  maxst fUt 1 j Itg = u
 
C1t

+ u
 
C2t+1

(1.12)
For an old individual born a time t  2 the indirect utility, W2t ; at time t is:
W2t  u
 
C2t

(1.13)
We call autarky indirect utility, Wat , the lifetime utility of an adult born
at time t  1; when taxation and public spending are precluded:
Wa  max
st
fUt 1 j It = 1g
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Suppose there is no government that has the authority to levy taxes. As a
consequence, adults keep the entirety of their labor income to purchase nal
good and to save. Capital earns a gross return of R, used by old to buy
consumption goods. Clearly, the economy converges to the unique steady
state in one period, where ha = 0; ka = (1+)(1+n) ; c
a1 = 11+ ; c
a2 = 1+R
and wa = 1.
Denition 2 (Equilibrium Feasible Allocation) An equilibrium feasi-
ble allocation is a sequence of competitive economic equilibrium allocations
c1t ; c
2
t+1; ht+1; kt+1
	1
t=0
and policies fftg1t=0 that satisfy, the balanced bud-
get constraint, Eq. (1.7), and the scal feasibility conditions, t 2 (0; 1) and
et 2 (0; e^t) at each time t.
1.4.2 Political System
In this section we describe how people interact in order to choose a par-
ticular policy. Public policies are chosen through a repeated voting system
according to majority rule. Young have no political power.11 To describe the
behavior of politicians we consider a probabilistic voting setting.12 Suppose
there are two parties, l 2 fA;Bg, that compete to attain political power,
with no ability to extract individual rent from election. As a consequence,
their objective is the maximization of the probability of winning elections
at each time in order to implement the proposed policy, f lt , with no ability
11We reect the fact that young people show a much lower turnout rate at elections in
comparison to adults and old. As Galasso and Profeta (2004), report in some countries the
elderly have a higher rate at elections than the youth. In the USA turnout rates among
those aged 60-69 years is twice as high as among the young (19-29 years). Again in France
it is almost 50% higher.
12Due to the multidimensionality of the political platform Condorcet winner generally
fails to exist. Consequently the median voter theorem does not hold (Plot, 1967). In
the literature there are three main inuential approaches to making predictions when the
policy space is multi-dimensional. The rst is the implementation of structure-induced
equilibria. By following Shepsle (1979), agents vote simultaneously, yet separately (i.e.
issue by issue), on the issues at stake. Votes are then aggregated over each issue by the me-
dian voter. See Condez-Ruiz and Galsso (2005) for a detailed discussion of this approach.
The second is the legislative bargaining approach, which stems from the seminal work of
Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and is further developed by Battaglini and Coate (2006). This
approach applies when legislatorsrst loyalty is to their constituents and when legislative
coalitions are uid across time and issues. The latter concerns the adoption of proba-
bilistic voting rule. While this model of voting dates back to the 1970s, its resurgence in
popularity stemed from Lindbeck and Weibull (1987). It applies to political environments
where party discipline is strong and the winning political party simply implements its
platform. See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a survey of this framework.
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to commit to future one. The electorate is heterogeneous in its own politi-
cal ideology. Then, to each individual j belonging to the cohort i 2 f1; 2g
is assigned the ideological values ij . We assume 
i
j is a random variable
extracted from a distribution function Gi and represents the ideological bias
towards party B. The timing of the electoral competition game played at
the beginning of each period is then characterized by the following three
steps:
i. each party proposes a political platform, f lt , in order to maximize its
probability of winning the election;
ii. the ideological bias is realized among voters;
iii. fully rational and forward-looking voters take their voting choice.
With abuse of notation, let us denote with lW ijt the indirect utility at-
tained by agent j of cohort i at time t who votes for party l. At each time,
rst parties propose their political platforms, second any individual votes
for party A if and only if the following inequality holds:
AW ijt >B W ijt + ij
Given the equilibrium policy choice of party B, fBt , the ex-ante political
maximization problem for party A turns out to be equivalent to:
max
fAt
(1 + n)G1
 
AW1jt  BW1jt

+ G2
 
AW2jt  BW2jt

(1.14)
By symmetry party B solves an equivalent problem. In the Nash equilibrium
of the electoral competition game both candidates propose the some policy
platform, implementing the utilitarian optimum with respect to current liv-
ing voters.
1.4.3 Politico-Economic Equilibrium
In the previous section we have described how the political process takes
place in each period. To characterize the politico-economic equilibrium,
we need to consider the dynamic aspects of the political process that take
place in the economy. As in Krusell et al. (1997), we restrict the notion of
politico-economic equilibrium to the di¤erentiable political SMPE concept as
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equilibrium renement of subgame perfect equilibria.13 The payo¤-relevant
state variables of our economy are the assets held by adults and old, i.e.
human and physical capital.
At each time the implementation of a particular political platform gen-
erates dynamic linkages of policies across periods. Due to the non-negligible
impact of current political actions on future equilibria, rational agents inter-
nalize this dynamic feedback. In our framework dynamic linkages generated
by physical and human capital arises both directly, a¤ecting asset accumu-
lation decision (direct dynamic feedbacks), and indirectly, a¤ecting future
political choices (indirect dynamic feedbacks). Focusing on Markov strate-
gies, agents are able to fully internalize the overall direct and indirect impact
of taxation and redistribution through the evolution of assets.
Let us denote with t = T (ht ; kt) and et = E (ht ; kt) the taxation and
education equilibrium policies rules, respectively, and with F = fT ; Eg their
collection. In a perfect forward-looking environment, in which parties play
Markov strategies, the following Denition of equilibrium is adopted:
Denition 3 (Politico-Economic Equilibrium) A perfect foresight politico
- economic SMPE is dened as the sequence of competitive economic equilib-
rium feasible allocations

c1t ; c
2
t+1; ht+1; kt+1
	1
t=0
and policies fftg1t=0, such
that the functional vector of di¤erentiable policy decision rules, F = fT ; Eg,
where T : R+R+ ! [0; 1] and E : R+R+ ! [0; e^t], satises the following
points:
i: Each party solves the maximization program described in (1.14);
ii: The xed point condition holds, i.e. the policies are xed points of the
mappings E into Eex (ht; kt) and T into T ex (ht; kt), where the apex ex
stands for expected.
The rst equilibrium condition requires the political control variables,
ft, to be chosen in order to maximize the partys objective function, taking
13The Markov-perfect concept implies that outcomes are history-dependent only in the
fundamental state variables. The stationary part is introduced to focus only on the current
value of the payo¤ relevant state variable. Consequently the vector of equilibrium policy
decision rules is not indexed by time, i.e. the structural relation among payo¤-relevant
state variables and political controls is not time variant. The di¤erentiable part is a
convenient requirement to avoid multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes and in order to give
clear positive political predictions.
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account that future redistribution and taxation depend on the current policy
choices via both the equilibrium private decisions and future equilibrium
policy rules.
The second condition requires that, if the equilibrium exists, it must
satisfy the xed point requirement. From a technical point of view, we
are looking for two di¤erentiable policies which obey the recursive rules
given by the functions t = T (ht ; kt) and et = E (ht ; kt), where T and
E are innite dimensional objects and the key endogenous variables of the
problem. The second fundamental element we are looking for is a function,
K, which describes the private sector response to a one-shot deviation of
the government, when agents expect future policies to be set by politicians
according to F as function of current state and political control variables.
From Eq. (1.9) the function K fully describes the equilibrium behavior of
private agents as a function of current state and both current and future
policies. If di¤erentiable functions, T and E , which describe the policy
behavior followed by politicians in equilibrium, exist, these rules can be
internalized by fully rational private agents. It follows that:
kt+1 = K
 
ht; t; E
 
ht+1 ; kt+1

; T  ht+1 ; kt+1 (1.15)
Plugging Eq. (1.5) into Eq. (1.15) and rearranging the terms we get:
kt+1 = K (ht; t; et)
Due to the full depreciation of physical capital and the absence of distor-
tionary taxation on capital, K is not a function of current level of physical
capital, which strongly simplies the analyses.
Before recursively solving the equilibrium policy rules E and T , we in-
vestigate the marginal impact of et and t on the partiesobjective function.
Maximizing Eq. (1.14) with respect to both policies and applying the en-
velope theorem, we obtain the following system of rst order conditions for
each l 2 fA;Bg:
(1 + n)
dlW1t
d lt
+ g2g1
dlW2t
d lt
= 0
(1 + n)
dlW1t
delt
+ g2g1
dlW2t
delt
= 0
where gi is the density function of Gi: Let us denote with   g2g1 2 [0;1) a
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synthetic measure of the ideological bias among voters, which also represents
the relative political weight of the voters belonging to old cohort.14 If 0 < 
< 1 then on average the old cohort cares less about ideology and has more
swing-voters than the adults one. For  > 1 the opposite holds, where the
elderly represent the majority in the political debate. Finally, when  = 1;
all voters are equally represented. Using the indirect utility functions, Eq.
(1.12) and (1.13) ; the following rst order conditions are attained for t and
et, respectively:15
0 = (1 + ht)uC2t| {z }
olds direct benet
  (1 + ht)uC1t| {z }
adultsdirect cost
+(1 + n)uC2t+1

(1 + ht+1)
d t+1
d t
 (1 + n)det+1
d t

| {z }
adultsexp. cost/benet
(1.16)
0 =  uC2t| {z }
olds direct cost
+ uC2t+1

dht+1
det
t+1+(1 + ht+1)
dt+1
det
  (1 + n)det+1
det

| {z }
adultsexpected direct/indirect net benet
(1.17)
Let us rst refer to Eq. (1.16). At each time an interior solution for
the income tax rate is simply determined as the outcome of a weighted
bargaining between current elderly and adults, who reap benets and sustain
costs by a variation in tax level. The rst term represents the elderlys
marginal benets in terms of PAYG social security due to the increase in
income tax rate. Since tax levying on labor income makes adults sustain
the whole tax burden, the second term captures the adultsmarginal cost
caused by a positive variation on the scal dimension. Finally, the third
term measures the expected marginal impact of current variation in the tax
rate on the utility of next-period old. Similarly, redistributive choices are
made as the outcome of a weighted bargaining between current and future
elderly. An increase in public education transfers is a double-edged sword.
On one hand, it makes current old sustain direct costs due to reduction in
social security contributions, represented by the rst part of Eq. (1.17) : On
the other hand, future old enjoy direct benets from expected returns of
productive investment in human capital, whose e¤ects are captured by the
14 is a measure of how strongly the old generation pursues her own interest.
15Since in equilibrium the parties A and B face the same maximization problem and
choose an identical political platform, we remove the apex l.
Chapter 1 19
second part.
FOCs (1.16) and (1.17) internalize the strategic e¤ects, capturing how
politicians can a¤ect future policies through their current choices of ft: If
dt+1
dt
> 0 (< 0) and dt+1det > 0 (< 0) agents know that a higher income tax
rate and larger education transfers lead to a higher (lower) tax rate in the
future. Thus, representatives may strategically increase (reduce) t and et
in order to a¤ect the tax rate outcome of tomorrow. The same idea holds
for et+1.
1.4.4 Political SMPE with Perfect Foresight
Due to the non-linearity and bidimensionality in the political space, the
system of partial di¤erential equations (1.16) and (1.17) cannot be easily
solved using integration methods.16 As reported in Klein et al. (2008), the
equilibrium is obtained as the limit of a nite-horizon equilibrium, whose
characteristics do not signicantly depend on the time horizon, as long as
the time horizon is long enough. Consequently, our resolution strategy con-
sists of a constructive approach (induction method). We compute the FOCs
dening the feasible equilibrium policy rules in a nite-horizon environment
via backward induction. We start at a nal round t <1 and we re-compute
the equilibrium policy rules, Ft = fTt; Etg, as long as all the direct dynamic
feedbacks, induced by political choices on private one, have been internal-
ized. In particular, due to two-periods lag impact of et on private saving
choices, we perform recursive maximization until period t  2. At each time
the political objective function, described in Eq. (1.14), has to be simul-
taneously maximized with respect to its arguments, i.e. the pair ft; etg,
subject to the balanced budget constraint, Eq. (1.7), the Euler condition of
the economic optimization problem, Eq. (1.9), and the equilibrium policy
rules of the following periods, computed via backward procedure. Once a
recursive structure is identiable, making the time horizon goes to innity
for all the time-variant coe¢ cients determined so far, we obtain the equilib-
rium policy rules as xed point of the recursive problem in multidimensional
environment.
For notational purposes let us denote with 
i the relative political bar-
16See Grossman-Helpman (1996) and Azariadis-Galasso (2002) frameworks where by
applying the envelope theorem the di¤erential equation becomes linear and solution is
easily determined.
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gaining power for i 2 f1; 2g, which are dened as follows:

1  (1 + n) (1 + )
+(1 + n) (1 + )
and 
2  
+(1 + n) (1 + )
(1.18)
Remark 1 The more the population ages (i.e. n decreases and  increases),
the smaller the relative political weight of adults, 
1, and larger the relative
political weight of old, 
2.
Fixing  = 12 , we analytically determine a fundamental equilibrium cap-
turing the e¤ects that are inherent in the dynamic game itself, which turns
to be unique. Let Pol be the state-space where interior policy rules are si-
multaneously obtained and R  1R 1 where R =1+nR measures the economy
dynamic e¢ ciency ratio. The following Theorem characterizes the equilib-
rium outcomes of public choices in a fully rational environment when Markov
strategies are implemented.
Theorem 1 Let   = 1

2R


R pR2   

  1

. Under dynamic e¢ -
ciency condition, for any level of fht; ktg 2 Pol the feasible rational poli-
cies, ft = ft; etg, which can be supported by a perfect foresight political
SMPE, have the following functional forms:
i:
E (ht) = a1ht + a0 (1.19)
where a1  1+n  and a0  1 1+nh ;
ii:
T (kt; ht) =  b3 kt
1 + ht
+ b2
ht
1 + ht
+ b1
1
1 + ht
+ b0 (1.20)
where b3  R
1, b2   (
1+2
2), b1  h1  b2+ R
 
1 + h (1  ) 
2
and b0  
2.
Otherwise, for any (ht; kt) =2 Pol corner solutions result in at least one
of the two dimensions.
Proof. (See appendix).
From a structural point of view, while the policy rule associated with
education transfers is linear in the human capital production, the scal
policy rule is a linear function in the physical capital but not in the human
capital level.
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1.4.5 Dynamics and Steady States
We now discuss the transition dynamics of the economy during the adjust-
ment towards the steady state.
Denition 4 (Law of Motion) The laws of motion of the collection fet; t; ht; ktg1t=0
are denite as the mappings:
ht+1 = H (E (ht) ; ht) ;
et+1 = E (H (E (ht) ; ht)) ;
kt+1 = K (E (ht) ; T (ht; kt) ; ht) ;
t+1 = T (K (E (ht) ; t; ht) ;H (E (ht) ; ht))
The economy dynamics is basically driven by the human capital evolution
which a¤ects both the education transferslaw of motion and the transition
dynamics of taxation policy. While the former is directly inuenced by
human capital, the latter is a¤ected by human capital both directly and
indirectly through physical capital. This implies that convergence conditions
in the state-space are also su¢ cient for the stable convergence of the policy
rules evolution. The following Lemma states the conditions for economys
convergence stability.
Lemma 1 Let    (R  (1 + n)) and n 
r
2R

R pR2   

    1.
Given any feasible initial condition (h0; k0) 2 Pol, if  >  and n >
n, then the sequence fet; t; ht; ktg1t=0 is characterized by stable monotonic
convergence. The speed of convergence for t crucially depends on the initial
condition and the human capital society endowment.
Proof. (See appendix).
Given the di¤erentiability of the policy functions, the interior solution
conditions and Lemma 1; the following Proposition holds:
Proposition 1 The feasible steady state (e; ; h; k) exists and is unique.
Proof. (See appendix).
Thus, depending on the initial condition, fh0; k0g, and the level of the
human capital society endowment, h, the control and the state variables
converge monotonically to the unique feasible steady state.17
17According to the particular Welfare State regime (see Section 1:5:1) di¤erent speeds
of convergence and amounts of intergenerational transfers characterize the economy.
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1.5 Discussion
In this section we discuss the necessary conditions for the sustainability of
the implicit intergenerational contracts. Furthermore, we fully characterize
the equilibrium policy rules described in Eq. (1.19) and (1.20).
The dynamic e¢ ciency requirement, i.e. R > 1+n, is a necessary condi-
tion for the simultaneous existence of PAYG and public education programs.
In our economy, during the transition path, the implicit net return to pen-
sions is determined by both the population growth rate and the marginal
increase in the taxable income due to human capital investment net of the
current resources devoted to education. As long as the implicit net return is
higher than the capital rental price, incentives in spending simultaneously
on both sides of the redistribution programs emerge. Contrarily, suppose
that the population growth rate exceeds the net rental price to physical
capital, then it is straightforward to prove that b1 tends to innity and,
consequently, the human capital negatively a¤ect the size of government.18
Remark 2 If R < 1 + n, then forward and backward transfers cannot be
simultaneously sustained as SMPE of the game.
According to Eq. (1.5) and (1.20), an increase in education spending
would determine a positive variation in the stock of human capital and, in
turn, a decrease in tax rate, dampening the strategic channel, which sustains
intergenerational cooperation over the pension transfers dimension. The
consequent increase of saving and physical capital induce further reduction
in the future tax level. As a result, this cannot be an equilibrium. Given the
condition R < 1+n, agents have always an incentive to deviate by choosing
higher levels of income tax in order to depress private saving and guarantee
higher future levels in pension contributions, even without investment in
education.
The ideological heterogeneity among agents plays also a relevant role for
the sustainability of the contract.
Corollary 1 If forward transfers are sustained as SMPE of the game, then
0 <  <1.
Proof. (See appendix).
18See Proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix A for the derivation of b1.
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Suppose  = 0, then by solving backward it is easy to check that forward
transfers cannot be sustained as SMPE of the intergenerational game.19 In a
small open economy, if adults anticipate that when old they will be prevented
to grab rent by exerting the political power, they never reduce their current
consumption by transferring resources forward. Whereas, they still decide to
optimally self-sustain backward transfers under dynamic ine¢ ciency. Equiv-
alently, suppose  ! 1, then all the political power is assigned to elderly.
As a result, at each time old would act myopically by expropriating adults
and by transferring all the collected resources backward.
As depicted in Figure 3, for any non-zero level of income tax, the greater
the human capital, the more political support the education program re-
ceives, i.e. detdht = a1 > 0. Two di¤erent congurations may arise depending
on the level of society endowment of human capital. As shown in Panel (a),
as long as h < 1(1 )  , then E (ht) lies within the feasibility boundaries,
(0; e^t), for any level of human capital. Instead, as reported in Panel (b), for
h > 1(1 )  , if ht is lower than a certain threshold, then boundary solution
is attained, i.e. E (ht) = e^t.20
Remark 3 The strategic political components embedded in the parameter 
does not a¤ect E (ht).
As reported in Eq. (1.19), in equilibrium the amount of education trans-
fers is equal to the highest feasible value, in order to maximize the net
implicit rate of future pensions. E (ht) maximizes the intertemporal utility
of current adults without considering the political distortions due to olds
bargaining power. This result sounds counterintuitive, because, as shown
in Eq. (1.17), old actually have incentives to reduce the education amount
at the minimal level. This, in turn, would remove the adults incentives
19 It would be equivalent to model a median voter or adultsdictatorship game, where
adults detain power at each time.
20The scenario characterized by transferring all tax revenue to public education in-
vestments (i.e. no current pension benets) is an equilibrium outcome as long as one-
period future pension transfers are allocated to current adults. When h  1
(1 )  and
ht < ~h  1 h(1 ) 

  1 , there exists an initial condition
~h0 such that for any h0 > ~h0
future human capital level exceeds the threshold level ~h, i.e. ht+1  ~h. In this case,
adults have an incentive in taxing their income because of positive expectation in terms
of social security. Thus, a one-period-equilibrium characterized by an intergenerational
contract with current backward transfers equal to zero emerges. Otherwise, if h0 < ~h0,
then no future pensions are provided for current adults and no incentive to implement an
intergenerational contracts may arise.
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in substituting private saving with public one. As nal result the autarky
would be established. It cannot be an equilibrium for the setting of an in-
tergenerational contract and, as a consequence, the emergence of a public
education program undistorted by the political bias is justied.
Figure 4 reports the equilibrium scal policy rule described in Eq. (1.20).
For illustrative purpose, let us to disentangle the e¤ects of the two asset
variables on T (ht; kt). Panel (a) describes the structural relation between
the equilibrium tax rate and the level of human capital. The intercept,
T (kt; 0), is a decreasing function in physical capital. As long as kt < ~k
where ~k  b1 b2b3 , the larger the human capital, the higher the opportunity
cost to tax levy, i.e. dtdht < 0. Otherwise if kt > ~k, incentives to increase si-
multaneously the taxable income and the income tax rate arise, i.e. dtdht > 0.
Fig. 3: Education Transfers Policy Rule
Panel (b) illustrates the structural relation between the equilibrium tax
rate and the level of physical capital. The equilibrium predicts for any value
of kt the higher the physical capital, the lower the income tax rate, consis-
tently with previous literature.21 The intuition for the scal policy function
to be non-increasing in the capital stock is the following. By contradiction, if
T (ht; kt) were increasing in kt, current adults would have incentives to save
in order to provide the next generation with a higher level of capital and,
therefore, receive a higher pension. This cannot be an equilibrium, since the
21See among others Grossman and Helpman (1998), Azriadis and Galasso (2002), Forni
(2005) and Bassetto (2008).
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higher amount of backward transfer reduces the level of saving that workers
are able to make.
Remark 4 Both the strategic political components embedded in the parame-
ter  and the demographic component, n, matter for the determination of
T (ht; kt).
Due to politiciansopportunistic behavior, strategic persistency deter-
mines the income tax. In our environment human capital plays a crucial
role in two di¤erent ways. On one hand, it mitigates the politiciansstrate-
gic behavior. Precisely, the higher the level of human capital, the atter
the equilibrium policy function and the lower the elasticity of T (ht; kt) with
respect to physical capital. The lower responsiveness of taxation policy de-
cisions on the level of private savings weakens the strategic channel through
which politicians can increase the probability to win elections. On the other
hand, human capital perturbs the political choice concerning the size of gov-
ernment. Depending on the political bargaining intensity between adults and
old embedded in the coe¢ cients b1 and b2 of Eq. (1.20), the marginal impact
of human capital on taxation decisions can be either positive or negative.
Fig. 4: Income Tax Policy Rule
Figure 5 reports a complete description of the recursive Markov struc-
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ture.
Fig. 5: Markovian Structure
The picture points out the strategic relations, which provide the neces-
sary incentives to selsh agents to sustain simultaneously backward redis-
tributive policies and forward ones.
1.5.1 Welfare State Regimes
Figure 5 points out the strategic structural relation between income tax
rate and human capital in the Markovian environment, which drives the
economy towards di¤erent WSR. If purely political factors matter in splitting
the public spending, then a Politico WSR will emerge. If the economic
factors are also relevant, then a Politico-Economic WSR will arise. The
following Corollary fully characterizes the conditions for the identication
of the di¤erent regime congurations.22
Corollary 2 Given the stationary equilibrium policy rules T (ht; kt) and
E (ht):
i. if b1 6 b2, then the Politico Complementarity WSR, PCR, arises, i.e.
dt
dht
> 0;
ii. if b1 > b2 and kt > ~k, then the Politico-Economic Complementarity
WSR, PECR, arises, i.e. dtdht > 0;
iii if b1 > b2 and kt < ~k, then the Politico-Economic Substitutability
WSR, PESR, arises, i.e. dtdht < 0.
Proof. (See appendix).
22Formally, let us dene 
2  ( (1 )
h) 
(2(1 )h+) + R . An economy where 
2  
2 experi-
ences a political competition characterized by a weak old bargaining power and b1 6 b2.
Contrarily, if 
2 > 
2, then old exert a strong bargaining power and b1 > b2.
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While the economic factors driving the system into di¤erent WSR are
endogenously determined by the capital asset accumulation through the sav-
ing choices, the political factors depend on the relative bargaining power of
voters. An economy characterized by a weak level of old bargaining power
in the political process, i.e. b1 6 b2, will experience a PCR, for any level
of kt. Contrarily, an economy with a strong level of olds bargaining power
in the political arena, i.e. b1 > b2, will experience a PECR if the system is
high-capitalized, i.e. kt > ~k, otherwise a PESR will emerge if the economy
is low-capitalized, i.e. kt < ~k.
Intuitively, as already pointed out, in equilibrium a higher level of cur-
rent income tax rate will determine a decrease of future physical capital
stock and, consequently, an increase of future tax rate. In the PCR, adults
anticipate that, if they invest in education today, an increase in future hu-
man capital will determine a further positive variation in the level of income
tax rate tomorrow. Given the increase in both the future tax rate and
taxable income, i.e. gross future pension benets, which maximize adult in-
tertemporal utility, PCR emerges as the only sustainable WSR when adult
bargaining power prevails.
To fully characterized the public spending process, we move the analyses
to the equilibrium characterization for pension benets.
Corollary 3 Under decreasing return in education, in equilibrium the im-
pact of education spending on the social security transfers is always positive,
i.e. dpt+1det > 0.
Proof. (See appendix).
Remark 5 The existence of a PAYG social security program supports public
investment in higher education even in absence of altruism.
Independently from the WSR characterizing the economy, an increase
in public education transfers induces a higher pension benets in the fu-
ture, creating the incentive for adults in supporting the education program.
Ceteris paribus, by supporting a higher education cost today, the adults
internalize that it will generate a higher taxable income of tomorrow, guar-
anteeing a higher level of the pension benets when they will be old, for any
level of T .
The interaction between political and economic institutions determine
the amount and the dynamic evolution of pension system.
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Corollary 4 At each time t, for any given level of human capital, in PESR
the pension benets are lower than PCR and larger than PECR, i.e. pPECRt <
pPESRt < p
PCR
t .
Proof. (See appendix).
When the adults bargaining power is su¢ ciently strong, i.e. b1 6 b2,
and PCR arises, the equilibrium pension benets reach the highest feasible
level. Otherwise, when old prevail in the political debate, depending on the
physical capital stock, the pension benets are lower in a high-capitalized
economy than in a low-capitalized one.
To resume graphically, in Figure 6 we plot on the state-space fht; ktg
the WSR congurations which arises when h > 1(1 )  and h0 > ~h0.
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Panel (a) shows the case in which a weak level of adult bargaining power
characterizes the political scenario. Contrarily, Panel (b) allows for a strong
bargaining power of the adults.
Fig. 6: Panel (a) shows the case for b2<b1, Panel (b) shows the case for b2>b1
As long as kt < kt in both cases full expropriation occurs. The tax rate,
equal to 100% of labor income, is assigned either to nance only public ed-
ucation program if ht < ~h or to support both redistributive social programs
if ht > ~h. Whereas, as long as kt > k^t autarky economy arises. Panel (a) re-
ports the politico-economic parameterscongurations, which makes PECR
and PESR arise, i.e. b2 + b0 < 1 and b1 + b0 > 1. Whereas Panel (b) shows
the emergence of PCR due the pure political factors, i.e. b2 > b1.
23 If h  1
(1 )  , then the human capital does not play any role in splitting the pub-
lic spending between education and retirement transfers. In other terms, it avoids the
interesting case with pension benets set to zero.
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1.5.2 Aging
Quantitatively, one of the most severe challenges concerning the intergener-
ational transfer system in developed economies regards the impact of popu-
lation aging both in demographic (n) and political () terms. Demographic
aging, which represents the quantitative component of the aging phenom-
enon, partially decreases the returns from a PAYG system in our econ-
omy characterized by endogenous human capital formation. Political aging,
which represents the qualitative component of aging phenomenon, provides
retirees with a stronger claim for pension benets even on constant demo-
graphic terms. Based on the characterization of the political equilibrium, we
now consider how aging a¤ects the policy decisions of representatives who
face electoral constraints in the form of both the size of welfare state, T , and
the amount of intergenerational transfers, E and P, where P is the pension
equilibrium policy rule. It is obtained by plugging the equilibrium policy
rules (1.19) and (1.20) into the balanced budget constraint (1.7). Focusing
on political aging the following Corollary holds:
Corollary 5 The political aging, i.e. the increase in ; has no quantita-
tive impact on the education transfers, dEd = 0, and induces increase in the
income tax rate, dTd > 0. It follows, for any level of h,
dP
d > 0.
Proof. (See appendix).
The political e¤ect is captured by a relative decrease in the political
weight for the adult, in favour of an increase in the political weight for old.
Higher levels of ideological pressure in the political debate from the elderly
cohort implies higher income tax rate. This in turn determines a larger
social security system supported by voting. Given the e¢ ciency criterion
driving the implementation of public education policy, the overall e¤ect of
political aging does not distort E .
Corollary 6 The demographic aging, i.e. the decrease in n, induces an
increase in education transfers, dEdn < 0, and has an ambiguous impact on
the income tax rate, dTdn R 0. It follows
dP
dn R 0.
Proof. (See appendix).
Departing from earlier literature that argues that social security increases
with population growth, our model predicts the scenario under which para-
metric conditions also allow for the inverse relation to appear. Specically,
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demographic aging has an ambiguous impact on the amount of pension
transfers in per-capita terms. An interesting case arises when the margin
R (1 + n) is su¢ ciently small, which in turns implies, even without consid-
ering the human capital return, the implicit return to pensions to be close
to the gross return to private saving. This scenario gives incentives in a
younger society to sustain higher pension benets due to their larger demo-
graphic return, i.e. dPdn > 0. A second illustrative case emerges when the
relative adults political weight is larger than R and h is su¢ ciently high.
In this scenario, even if population ages and, in turn, the demographic pen-
sion returns decrease, adults have incentives to depress the current level of
savings in order to compensate for the smaller number of future tax payers
with higher tax rate level tomorrow, i.e. dPdn < 0.
1.6 Benevolent Government Allocation
In Section 1:4:3 we have proved the existence of a bidimensional scal plane
when public policy choices are taken through a repeated voting system.
The politico-economic SMPE has been also characterized in closed-form as a
nite-horizon equilibrium when the time goes to innity. We now implement,
as a normative benchmark, the innite-horizon Gvt allocation under zero-
cost enforceability constraint.
As in the political game, we exclude private agentsdefault on the im-
plemented scal plane within the period. Furthermore, under balanced
budget constraint, the government platform is characterized by the vector
fgt = fegt ;  gt g, where the apex g stands for Gvt. Given the initial conditions
fh0; k0g, we dene the Gvt optimization program in sequential version, as
follows:
max
ffgt g1t=0
1X
t=0
(1 + n)t t
 
(1 + n) u
 
C1t

+ u
 
C2t

(1.21)
subject to the constraints given by Eq. (1.5) and (1.9).  is the welfare
weight that the Gvt assigns to each dynasty. Let us consider the restric-
tion  <   11+n . Di¤erently from the relative political bargaining power
of adults and old, Eq. (1.18), the innite-horizon Gvt takes account of
both the relative welfare weight of the representative agent, 
gR, and the
elderlys relative welfare weight gap between current and future pensioners,
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gO, where:

gR 
 (1 + n) (1 + )
 + (1 + n)
and 
gO 
 (1   (1 + n))
 +  (1 + n)
(1.22)
Remark 6 The more a population ages (i.e. n decreases), the smaller the
relative welfare weight of the representative agent
 

gR

, the larger is the
elderlys relative welfare weight gap
 

gO

.
As in Klein at al. (2008),24 let us rewrite the sequential Gvt program in
a recursive way to derive the Gvt Generalized Euler Equations (GEEs).25
They capture the Gvt optimal trade-o¤s between taxation and redistribution
wedges over time. Due to stationarity, we omit the time subscript, denoting
by the prime symbols next-period values. The economic rst order condi-
tion, Eq. (1.8), requires  (fg; fg0; h; h0; k0) = 0. In equilibrium, by using the
implicit function theorem, there exists a unique k0 = K (fg; fg0; h; h0) satisfy-
ing  (fg; fg0; h; h0;K ()) = 0. If the equilibrium policy rules exist, T g (h; k)
and Eg (h; k), then by using h0 = H(eg; h) we derive the recursive formula-
tion of K (), whose functional form is equal to k0 = K (fg; h). The recursive
economic rst order condition becomes  (fg; h;K (fg; h)) = 0. Derivating
the function  () with respect to its arguments we obtain Kfg =  

fg
k0
and
Kh =   hk0 , which give a measure of the variation in the amount of savings
due to a change in either policies or human capital.
After some manipulations, Eq. (1.21) can be reformulated in terms of
Bellman equation, as follows:
V g (h; k) = max
ffg ;h0;k0g

(1 + n) u
 
C1

+ u
 
C2

+ (1 + n) V g
 
h0; k0

(1.23)
24Recent studies have extended the dynamic politico-economic modelling to the innite-
horizon Gvt problem (Klein et al., 2008, and Azzimonti et al., 2009). These models
di¤er from ours in that the policy space is one-dimensional and the dynamic linkages are
not long-run persistent due to the full depreciation of the relevant-payo¤ state variables.
Departing from earlier literature, we nd analytical solutions in a multi-dimensional state
space where the equilibrium policies become non trivially dependent on fundamental asset
variables.
25The GEE is the FOC of the government maximization program. It is obtained by
deriving the Bellman equation with respect to the political control variables, fg. GEE
can be equivalently derived by using Bellmans principle to identify a Markov equilibrium
with the solution of the sequential version of the Governemt program. The Euler equation
of this sequential problem is exactly the GEE. See Appendix B for the derivation of both
Bellman equation and GEEs.
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We now provide the formal Denition of the Gvt equilibrium allocation
without commitment.
Denition 5 (Benevolent Government Allocation) A perfect foresight
SMPE of the Benevolent Government problem is dened as the sequence of
competitive economic equilibrium allocations

c1; c2; h0; k0
	
and policies fg,
such that, given the Bellman Eq. (1.23), the functional vector of di¤eren-
tiable policy decision rules, Fg = fT g; Egg, where T g : R+  R+ ! (0; 1)
and Eg : R+  R+ ! (0; e^t) are respectively the taxation policy rule,  g =
T g (h; k), and public higher education policy rule, eg = Eg (h; k), satises
the following conditions:
i:
fT g (h; k) ; Eg (h; k)g = argmax
fg ;egg

(1 + n) u
 
C1

+ u
 
C2

+(1 + n) V g
 
h0; k0

ii:
V g (h; k) =M (V g) (h; k)
where the functionalM : C1  R2! C1  R2 is dened as follows:
M (V g) (h; k) = max
fg ;egg

(1 + n) u
 
C1

+ u
 
C2

+(1 + n) V g (H;K)
The rst condition requires the political variables,  g and eg, have to
be chosen by the Gvt in order to maximize the utilitaristic social welfare,
internalizing the equilibrium private saving decision and all the direct and
indirect feedback e¤ects. The second requirement is the x point condition,
given the mappingM (V g).
In terms of wedges, the GEEs of the sequential Gvt program with re-
spect of eg and  g are as follows:
0 = e + 
e
k0
s + 
0
 0 (1.24)
0 = (1 + h) + (1 + n)

k0
s (1.25)
where   d((1+h0) 0)de . x with x 2 fs; ; eg describes the rst best wedges
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and are equal to:26
s  uC1   RuC20 savings/consumption wedge
  (1 + h) (uC2   uC1) backward redistribution wedge
e  He

 (1 + n)
H0
h0
H0
e0
uC20 + uC10

  uC2 forward redistribution wedge
The above wedges can be interpreted as potential deviations from the
e¢ cient intertemporal decisions. First consider Eq. (1.25). Due to a mar-
ginal increase in taxation,  , the intertemporal savings wedge, s, is scaled
by the reduction in household savings, K < 0. Furthermore an increase in
income tax rate determines an increase in the gap between uC2 and uC1 ,
which is captured by the intratemporal utility wedge,  . Note that, due
to full depreciation of physical capital, k00 is equal to K (f 0; h0) and it is not
a function of k0. Then a variation in the current tax rate does not a¤ect
the next-period wedges through its e¤ect on future level of physical capi-
tal. More cumbersome dynamic e¤ects emerge instead from the equilibrium
determination of public education transfers, Eq. (1.24). An increase in ed-
ucation transfers, e, makes private savings wedge scaled by the variation in
household savings, Ke < 0, which is negative due to the substitution e¤ects
with public savings that are increased via the retributive pension scheme.
The second component, e, represents the intertemporal utility variation
due to an increase in education transfers today, which a¤ects the utility of
current old and simultaneously a variation of the subsequent periods adults
and elderly utility through h0. Finally, in contrast from  , a variation in
the current level of education transfers also a¤ect next periods wedges, 0 0 ,
through its e¤ect on h0, which induces a variation of both k00 and h00.
1.6.1 The Government SMPE
To solve the Gvt optimization problem, we guess a time consistent bidimen-
sional policy, structurally equivalent to Eq. (1.19) and (1.20), which veries
26The wedges s; and e are derived as the marginal direct impact on the intertem-
poral agentsutility of a variation in individual savings, taxation/pension contributions
and education investments, respectively. The marginal variation in the income tax rate
detemines the direct cost for current adults equal to  (1 + n) (1 + h)uc1 and the direct
benets for current old equal to  (1 + n) (1 + h)uc2 . The intergenerational backward
redistribution wedge becomes then    (1 + n) (1 + h)uc2    (1 + n) (1 + h)uc1 that
normalized by (1 + n) (1 + h) is equal to   uc2   uc1 : The same characterization
holds for s and e.
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the conditions (1.24) and (1.25).27 Fixing  = 12 ; let 
Gvt be the state-
space in which interior policy rules are obtained. Then the next Proposition
characterizes the optimal feasible time-consistent policy rules.
Proposition 2 Under dynamic e¢ ciency condition, for any fh; kg 2 Gvt
the set of individual feasible rational policies, fg = f g; egg, which can be
supported by a Government SMPE with perfect foresight, has the following
functional form:
i:
Eg (h) = ag1h+ ag0 (1.26)
where ag1 = a1 and a
g
0 = a0;
ii:
T g (h; k) =  bg3
k
1 + h
+ bg2
h
1 + h
+ bg1
1
1 + h
+ bg0 (1.27)
where bg3  R
gR, bg2  
p
 
R p  (

g
O+R
p
 
gR  ), bg1  h1  RR (1+n)bg2
+ R(
gO   h (1  ) ) and bg0  
gO.
For any (h; k) =2 Gvt corner solutions result in at least one of the two
dimensions.
Proof. (See appendix).
The two equilibrium concepts described in Denition 3 and 5 lead to
the implementation of the same education program. Specically, in equilib-
rium both the Gvt and the o¢ ce-seeking politicians set the same amount
of forward transfers, inducing education-e¢ cient political scal planes, i.e.
Eg (h) = E (h) for any level of human capital. The main di¤erence concerns
their quantitative predictions on the taxation policy dimension, which are
27Although there is an innite persistent impact of the current tax rate and public
education investment, only the current and the subsequent period matter directly. Thus
the marginal costs and benets in equilibrium can be summarized by terms involving only
two consecutive periods. As a consequence, the GEEs can also be viewed as resulting
from a variational (two-periods) problem. In other words, given the state variables (h; k)
and (h00; k00) xed, let us vary (h0; k0) through the controls (;  0) and (e; e0), in order to
obtain the highest possible utility. Recalling that the SMPE in the political case has been
obtained as the limit of a nite horizon economy, whose convergence has been attained
after two periods, we conjecture no structural di¤erences between the two equilibrium
policy rules. For this reason, in the following section we use the guess of the political
equilibrium to verify the GEEs, and obtain the Gvt solution without commitment.
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fully captured by the policy parameters. In the following subsection we dis-
cuss in details how a political equilibrium divergences from the Gvt optimal
allocation.
1.6.2 Are the political choices on pensions and education
optimal?
Both the politicians and the Gvt have incentives to provide intergenera-
tional transfers. Moreover, their equilibrium policies share similar struc-
tural properties. However the quantitative di¤erences detected so far imply
distinct predictions in terms of WSRsidentication and political behavior.
We now examine how the politicians act relatively to the Gvt in terms of
scal design. In order to obtain clear predictions, we normalize the vec-
tor of welfare weights by  assigning    . Consequently we write the
relative welfare weights, Eq. (1.22), in terms of political weights, making
the two solutions comparable.28 Let us introduce the following notation  
(; n) 2  ;1 (n; n) j b2 > b1	 and g  (; n) 2  ;1 (n; n) j bg2 > bg1	,
in order to delimit the parametric space in which PCR emerges respectively
for the political and the Gvt cases. The following Corollary resumes the con-
ditions for the welfare regimescomparison between the political and Gvt
cases in the parametric space (; n).
Corollary 7 For any level of h and n 2 (n; n) the condition   g holds.
Proof. (See appendix).
The parametric space where PCR emerges is always larger in the Gvt
environment than in the political one. Furthermore, let  be a su¢ ciently
large value of the ideological bias, such that for any  < , the following
Proposition is stated.29
Proposition 3 For  <  and for any  < , the political SMPE in-
duces overtaxation with respect to the Government SMPE, i.e. T (ht; kt) >
T g (ht; kt) for any fht; ktg 2 Pol \Gvt.
Proof. (See appendix).
28After the normalization, the relative welfare weights turn out to be 
gR  (1+n)(1+)+(1+n)
and 
gO   (1+n)+(1+n) .
29See proof of Proposition 1 for the exact determination of .
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According to Proposition 3, if the Gvt adopts a politically equivalent
system of welfare weights, the level of income tax rate is always lower than
in the political case, i.e. T (ht; kt) > T g (ht; kt), for any value of human
and physical capital. We conclude that politicians involved in a Markov
game among successive generations of players deliver the Gvt allocation if
they reduce the political weight they assign to the elderly agents. Given the
invariant level of education transfers achieved by both the politicians and
the Gvt, high tax rate implies pension benets too generous. These distor-
tions come from the politiciansstrategic behavior. In determining taxation
rules, short-lived politicians take into account that future politicians will
compensate the scal cost of current adults by paying the pensions in their
old age. This stems from the fact that higher taxes on today environment
lead to a lower private wealth in old age, i.e. to a lower state variable in the
following period, thereby triggering more transfers by the future politicians.
Thus, the policy response of the future politicians reduces the current cost
of transferring resources to the elderly and leads to overspending, unless
the adults enjoy an unusually large political power. Consequently, by trans-
ferring too much resources to old age due to both the overrepresenting of
current elderly agents and the policy response of the future politicians, the
politicians fail to provide the optimal income tax rate policy.
1.7 Conclusions
In this paper we investigate the conditions for the emergence of implicit
intergenerational contracts without assuming reputation mechanisms, com-
mitment technology and altruism. We present a tractable dynamic politico-
economic model in OLG environment where political representatives com-
pete proposing multidimensional scal platforms. Both backward and for-
ward intergenerational transfers, respectively in the form of pension benets
and education investments, are simultaneously considered in an endogenous
human capital setting with income taxation when agents play Markovian
strategies. The innite horizon Gvt solution without commitment is used
as benchmark to evaluate the e¢ ciency of politically determined rules.
The dynamic mechanisms driving our results are intuitive. Social secu-
rity system sustains investment in public education, that, in turns, creates
a dynamic linkage across periods through both human and physical capital
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driving the economy towards di¤erent WSR.
We show that intergenerational contracts may be politically sustained
uniquely as long as the economy is in dynamic e¢ ciency, i.e. the rental
gross price of capital is larger than the economic growth rate. Our economic
environment is in line with empirical ndings on the dynamic e¢ ciency sta-
tus of most developed countries, especially after the demographic transition.
By endogenizing human capital formation through public education invest-
ments, backward and forward redistributive programs may optimally self-
sustain each other even in the absence of a benevolent Gvt. In equilibrium
political decisions are education e¢ cient.
Relatively to the prediction about the transition towards the steady
state, we nd three di¤erent WSR may emerge depending on both the rela-
tive political bargaining power between adults and old and the endogenous
capital asset accumulation. The emergence of di¤erent regimes leads the
economy towards di¤erent dynamic paths and persistence degrees of polit-
ically distortionary redistribution. In the regime supported by adults, the
equilibrium pension benets reach the highest feasible level.
Demographic aging increases the equilibrium per-capita level of forward
transfers, i.e. public education spending. Due to the decreasing return in
human capital accumulation aging does not always exacerbate the generous
behavior of the politicians towards the elderly. Political aging has instead
positive impact on taxation but no e¤ects on the level of public education
investments.
Finally, due to the distortions generated by the repeated political com-
petition process and to the political overrepresentation of elderly agents,
political equilibrium is characterized by overtaxation compared with the
Gvt solution.
Our analysis leaves some natural directions for future research. We have
assumed only adults and old compete in the political debate. Using the
developed methodology, a change in the voting rule, which enables also
the young to vote, would generate di¤erent equilibrium allocations both in
terms of education transfers and government size. Another direction for
future research concerns the introduction of a dynamic electoral stage by
endogenizing the probability of re-election, which would introduce a new
source of distortion.
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1.8 Technical Appendix A
Theorem (1).
As in Klein et al. (2008), our resolution strategy consists in computing
the rst order conditions starting from a time t <1 large enough and solv-
ing backward for each time t j with j = 1; 2; ::: subject to: 1) the economic
Euler condition, Eq. (1.8), 2) the balanced budget constraint, Eq. (1.7), and
3) the equilibrium policy rules of following periods. We recursively deter-
mine the conditions for the existence of xed points taking the limit for
j !1.
Suppose the economy ends at time t <1, and adults at that time have
one period temporal-horizon. Thus, the political objective function is as
follows:
Wt  (1 + n)u
 
C1t

+ u
 
C2t

where C1t  (1 + ht) (1  t) and C2t  (1 + n)Rkt + pt. At time t there are
no incentives in investing in education, i.e. et = 0. The scal dimension, t,
is determined according to the Euler condition, as follows:
uC2t
uC1t
=
1

Under logarithmic utility, the equilibrium scal policy rule at time t is t =
 R
1;t kt1+ht + 
2;t where 
1;t  1+n1+n+ and 
2;t 

1+n+ . Consequently,
the equilibrium policy rules, Ft = fTt; Etg, are equal to:
Ft :
(
Tt =  b1(0) kt1+ht + b0(0)
Et = 0
(1A)
where b1(0)  R
1;t and b0(0)  
2;t: The number in the brackets represents
the number of iterations.
Next we consider period t  1, in which adults born at time t  2 live up
three periods. The political objective function is as follows:
Wt 1  (1 + n)
 
u
 
C1t 1

+ u
 
C2t

+ u
 
C2t 1

(2A)
where C1t 1  (1 + ht 1) (1  t 1)  (1 + n) kt and C2t 1  (1 + n)Rkt 1 +
pt 1. After plugging the equilibrium policy rules of period t, Eq. (1A),
into Eq. (2A), we maximize with respect to ft 1 = ft 1; et 1g. Applying
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envelope theorem, we get the following system of Euler equations:8><>:
u
C2t 1
u
C1t 1
= 1++(+1+n)
u
C2t 1
u
C1t 1
= 1R

1+
+(+1+n)

dht
det 1
(3A)
Equating the two conditions in (3A), we get the necessary condition for the
determination of the equilibrium level of et 1, i.e. dhtdet 1 = R: Recalling that
ht =

ht 1+(1 )h
1+n

e1 t 1 and plugging
dht
det 1 into the equilibrium condition,
we derive the equilibrium public education transfers at time t   1: Let us
denote  (1) 
 
1 
R
 1
 and (1) =
1+n
R . The equilibrium policy rules are
equal to:
Ft 1 :
(
Tt 1 =  b4(1) kt 11+ht 1 + b3(1)
ht 1
1+ht 1 + b2(1)
h
1+ht 1 + b1(1)
1
1+ht 1 + b0(1)
Et 1 = a1(1)ht 1 + a0(1)
(4A)
where a0(1)  (1 )
h
1+n  (1), a1(1)  1+n (1) and b0(1)  
2;t 1, b1(1) 
(1)
2;t 1, b2(1)  (1  ) 
1;t 1 (1), b3(1)  


1;t 1 + 1(1 )
2;t 1

 (1)
and b4(1)  R
1;t 1. 
2;t 1  
2  +(1+n)(1+) and 
1;t 1  
1 
(1+n)(1+)
+(1+n)(1+) are the indexes of the relative olds and adultspolitical power
in an economy that lasts more than one period, respectively.
Finally let us consider time t   2. At this point, all the direct dynamic
feedbacks are internalized. The political objective function is equivalent to
Eq. (2A). The recursive problem is now subject to the equilibrium policy
rules of the next two periods, (1A) and (4A). Maximizing the political
objective function with respect to ft 2 = ft 2; et 2g the system of Euler
conditions are:8>><>>:
u
C2t 2
u
C1t 2
= 1+(1+n)
u
C2t 2
u
C1t 2
= 1R(+(1+n))

1 + 1 
 
1 
R
 1


dht 1
det 2
(5A)
Let us now denote with  (2) 


R
 
1 
R
 1
 + 1 R
 1

and (2)  1+nR + 
1+n
R
2
. Furthermore, let us introduce the following notation g(2)  1+nR  (1)+
 (2). As before, solving the system (5A) we yield the following pair of equi-
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librium policy rules at time t  2:
Ft 2 :
(
Tt 2 =  b4(2) kt 11+ht 1 + b3(2)
ht 1
1+ht 1 + b2(2)
h
1+ht 1 + b1(2)
1
1+ht 1 + b0(2)
Et 2 = a1(2)ht 1 + a0(2)
where b0(2)  b0(1), b1(2)  (2)
2, b2(2)  (1  )


1+
1
1 
2

 (2)+

1 
2g(2)

,
b3(2)   (2)(
1 + 11 
2), b4(2)  b4(1) and a0(2)  (1 )
h
1+n  (2), a1(2) 

1+n (2). It is straightforward to show that  (2) can be derived as a di¤er-
entiable monotonic transformation of  (1), i.e. m (). It is characterized by
m (0) > 0,m > 0, andm  > 0. In particularm
 
 (1)

=
 

R  (1) +
1 
R
 1
 .
The argument can be repeated for each time j > 0 such that:
 (j+1) = m
 
 (j)

(6A)
Furthermore for each j the following series can be derived:
(j) 
jX
l=1

1 + n
R
l
and g(j) 

1 + n
R
j 1
 (1)+

1 + n
R
j 2
 (2)+:::+ (j)
Using the above notation, starting from t   3 we can nally derive the
recursive structure which characterizes the political problem:
Ft j :
(
Tt j =  b4(j) kt j1+ht j + b3(j)
ht j
1+ht j + b2(j)
h
1+ht j + b1(j)
1
1+ht j + b0(j)
Et j = a1(j)ht j + a0(j)
(7A)
where a0(j)  (1 )
h
1+n  (j), a1(j)  1+n (j) and b0(j)  b0(1), b1(j)  (j)
2,
b2(j)  (1  ) ((
1+ 11 
2) (j)+ 1 
2g(j)), b3(j)   (j)


1 +
1
(1 )
2

,
b4(j)  b4(1).
If a political SMPE exists, then the limits for j !1 of the set of time-
variant parameters

a0(j); a1(j); b0(j); b1(j); b2(j); b3(j); b4(j)
	
exist and are -
nite. The determination of the xed points for the two stationary policy rules
crucially depends on the existence of the xed point of the policy e and, in
nal instance, on the determination of the limit for  (j). Thus, we start with
the redistributive policy dimension. The computation consists in solving the
non-linear di¤erence equation (6A). The lim
j!1
 (j) is equivalent to the so-
lution(s), if any, of such di¤erence equation given  0 as initial condition.
Let us denote with  ^j the value of  j such that

dm( j)
d j

 j= ^j
= 1. We
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yield respectively zero, one or two xed points as solution of the di¤erence
equation i¤m

 ^j

R  ^j . Thus,  ^j is equal to:
 ^j =
1


R

 1
1 
  1  

(8A)
Note thatR >  in all the parametersspace. Such condition guarantees
the existence of at least one stable xed point. For analytical tractability we
determine the solutions for quadratic form case. Under the condition (8A)
for  = 12 the two xed points are:
 1;2 =
1


2R


R
p
R2   

  1

We focus on the stable equilibrium, denoted by   = 1

2R


R pR2   

  1

and we take  0 =   as initial condition. The solution of the di¤erence equa-
tion (6A) is represented in Figure 7.
Fig. 7:  (j+1)=m[ (j)]
Under the condition R > (1 + n) the lim
j!1
(j) <1 is equal to 1+nR (1+n) 
R. Consequently, the lim
j!1
g(j) = lim
j!1
 
Pj
l=1
 
1+n
R
l
< 1 is equal to
R


2R


R pR2   

  1

. Under such convergence conditions the xed
points are nally attained. Rearranging the terms we reformulate the indi-
vidual rational scal and redistribution policies as follows:
T (ht; kt) =  b3 kt
1 + ht
+ b2
ht
1 + ht
+ b1
1
1 + ht
+ b0
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where b0  
2, b1  h (1  ) 
 

1 +
 
2 + R


2

+ R
2, b2    (
1 + 2
2)
and b3  R
1;
E (ht) = a1ht + a0
where a0  1 1+nh  and a1  1+n .
We denote (Kt ;H

t ) = f(kt; ht) jkt < kt < k^tg where k^t  b2+b0b3 ht+ b1+b0b3
and kt(ht)  b2+b0 1b3 ht + b1+b0 1b3 . While
Het =
(
fhtjht 2 (0;1)g
fhtjht 2 (~h;1)g
if h < 1(1 ) 
if h  1(1 ) 
where ~h  1 h(1 )   1 . Jointly considering the above feasibility conditions
for both scal and redistributive dimensions, non-degenerate policies, i.e.
t 2 (0; 1) and et 2 (0; e^t), are achieved at each time for any (kt; ht) 2
Pol  (Kt ;Ht ) \Het .
Lemma (1). Let us rst consider the transition dynamics of ht and et.
Plugging the equilibrium education transfers, Eq. (1.19), into the human
capital production, Eq. (2.4), we obtain the law of motion ht+1 = Hd (ht),
which is equal to:
ht+1 = 1ht + 0 (9A)
where 0  (1 )h1+n
p
  and 1  1+n
p
 . Since 1 > 0, the serial correla-
tion between current and future level of human capital is always positive. To
determine the law of motion of the redistributive policy we plug Eq. (2.4)
into the equilibrium education policy rule at time t+ 1. The law of motion
et+1 = E
d (ht) is as follows:
et+1 = 1ht + 0 (10A)
where 0  a0

a1p
  + 1

and 1  a
2
1p
  . If the dynamics of ht is charac-
terized by stable convergence, i.e. 1 < 1, then also the dynamics of et
converge toward the steady state. Thus, using the expression of 1, the
su¢ cient condition for the convergence stability of both ht and et requires:
n > n (11A)
where n 
r
2R

R pR2   

     1. Due to linearity, both ht and et
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converge monotonically toward the steady states.
Let us now analyze the transition dynamics of kt and t. First, con-
sider the following recursive formulation for the equilibrium saving under
log-utility, kt+1 = K (et; t; ht), which is obtained plugging the human cap-
ital production, Eq. (2.4), and the expected equilibrium policies et+1 and
t+1 according to Eq. (1.19) and (1.20). The saving function can then be
rewritten as follows:
kt+1=
R (1 + ht) (1   t)
(R (1 + ) b3) (1 + n) 
(b0+b2  (1 + n) a1)H (et; ht)+ (b0+b1  (1 + n) a0)
R (1 + ) b3
(12A)
Plugging the equilibrium policy rules, Eq. (1.19) and Eq. (1.20), into Eq.
(12A), we obtain the law of motion kt+1 = Kd (ht; kt):
kt+1 = 2kt + 1ht + 0 (13A)
where:
2 Rb3
(1 + n) (R (1 + ) b3)
1 

(b0+b2 a1 (1 + n))1
(R (1 + ) b3) +
R (b0+b2 1)
(1 + n) (R (1 + ) b3)

0 

b0+b1 a0 (1 + n)
(R (1 + ) b3) +
(b0+b2 a1 (1 + n))0
(R (1 + ) b3) +
R (b0+b1 1)
(1 + n) (R (1 + ) b3)

It should be noted that current and future level of physical capital are pos-
itively interrelated each other, 2 > 0, on the contrary the way ht perturbs
kt+1 depends on the WSRs intensity embedded in 1.
Under condition (11A), the dynamics of physical capital is characterized
by stable convergence if 2 < 1, which requires:
 >  (14A)
where    (R  (1 + n)). Let us denote by Qht  1+ht1+ht+1 . Plugging Eq.
(9A) and (12A) into the equilibrium income tax policy at time t + 1, af-
ter some manipulations, we attain the law of motion t+1 = T d (t; ht), as
follows:
t+1 =  (ht) t +  (ht) (15A)
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where:
 (ht) Rb3
(1 + n) (R (1 + )  b3)Q
h
t
 (ht)R (1 + ) (1 + n) (b1 b2)+ (1 + n)
2 (a1 a0) b3
(R (1 + )  b3) (1 + n)
1
1 + 1ht+0
  Rb3
(R (1 + )  b3) (1 + n)
1 + ht
1 + 1ht+0
+
R (1 + ) (b0+b2)  (1 + n) b3a1
R (1 + ) b3
Note that, under Eq. (11A), the convergence condition for kt, Eq. (14A),
is also su¢ cient for the convergence of t, i.e.  (h) < 1. Furthermore the
speed of convergence for t basically depends on the WSR characterizing the
economy jointly with the exogenous human capital society endowment. To
show how such elements may a¤ect the type of convergence let us take the
derivative of   (ht) with respect to the human capital asset. We obtain:
d (ht)
dht
=
 b3

R (1+0   1)+ (1 + n)2  (a1 a0)

 R (1 + ) (1 + n) (b1 b2)1
(1 + n) (R (1 + )  b3) (1 + 1ht+0)2
It is straightforward to show how the sign of d(ht)dht crucially depends on the
di¤erences (a1 a0) and (b1 b2) and in nal instance on h, and on the rela-
tive political power weights of adults and old embedded in the coe¢ cients b1
and b2. When
d(ht)
dht
R

S

0 and 0 S
 
R

 then the speed of convergence
toward the steady state is lower (higher) than in the opposite case.
Fig. 8: Panel (a) shows the law of motion of et; Panel (b) shows the law of motion of t
From a qualitative point of view the dynamics of et and t are mirror
image respectively to the dynamics of ht and kt. They mainly di¤er from an
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autoregressive component of innite order in the past level of public educa-
tion, which arises because of the innite persistence of education spending on
the future level of human capital through the parental transmission. Figure
8 emphasizes the dynamics of the political variables. Panel (a) shows that,
once the human capital converges to the steady state also the education
policy reaches its balanced growth path. Di¤erently, Panel (b) highlights
how the convergence condition of ht is necessary but not su¢ cient for the
stable convergence of the scal policy rule, which also requires the dynamic
stability of kt.
Proposition (1). Under Lemma 1, due to linearity of the laws of mo-
tion, Eq. (9A) ; (10A) ; (13A) and (15A), there exists a unique steady state
fe; ; h; kg. Equating ht+1 = ht = h in Eq. (9A) and kt+1 = kt = k
in Eq. (13A) ; the following steady state levels for the state variables are
obtained:
h =
(1  ) hp 
(1 + n)  p  (16A)
and
k=
R (b0+b2 1)+ (1 + n) (b0+b2  (1 + n) a1)1
b3 ((1 + n)+R) R (1 + ) (1 + n) h
 (17A)
+
((1 + n) (1 + 0)+R) b0+((1 + n)+R) b1+(1 + n) b20  (1 + n)2 (a10+a0) R
b3 ((1 + n)+R) R (1 + ) (1 + n)
Plugging Eq. (16A) and (17A) into the equilibrium policy rules described in
Theorem 1, we obtain the following the steady states levels for the political
control variables:
e =
(1  ) h 
(1 + n)  p 
and
= (1 + n) (R (1 + ) (b1 b2)+ (1 + n) (a1 a0) b3)
b3 ((1 + n)+R) R (1 + ) (1 + n)
1
1 + h
+
Rb3
b3 ((1 + n)+R) R (1 + ) (1 + n)
 (1 + n) (R (1 + ) (b0+b2)  (1 + n) b3a1)
b3 ((1 + n)+R) R (1 + ) (1 + n)
46 Chapter 1
By balanced budget constraint the pension steady state level is:
p = (1 + n) (1 + h)    (1 + n)2 e
Corollary (1). The result comes directly from the proof of Theorem 1.
Corollary (2). The Proof is straightforward. The derivative of Eq. (1.20)
with respect to ht is equal to:
dt
dht
=
b3kt + b2   b1
(1 + ht)
2 (18A)
For any level of kt; if b1 6 b2, then dtdht > 0. Otherwise, if b1 > b2, then the
sign of Eq. (18A) depends on the value reached by kt. When kt < ~k where
~k  b1 b2b3 the income tax rate is a decreasing function of ht, i.e. dtdht < 0.
The opposite holds for kt > ~k.
Corollary (3). Given the balanced budget constraint (1.7), let us denote
with P (ht; kt)  (1 + n) (1 + ht) T (ht; kt)   (1 + n)2 E (ht) the equilibrium
pension policy rule. Under the decreasing return in education and the equi-
librium level of policy rules, Eq. (1.20) and Eq. (1.19), the total amount of
pension contributions can be rewritten as follows:
pt+1 = P (ht+1; kt+1) (19A)
 (1 + n) ( b3kt+1 + (b2 + b0   (1 + n) a1)ht+1 + (b1 + b0   (1 + n) a0))
The derivative of (19A) with respect to et is equal to:
dpt+1
det
= (1 + n)

 b3dkt+1
det
+ (b2 + b0   (1 + n) a1) dht+1
det

(20A)
where under log utility dkt+1det =  
(b2+b0 a1(1+n))
R(1+)
dht+1
det
. After some algebra,
the derivative (20A) is as follows:
dpt+1
det
=
R (1 + ) (1 + n) (b2 + b0   a1 (1 + n))
R (1 + )  b3
dht+1
det
(21A)
Noting that (b2 + b0   a1 (1 + n)) > 0 and R (1 + )   b3 > 0, Eq. (21A)
takes always positive values for any Welfare Regime and in the whole state
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space.
Corollary (4). Let us denote with  = b2+b0b1+b0 a measure of the Welfare
State Regimesintensity. Then the higher the adultsrelative power is, the
larger is the value of . Normalizing the Eq. (19A) by the factor (b1 + b0),
we obtain:
pt = (1 + n)
h
 b3kt + (  (1 + n)a1)ht + (1  (1 + n)a0)
i
(22A)
where pt  ptb1+b0 , b3  b3b1+b0 , a0  a0b1+b0 and a1  a1b1+b0 . Taking the
derivatives of Eq. (22A) with respect to  and kt, the marginal impacts
dpt
d = (1 + n)ht > 0 and
dpt
dkt
=   (1 + n)b3 < 0 are attained. In other
words, the higher the level of  and the lower the level of physical capital
are, the larger is the amount of pension benets.
Corollary (5). The equilibrium education transfer chosen by politicians is
the linear policy rule E (ht) = a1ht + a0; with a1 and a0 dened in Theo-
rem 1. Political population aging, an increase in , does not a¤ect at all
the amount of equilibrium forward transfers, then dEd = 0. The equilibrium
level of income tax rate is instead a linear function of kt and non linear
in ht, T (kt; ht) =  b3 kt1+ht + b2 ht1+ht + b1 11+ht + b0, where the coe¢ cients
are fully described in Proposition 2. A variation in the exogenous political
ideological bias  determines the following marginal changes in the struc-
tural parameters: db3d =   R(1+n)(1+)(+(1+n)(1+))2 < 0,
db2
d =
 (1+n)(1+)
(+(1+n)(1+))2
> 0,
db1
d =
(1+n)(1+)(1+n+(1 ) hR)
(R (1+n))(+(1+n)(1+))2 > 0 and
db0
d =
(1+n)(1+)
(+(1+n)(1+))2
> 0. Then,
for any level of h dTd > 0, which implies positive correlation between the pen-
sion benets and the ideological bias in favor of old agents. Finally, using the
above results, the derivative of pensions transfers obtained by balanced bud-
get constraint, P (ht; kt) = (1 + n) ((1 + ht) T (ht; kt)  (1 + n) E (ht)), with
respect to the political aging parameter is dPd = (1 + n)

(1 + ht)
dT
d

> 0.
Corollary (6). To determine the e¤ect of demographic population aging
on the level of education transfers chosen by politicians, i.e. a decrease in
n, note that da1dn =   (1+n)2  < 0 and
da0
dn =   1 (1+n)2 h  < 0. Then it
follows dEdn < 0. Concerning the impact of n on the political equilibrium
level of income tax rate the following marginal changes in the structural
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parameters hold: db3dn =
+R(1+)
(+(1+n)(1+))2
> 0, db2dn =    
(1+)
(+(1+n)(1+))2
< 0,
db1
dn = D0 + D1D2 R 0, where D0  (R (1+n))(+(1+)(1+n)) > 0, D1 
(1+n+h (1 )R)
(R (1+n))(+(1+)(1+n)) > 0 andD2 

1
R (1+n)   1++(1+)(1+n)

= 11+n
 
R  
A

R
0 if R R 
A, nally db0dn =   (1+)(+(1+n)(1+))2 < 0. Then it follows that
dT
dn R 0
depending on the di¤erence
 
R  
A

and on the level of h. In particular a
su¢ cient condition to yield dTdn < 0 is R < 
A and h high enough. Finally
the marginal variation of pension benets due to population growth is equal
to dPdn = (1 + n) ((1 + ht)
dT
dn   (1 + n) dEdn) R 0.
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1.9 Technical Appendix B
1.9.1 Derivation of Generalized Euler Equation
We derive the recursive formulation of the Gvt program starting from its
sequential version:
V g0 (h0; k0) = maxffct ;ht+1;kt+1g1t=0
1X
t=0
(1 + n)t tU (fgt ; ht; kt; kt+1)
where (h0; k0) are the initial conditions of the payo¤-relevant state variables
of the dynamic optimization program and U (fgt ; ht; kt; kt+1)  (1 + n) u(C1t ( gt ; ht; kt+1))+
u
 
C2t (f
g
t ; ht; kt)

. Equivalently we rewrite the above value function in the
following terms:
V g0 (h0; k0) = maxffg0 ;k1g
U (fg0 ; h0; k0; k1)+(1 + n)  maxffgt ;ht+1;kt+1g1t=1
1X
t=0
(1 + n)t tU(fgt ; ht; kt; kt+1)
(1B)
By denition, we have:
V g1 (h1; k1) = maxffgt ;ht+1;kt+1g1t=1
1X
t=0
(1 + n)t tU (fgt ; ht; kt; kt+1) (2B)
Due to stationarity condition, the indirect utility function satises V g0 () 
V g1 ()  :::  V gt (). We omit time indexes and denote by prime symbol next
period variables. Plugging Eq. (2B) into Eq. (1B) we yield the following
Bellman equation:
V g (h; k) = max
ffg ;h0;k0g
U
 
fg; h; k; k0

+ (1 + n) V g
 
h0; k0

subject to the constraints k0 = K (fg; h) and h0 = H (eg; h). We rewrite the
Bellman equation as follows:
V g (h; k) = max
fg
U (fg; h; k;K (fg; h)) + (1 + n) V g (H (eg; h) ;K (fg; h))
(3B)
The GEE are obtained as the FOC of the Gvt optimization plan. The
derivation follows the method proposed by Klein et al. (2008) and it is
extended to OLG case with two political controls in bidimensional state-
space. For simplicity of notation we will omit the apex g. The political rst
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order conditions of Eq. (3B) with respect to f = fe; g are equal to:
0 = Ue + Uk0Ke + (1 + n)  (Vh0He + Vk0Ke) (4B)
0 = U + Uk0K + (1 + n) Vk0K (5B)
Using Benveniste-Scheinkman formula we obtain the following expression
for Vh and Vk:
Vh = Uh + Uk0Kh + (1 + n)  (Vh0Hh + Vk0Kh) (6B)
Vk = Uk (7B)
From Eq. (4B) and (5B) we obtain the expression for Vh0 and Vk0 :
Vh0 =
1
(1 + n) He

UKe   UeK
~K

(8B)
Vk0 =  U + Uk
0K
(1 + n) K (9B)
Plugging Eq. (8B) and (9B) into (6B) we get the nal expression for Vh:
Vh = Uh +
UKe   UeK
K
Hh
He
  U KhK (10B)
Using stationarity condition and plugging Eq. (7B) and (10B) into (4B) and
(5B), we obtain the GEEs of the Gvt problem respectively for e and  :
0 = Ue + Uk0Ke + (1 + n) 

U 0h0 +
U 0 0K0e0   U 0e0K0 0
K0 0
H 0h0
H 0e0
  U 0 0
K0h0
K0 0

He + U
0
k0Ke

(11B)
0 = U +
 
Uk0 + (1 + n) U
0
k0
K (12B)
From denition of U , we have: Ue =   (1 + n)2 uC2 , U = (1 + n) (1 + h) (uC2 
uC1), Uh = (1 + n) (uC2 +  (1  )uC1), Uk = R (1 + n)uC2 and
Uk0 =   (1 + n)2 uC1 . Using the above partial derivatives and rewriting
Ki where i 2 (fg; h) in terms of  (), we get the GEEs as a weighted
combination of intergenerational wedges:
0 = e + 
e
k0
s + 
0
 0
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0 = (1 + h) + (1 + n)

k0
s
where   He

 0 + (1 + h0)
K0
e0
K0
 0
H0
h0
H0
e0
  K
0
h0
K0
 0

= d((1+h
0) 0)
de and the rst
best wedges x with x 2 fs; ; eg are dened as   uC2   uC1 , s 
uC1   RuC02 and e  He

 (1 + n)
H0
h0
H0
e0
uC02 + uC01

  uC2 .
Proposition (2). Let us guess as equilibrium policy functions for the
Benevolent Government solution the following functional form for e and
 , respectively:
eg = ag1h+ a
g
0
h (13B)
 g = bg3
k
1 + h
+ bg2
h
1 + h
+ bg1
1
1 + h
+ bg0 (14B)
If Eq. (13B) and (14B) are the equilibrium of the Gvt problem, then they
must satisfy simultaneously the GEEs given by conditions (11B) and (12B).
Let us manipulate theGEEs, plugging the expressions for each partial deriv-
ative. We obtain for  and e, respectively:
0 =  uC2 + 
0BBB@
( 0uC20 +  (1   0)uC10)
+ (1 + h0) (uC20   uC10)
K0
e0
K0
 0
H0
h0
H0
e0
  K
0
h0
K0
 0

+(1 + n)uC20
H0
h0
H0
e0
1CCCAHe (15B)
0 = uC2   uC1 (16B)
Using the equation of H (), the following expressions result:
He =
h+ (1  )h
2(1 + n)h0
H 0h0
H 0e0
=
e0
h0 + (1  )h (17B)
Under logarithmic utility and linear production function, plugging the guess
given by Eq. (13B) and (14B) into the saving function, we obtain the fol-
lowing recursive function for saving choice:
k0 = K (e; ; h) = R
(1 + n) (bg3 +R (1 + ))
(1 + h) (1  ) (18B)
  b
g
2 + b
g
0   (1 + n) ag1
bg3 +R (1 + )
s 
h+ (1  ) h e
1 + n
  b
g
1 + b
g
0   (1 + n) ag0h
bg3 +R (1 + )
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Using Eq. (17B) and (18B) and simplifying, we get
K0
e0
K0
 0
H0
h0
H0
e0
  K
0
h0
K0
 0
= 1 
0
1+h0 .
Finally rearranging all the terms, Eq. (15B) becomes as follows:
0 =  uC2 + 

1 + (1 + n)
e0
h0 + (1  )h

uC20He (19B)
Using the political Euler condition uC2   uC1 = 0 and the economic one
uC1  RuC20 = 0, Eq. (19B) simplies to:
1 =

1 + (1 + n)
e0
h0 + (1  )h

1
R
He (20B)
Eq. (20B) is equivalent to:
e =

1 + (1 + n)
e0
h0 + (1  )h

1
2R
2 h+ (1  )h
1 + n
(21B)
Let us now make a further assumption on the guess on e, considering the
following variant of Eq. (13B):
eg = ag1 ( 
g)h+ ag0 ( 
g) h (22B)
such that ag1 ( 
g) = 1+n 
g and ag0 ( 
g) = 1 1+n 
g, i.e. we guess the policy
e as a linear convex combination between parental human capital h and
human capital society endowment h scaled by a constant which has to be
determined,  g. Then Eq. (21B) can be rewritten as follows:
eg =

1 + n
~ gh+
1  
1 + n
~ gh
where ~ g 

1 + (1 + n) e
0
h0+(1 )h

1
2R
2
. Plugging the guess of eg given
by Eq. (22B) into the expression of ~ g and simplifying we get:
~ g = (1 +  g)2

1
2R
2
By xed-point condition ~ g =  g which yield the following solutions  g1;2 =
1


2R


RpR2   

  1

. Similar arguments as in Proof of Theorem 1
can be made. Then let us consider the stable root   = 1

2R


R pR2   

  1

as feasible solution. It immediately follows that ag1 =

1+n 
 and ag0 =
1 
1+n 

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are the solutions for the guess on e which turns out to be equivalent to the
political outcome After plugging the guesses, Eq. (13B) and Eq. (14B), and
the recursive saving function, Eq. (18B), into Eq. (16B), the GEE for the
policy  is as follows:

1
(1 + n)Rk + (1 + n)(1 + h)   (1 + n)2eg = 
1
(1 + h)(1  )  (1 + n) ~K (eg; ; h)
After some algebraic manipulations we obtain the following well-dened sys-
tem:8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
bg0 =
(R+bg3)
R(+(1+n)(1+))+(+(1+n))bg3
bg1 =
(1+n)(bg0+b
g
1 (1 )h ) (1 )h
p
 ( (bg0+bg2) (1+n)(R(1+)+bg3)
p
 + )
(1+h)(R(+(1+n)(1+))+(+(1+n))bg3)
bg2 =
h
p
 ((bg0+b
g
2)+(1+n)(R(1+)+b
g
3)
p
   )
R(+(1+n)(1+))+(+(1+n))bg3
bg3 =  
R(1+n)(R(1+)+bg3)
R(+(1+n)(1+))+(+(1+n))bg3
Solving the system we obtain the following two solutions for  :
 g1 = bg13
k
1 + h
+ bg12
h
1 + h
+ bg11
1
1 + h
+ bg10 (23B)
where, under 
gR  (1+n)(1+)+(1+n) and 
gO  (1 (1+n))+(1+n) :
bg11 =
h1 
R
R (1+n)2 + R
 

gO   h (1  ) 

;
bg12 =

p
 
R p  (

g
O +R
p
 
gR   
p
 );
bg13 =  R
gR;
bg10 = 

g
O;
and
 g2 = bg23
k
1 + h
+ bg22
h
1 + h
+ bg21
1
1 + h
+ bg20 (24B)
where bg23 =  R, bg11 = (1  ) h, bg12 =   and bg10 = 0.
Note that the Eq. (23B) is equivalent to Eq. (24B) under the condition

gR = 1 and 

g
O = 0, which implies  =
1
1+n . Recall that, for the existence of
the x point, the condition  < 11+n , which induces 

g
O to be strictly greater
than zero, is required. Consequently the Eq. (24B) is not feasible.
Proposition (3). Let us rst consider the following normalization of the
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relative Welfare weights, Eq. (1.22), after assigning    :

gR 
(1 + n) (1 + )
+ (1 + n)
and 
gO 
   (1 + n)
+(1 + n)
(25B)
Using the weights (25B) and comparing the parameters of the policy rules
of Eq. (1.20) and Eq. (1.27) we obtain for any  <  where:
  1
2
0@  1  n
 
q
(1+n)2( 1+2Rp   )( (1+2)2+2R(1+2(1+))p   )
 1+2Rp   
1A
the following inequalities must hold:
bg0 < b0; b
g
1 < b1; b
g
2 < b2; b
g
3 > b3
Then we conclude T (ht; kt) > T g (ht; kt) for any fht; ktg 2 Pol \Gvt.
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Chapter 2
Politicians, Redistribution
and Intergenerational
Conicts
2.1 Introduction
Decentralized overlapping generations economies populated by selsh agents
typically feature dynamically ine¢ cient asset accumulation paths. When
credit markets are incomplete and human capital is the main engine of
growth, two di¤erent sources of ine¢ ciencies simultaneously arise. On one
hand, young are precluded from borrowing money in order to acquire skills
and, in turns, increase future labor productivity. As a consequence, educa-
tional investments tend to be ine¢ ciently low, inducing underaccumulation
of human capital. On the other hand, adults are restricted from lending
money, having a limited investment portfolio. As a result, they tend to
overaccumulate physical capital, depressing future return to capital. In this
scenario, there is room to investigate the existence of intergenerational in-
stitutions, which might improve the welfare of all generations. Previous
literature (Boldrin and Montes, 2005; Docquier et al., 2007) has adopted a
normative perspective to determine the scal scheme, which allows the de-
centralized economy to reach the e¢ cient allocation.1
1Boldrin and Montes (2005) show how an interconnected pension and public education
system can replicate the allocation achieved by complete market. The authors formalize
public education and PAYG system as two parts of an intergenerational contract where
public pension is the return on the investment into the human capital of the next genera-
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We depart from the previous theoretical contributions by adopting a
positive perspective. Specically, we analyze how voting institutions and
intergenerational conicts over the implementation of redistributive policies
a¤ect dynamic e¢ ciency and welfare. A workhorse of past literature in po-
litical economy (Alesina and Tabellini, 1990; Barro, 1991; Azzimonti, 2011)
concerns the study of how political disagreement and uncertainty depress
growth and reduce welfare when intra-cohort heterogeneity is explicitly con-
sidered. When di¤erent groups disagree over the composition of public
expenditure and parties alternate in power via democratic process, gov-
ernments tend to be endogenously short-sighted. Due to political uncer-
tainty, the economy experiences under-investment of productive assets and,
in turns, loss in e¢ ciency.2
Our perspective is opposite to the one stated above. When inter-cohort
heterogeneity is explicitly considered and human capital accumulation is the
main force driving the economic growth, intergenerational conicts over the
redistribution of public resources may enhance e¢ ciency and improve wel-
fare. Although the preferences of younger agents to sustain productive pub-
lic spending are growth promoting, nonetheless the public education trans-
fers crowds-out private consumption. As a result, the education spending
maximizing welfare turns out to be smaller than that maximizing growth.
Consequently, welfare improvements are achievable by reallocating a share of
government spending from public educational to pork-barrel transfers. This
simple idea helps to justify why the existence of institutions, which rein-
force intergenerational political disagreement and uncertainty, may enhance
to achieve self-enforcing politico-economic equilibria closer to the social op-
timal allocation.
To support the positive relation between intergenerational conicts and
tion. In presence of credit market constraint, the welfare state is justied by the inability
of decentralized markets to deliver a Pareto e¢ cient solution. Relaxing the denition of
optimality by explicitly considering the positive externality generated by educational in-
vestments, Docquier et al. (2007) show that no justications to provide public pension
benets emerge, when the dynastic welfare weight is su¢ ciently high. For realistic val-
ues of discount rates, the achievement of e¢ cient allocation is guaranteed by taxing the
retirees in order to provide educational subsidy.
2The negative correlation between political instability and private investment has
been widely investigated both theoretically (Alesina and Tabellini, 1990) and empirically
(Barro, 1991). Azzimonti (2011) extends the previous studies in a dynamic electoral com-
petition framework. Ruling out commitment devices, the author gives further theoretical
support to the understanding of how political stability mitigates the e¤ects of polarization
dampening the ine¢ ciencies.
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e¢ ciency, we present a tractable dynamic politico-economic model in a neo-
classical environment. Focusing on a three period OLG economy with en-
dogenous growth generated by human capital accumulation, we determine
the subgame Markov perfect equilibrium of a dynamic game characterized
by both ideological heterogeneous voters and o¢ ce-seeking political parties.
Only adult and elderly have voting power. The electoral competition takes
place in a majoritarian probabilistic environment, where political parties
compete proposing multidimensional scal platforms, in order to maximize
the probability of winning election.3
Three main sources of distortions characterize the theoretical environ-
ment: Incomplete credit markets and physical capital taxation (economic
distortion), and political uncertainty (political distortion). In order to bet-
ter perform the analysis and provide clear theoretical insights, we distinguish
two cases.
The rst scenario is characterized by neither capital taxation nor politi-
cal distortions. Consequently, the only source of ine¢ ciency comes from the
credit market constraint. In equilibrium the presence of swing voters deter-
mines the emergence of intergenerational conicts over the redistribution of
public resources. The ratio of the idiosyncratic ideological densities between
the two cohorts of voters represents a simple quantitative measurement of
the political disagreement. The median voter framework where adults are
the decisive voter can be considered as an extreme benchmark case with
no intergenerational political disagreement. In equilibrium the politicians
implement a multidimensional platform characterized by: i) negative trans-
fers from the elderly, ii) positive transfers to subsidize the consumption of
adults, and iii) high investment in public education. Di¤erently from the
previous literature (Azariadis and Galasso, 2002; Forni, 2005), which stud-
ies how intergenerational transfers might be sustained in a median voter
framework with exogenous growth, here the relevant state variable of the
economy is the total return to capital, which is a¤ected by both human
and physical capital. Adults have incentives to invest in the education of
young in order to accumulate human capital and, in turns, increase the fu-
ture return to capital. At the same time the incentives to transfer public
3According to Persson and Tabellini (2000), we adopt an opportunistic models of elec-
toral competition, where politicians extract rent from being in power in order to maximize
the probability of winning elections. While this approach dates back to the 1970s, its
resurgence in popularity stems from Lindbeck and Weibull (1987).
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resource backward (i.e. pension benets in the form of PAYGO system) do
not arise. Adults perfectly anticipate that when old they are prevented to
grab public resources by exerting political power. As a consequence, in equi-
librium public education investment is nanced by taxes paid by the elderly.
Because of the resulting overaccumulation of both physical and human cap-
ital the economy turns out to be still characterized by dynamic ine¢ ciency.
In presence of ideological uncertainty, as soon as swing voters on behalf
of the elderly emerge, the equilibrium political platform reverses, turning
out to be characterized by: i) positive transfers to the elderly, ii) negative
transfers from the adult, and iii) lower investment in public education. The
participation of the elderly to the political debate with the emergence of
political disagreement on the redistribution of public resources improves the
overall economic e¢ ciency. The elderly claim for positive transfers induces
a simultaneous reduction in both physical and human capital accumulation,
partially o¤setting the dynamic ine¢ ciency.
The second scenario concerns the analyses of the politico-economic equi-
librium when both economic and political distortions are explicitly intro-
duced. Public expenditures are nanced through both labor and capital
income tax. In absence of commitment technology, the distortionary taxa-
tion adds an additional source of ine¢ ciency with respect to the previous
analyses.4 Furthermore, forward-looking politicians, who compete ideologi-
cally, might strategically manipulate their probability to win future election
by implementing the current scal platform. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the rst study, which analyzes in a dynamic framework how the in-
troduction of political distortions may a¤ect the equilibrium outcome.5 We
characterize the time-consistent Markov perfect politico-economic equilib-
rium in terms of Generalized Euler Conditions (GEEs). Finally, we discuss
how scal and political distortions alter the main nding about the positive
correlation between intergenerational political disagreement and e¢ ciency.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2:2 presents
4This component is similar to the optimality conditions derived in the previous litera-
ture by Klein, Krusell and Rios-Rull (2008).
5Azzimonti (2011) studies how political competition may endogenously a¤ect the prob-
ability of winning future elections. However, considering a partisan model of electoral
competition and limiting the analyses to symmetric strategy, the author nds that in
equilibrium the probability of being elected are constant and only a¤ected by the incum-
bency power index. As a consequence, it turns out to be no strategically manipulated by
politicians.
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the environment. Section 2:3 characterizes the rst best allocation. Sec-
tion 2:4 describes the politico-economic equilibrium in the perfect forward-
looking scenario. In Section 2:5 we fully characterize the case with undistor-
tionary taxation, providing a closed-form economy example. In Section 2:6
and 2:7 we show how distortionary taxation and ideological competition af-
fects the equilibrium prescriptions, respectively. Section 2:8 concludes. The
appendix contains all the proofs.
2.2 The Model
Consider an OLG economy populated by an innite number of ideological
heterogeneous agents, living up to three-periods: young, adult and old. We
denote by  2 f1; 2g the adult and elderly cohorts, respectively. Time is
discrete, indexed by t, and runs from zero to innity. Population growth
rate is exogenous and equal to zero with a unitary mass for each cohort.
Furthermore there are two ideological heterogeneous innite living parties,
left and right, denoted by i 2 fL;<g, who compete proposing at each time an
electoral platform in order to maximize their probability of winning election.
2.2.1 Household
The intertemporal random preference of a representative agent j born at
time t  1 and living at time t is dened as follows:
u
 
c1it

+ 1jit + E
Pit

u

c2it+1

+ 2jit+1

(2.1)
where  2 (0; 1) is the individual discount factor and it 2 fLt;<tg. Pit
denotes the endogenous probability of party < of being in power at time t+1
when the incumbent party is it. jit is equal to the individual ideological
bias toward party < of agent j belonging to cohort  at time t. c1it represents
the consumption when adult, and c2it+1 denotes the consumption when old.
6
Young do not consume.
The stochastic component of preferences can be decomposed into two
6Apart from the di¤erent time horizon, the unique source of heterogeneity among
agents is the ideology. Given that the ideological component is independent from the
perceived benets of consumption, saving decisions are identical across agents. Ideological
heterogeity only a¤ects the individual voting decisions.
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terms, as follows:
jit =
 
t +  

jt

Dit
where Dit is an indicator function, which is equal to 1 if <t is in power at
time t, or zero otherwise.
Assumption 2 (Ideology) The random variables  jt 
h
  12  ; 12 
i
and
t 
  12 ; 12  are i.i.d. and uniformly distributed, centered over zero.
 jt represents the idiosyncratic shock, whose distribution is cohort spe-
cic, and measures voter js individual preferences toward party <. t rep-
resents an aggregate shock and measures the average relative popularity of
candidate from party < relative to those from party L.
Assumption 3 (Utility) The function u : R+ ! R+ is twice continuously
di¤erentiable concave function with lim
c!0
uc (c) =1.
When young, agents spend all their time endowment in acquiring skills
if the forward productive transfers, fit , is publicly provided without having
access to private credit market. When adult, individuals supply inelastically
labor, pay taxes, consume and save for retirement. When old, agents pay
taxes and consume their entire income, which is composed of capitalized
saving and the publicly provided backward pork-barrel transfers, bit . The
total income tax rate is equal to it . The individual budget constraints for
adults and old are, respectively:
c1it  (1  it)wtht   st (2.2)
c2it+1 
 
1  it+1

Rt+1st + bit+1 (2.3)
At the initial time, t = 0, there is an exogenous human capital total
endowment, h0 > 0. The budget constraint of each adult is then equal
to c1i0 = (1  i0)w0h0   s0. At the same the elderly are endowed with
an exogenously given physical capital, k0 > 0. Their individual budget
constraint is equal to c2i0 = (1  i0)R0k0 + bi0 .
2.2.2 Technology
At each time t the economy produces a single consumption good, yt, com-
bining physical, kt, and human capital, ht, according to a constant return
to scale technology, yt = (kt; ht).
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Assumption 4 (Production Technology) The function  : R2+ ! R+
is strictly monotonic increasing and strictly concave with (0; ht) ;(kt; 0) 
0 and kh;hk  0.
Let us denote with ~yt  ytht and ~kt = ktht the per-e¢ ciency units of
nal good production and physical capital, respectively. Physical capital
fully depreciates each period. Under Assumption 4 it follows that yt =
ht

kt
ht
; 1

 ht#

~kt

and, in turns, ~yt = #

~kt

. As a consequence, the
inverse demands for factor prices are k = #~k

~kt

and h = #

~kt

 
~kt#~k

~kt

, withhk = kh =
#~k(~kt)
ht
#(~kt) ~kt#~k(~kt)
#(~kt)
andkk =
#~k(~kt)
kt
#(~kt) ~kt#~k(~kt)
#(~kt)
.
The human capital is produced according to a constant return to scale
technology, which combines parental education and public investment in
education as complement factors:
ht+1 = H (ht; fit) (2.4)
Assumption 5 (Human Capital Technology) The function H : R2+ !
R+ is strictly monotonic increasing and strictly concave with H (0; fit) ;H (ht; 0) 
0 and Hhf ;Hfh  0.
Let us denote with ~fit  fitht the per-e¢ cient units of productive transfers.
Under Assumption 5 it follows that ht+1 = htH

1;
fit
ht

 ht'

~fit

. As
a consequence, the human capital growth rate is equal to ht+1ht = '

~fit

,
which represents also the growth rate of the economy. The marginal impact
of parental education and forward productive transfers on the human capital
production are Hh = '

~fit

  ~fit' ~f

~fit

and Hf = ' ~f

~fit

, respectively.
2.2.3 Fiscal Constitution
In order to provide the intergenerational transfers, agents have to devise
a politician. In each period, the politician raises revenues through income
taxes and uses the proceeds to purchase consumption good to be converted
into transfers to young and old generations. The politicians cannot use
lump-sum taxes. They can only levy a proportional tax on labor and capital
income. The tax rates on the two sources of income are equal. We assume
for simplicity that the politician is prevented from borrowing: The public
balance must hold in every period. This implies that in each period total
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benets paid to the agents equalize total contributions collected from tax
payers. Then for each elected politician belonging to party it, the balanced
budget constraint condition can be written as:
ityt = fit + bit (2.5)
Eq. (2.5) allows us to reduce the multidimensionality of political plat-
form, zit  ffit ; bit ;  (fit ; bit)g.
Assumption 6 (Feasibility) At each time t and for each party it:
i) consumption of elderly agent is positive, i.e. bit >  Rt (1  it) kt;
ii) forward productive transfers are non negative, i.e. fit  0;
iii) income tax rate is a percentage of total production, i.e. it  1.
2.3 First Best Allocation
In this section we characterize the e¢ cient allocation chosen by a benevo-
lent planner with a commitment technology in the absence of distortionary
taxation. Lump sum taxes are used to nance forward productive trans-
fer and backward pork-barrel transfers. The benevolent planner takes the
initial level of human and physical capital fh0; k0g as given, and chooses a
sequence

c1t ; c
2
t ; ft; ht+1; kt+1
	1
t=0
in order to maximize a weighted sum of
lifetime utilities over generations. The welfare weight of each representative
dynasty is exogenously given,  2 (0; 1). The corresponding maximization
problem is equal to:
max
fc1t ;c2t+1;ft;ht+1;kt+1g1t=0
1X
t=0
t+1
 
u
 
c1t

+ u
 
c2t+1

+ u
 
c20

subject to the aggregate resource constraint and the human capital technol-
ogy:
c1t + c
2
t + kt+1 + ft   ht#

~kt

 0, 8t  tt+1
ht+1   ht'

~ft

 0, 8t  tt+1
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where
 
t
t+1

and
 
t
t+1

are the associated Lagrange multipliers. Re-
moving the functional arguments, the rst order conditions of the Lagrangian
turn out to be equal to:
c1t : uc1t = t
c2t+1 : uc2t+1 = t+1
ft : t = t' ~ft
ht+1 : t = t+1

#

~kt+1

  ~kt+1#~k

~kt+1

+ t+1

't+1   ~ft+1' ~ft+1

kt+1 : t = t+1#~k

~kt+1

together with the trasversality conditions (TVCs):
lim
t!1
t+1tkt+1 = 0 (2.6)
lim
t!1
t+1tht+1 = 0 (2.7)
Rearranging the rst order conditions, the following Euler conditions, or
rst order wedges, for the optimal allocations must be satised:
r  uc2t   uc1t = 0 (2.8)
s  uc1t   #~k

~kt+1

uc2t+1 = 0 (2.9)
f  ' ~ft  
#~k

~kt+1

#

~kt+1

  ~kt+1#~k

~kt+1
 (1  "t+1) = 0 (2.10)
where "t+1 
' ~ft
#~k(~kt+1)
't+1  ~ft+1' ~ft+1
' ~ft+1
denotes the education spillover ex-
pressed as a fraction of the education cost. It fully describes the impact
of current education investment on future level of human capital through
the channel of parental investment. The rst condition, Eq. (2.8), captures
the redistribution wedge between current adults and old cohorts. The second
condition, Eq. (2.9), describes the optimal investment choice, determining
the optimal accumulation of physical capital. The planner chooses kt+1 in
order to equate the marginal cost, in terms of foregone consumption, to the
discounted marginal benets of savings. The third condition, Eq. (2.10),
reects the direct e¤ect of productive transfers on the utility of the adults
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in terms of current cost and expected benets, which yield the optimal ac-
cumulation of human capital. Suppose "t+1 = 0, then Eq. (2.9) and (2.10)
are equivalent to the necessary conditions of a competitive equilibrium with
no credit market constraints, where young can borrow money at the market
interest rate.
Denition 6 (Pareto E¢ cient Allocation) For any initial conditions fh0; k0g
the optimal allocation

c1t ; c2t ; ft ; ht+1; kt+1
	1
t=0
(2.6), (2.7), (2.8), (2.9)
and (2.10) for all t  0.
2.4 Politico-Economic Equilibrium
This section characterizes the politico-economic equilibrium of a dynamic
game played among generations in a repeated voting setting. We consider
a majoritarian probabilistic voting framework where o¢ ce-seeking ideolog-
ically heterogenous parties compete in order to maximize their probability
of winning election, internalizing the impact of the proposed scal platform
on the outcome of future elections.
2.4.1 Timing
To fully describe the main mechanism underlying the resolution strategy of
the politico-economic equilibrium, let us provide a complete description of
the timing of the game:
i. at the beginning of each time and after the realization of shocks, the
two parties compete proposing a political platform (Political Compe-
tition Stage);
ii. the ideological shocks are realized, the election takes place and the
party, which casts the majority of votes, wins election (Electoral Stage);
iii. the outcome of the political competition is realized and the promised
political platform is implemented;
iv agents take economic decisions of saving and rms produce (Competitive
Equilibrium given Policies).
Following Krusell et al. (1997), in order to determine a time consistent
solution of the game, ruling out the assumption of commitment, we solve
Chapter 2 69
for the Markov subgame perfect equilibrium of the game using backward
procedure. Specically, the equilibrium outcome is determined as the limit
of the nite horizon game.
2.4.2 Competitive Equilibrium given Fiscal Policies
In a competitive equilibrium, adults choose their lifetime consumption tak-
ing factor prices and the government policy as given. Maximizing Eq. (2.1)
subject to the individual budget constraints (2.2) and (2.3) and feasibility
constraints c1it > 0 and c
2
it+1
> 0, the following rst order conditions for
interior solutions must hold:
0 = uc
 
c1it
  EPit h 1  it+1Rt+1uc c2it+1i (2.11)
In equilibrium by implicit function theorem a unique non-negative saving
function exists, st = K

I1it ; I
2
it+1

, where I1it  (1  it)wtht and I2it+1 
Pit
b<t+1
(1 <t+1)Rt+1
+ (1  Pit)
bLt+1
(1 Lt+1)Rt+1
. Then the capital market clears
when:
kt+1 = K

I1it ; I
2
it+1

(2.12)
After plugging Eq. (2.12) into Eq. (2.2) and (2.3) and using the condition
(2.5) the following individual consumption levels are attained:
c1it = C1it (it ; ht; kt; kt+1)  I1it   kt+1 (2.13)
c2it+1 = C2it+1
 
it+1 ; bit+1 ; ht+1; kt+1
   1  it+1Rt+1kt+1 + bit+1 (2.14)
Let us denote with u
 C1it (it ; ht; kt; kt+1) and u  C2it (it ; bit ; ht; kt) the
current utility that adults and old receive in equilibrium, respectively.
Firms produce in a perfectly competitive environment, then in equilib-
rium they choose the level of employment of capital and the e¤ective units of
labor so as to maximize prots, i.e. max
fkt;htg
[ (kt; ht)  wtht  Rtkt]. Firms
optimality and markets clearing imply that factor prices are given by the
marginal productivity of each factor:
Rt = k (kt; ht) (2.15)
wt = h (kt; ht) (2.16)
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Denition 7 (Intertemporal Competitive Equilibrium) Given the ini-
tial conditions fh0; k0g, the sequence of policies ffit ; bitg1t=0 and the probabil-
ity of winning elections fPitg1t=0 for each possible elected party, it 2 fLt;<tg,
an intertemporal competitive equilibrium with perfect foresight is a sequence
of allocations and factor prices fc1it ; c2it ; Rt; wt; ht+1; kt+1g1t=0 such that, for
all t > 0:
i) the allocation solves the maximization problem of adult household, i.e.
Eq. (2.11), (2.13) and (2.14) are satised;
iii) the factor prices are consistent with the prot maximization of rms,
i.e. Eq. (2.15) and (2.16) are satised;
iv) the private good market clears:
c1it + c
2
it + kt+1 + fit = (kt; ht) (2.17)
v) the markets for production inputs clear in period t, i.e. Eq. (2.4) and
(2.12) hold.
2.4.3 Electoral Stage
After the parties have proposed the political platform, ffit ; bitg, and the
ideological shocks are realized, voters have to take electoral decisions. Let
us denote with V  (kt; ht) the indirect utility of agents belonging to cohort
 if party Lt wins the election, whereas W  (kt; ht) measures the indirect
benets for  -cohort agents achieved when party <t is in power net of the
ideological shock. Note that the indirect utility of elderly is just charac-
terized by their current utility when old. Contrarily, the adults have an
intertemporal indirect utility whose next-period ideological shock has to be
realized. Consequently, for the old-age voter j the voting decision is given
by:
max

V 2 (kt; ht) ;W
2 (kt; ht) +
 
t +  
2
jt
	
By using Eq. (2.14) the individual indirect utility for elderly are give by:
V 2 (kt; ht) = u
 C2Lt and W 2 (kt; ht) = u  C2<t (2.18)
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Equivalently, for the adult voter j the voting decision is given by:
max

V 1 (kt; ht) ;W
1 (kt; ht) +
 
t +  
1
jt
	
By using Eq. (2.13) and (2.14), the individual indirect utilities for adults
are equal to:
V 1 (kt; ht) = u
 C1Lt+ V2 (kt+1; ht+1;Lt) (2.19)
W 1 (kt; ht) = u
 C1<t+ W2 (kt+1; ht+1;<t) (2.20)
where the adultscontinuation values are given by:
V2 (kt+1; ht+1;Lt)  E
 PLt  W 2Lt + t+1 +  2jt+1+ (1  PLt)V 2Lt
W2 (kt+1; ht+1;<t)  E
 P<t  W 2<t + t+1 +  2jt+1+ (1  P<t)V 2<t
with W 2it  W 2 (kt; ht; it) and V 2it  V 2 (kt; ht; it) are the indirect utilities
when old if the previous period incumbent party is it.7
Consequently, the elderly and the adults decide to vote for party <t as
long as:
 2jt   2t  V 2 (kt; ht) W 2 (kt; ht)  t (2.21)
 1jt   1t  V 1 (kt; ht) W 1 (kt; ht)  t (2.22)
Formally,  2t and  
1
t represent the swing voter in cohort 2 and 1, respectively.
Let us denote with u (Ct )  u
 CLt   u  C<t the di¤erence in utility
generated by the implementation of di¤erent scal platforms.
Using Eq. (2.18), (2.19), (2.20), (2.21), and (2.22), the share of elderly
voters for party < is equal to:
m2t 
1
2
   2  u  C2t   t
7Note that from the perspective of the adults the internalization of the t-period in-
cumbent party identity is relevant for their voting decisions. Indeed, suppose party it
wins election at time t, then it will implement policies which will a¤ect the relevant state
variables of the economy. Consequently both the probability of being re-elected and the
future implemented policies will turn out to be conditioned by the identity of the current
incumbent party.
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whereas the adultsshare is equal to:
m1t 
1
2
   1  u  C1t   t
   1  V2 (kt+1; ht+1;Lt) W2 (kt+1; ht+1;<t)
Under majoritarian rule, party <t wins the election ifmt  m1t+m2t > 1.
Consequently, t > t where t equal to:
t  1
 1 +  2

 2
 1
u
 C2t +u  C1t  (2.23)
+
1
 1 +  2

 V2 (kt+1; ht+1;Lt) W2 (kt+1; ht+1;<t)
Then the probability that party <t and Lt win the election is respectively
equal to:
Pr
 
t > t

=
1
2
  t (2.24)
Pr
 
t < t

=
1
2
+ t (2.25)
Note that Pit is endogenously given and a function of t. Specically,
Pit =
(
Pr
 
t+1 > t+1jt > t

if it = <t
Pr
 
t+1 > t+1jt < t

if it = Lt
(2.26)
2.4.4 Political Competition Stage
The last step concerns the determination of the equilibrium partiespolitical
platform. Specically, the equilibrium objective functions we are interested
in are: The forward and backward transfer policies implemented by the
winning party it as a function of the relevant payo¤ state variables of the
economy, i.e. human capital and physical capital, namely Fit (kt; ht) and
Bit (kt; ht), the probability that party <t wins the election when the in-
cumbent party is it, Pit (kt+1; ht+1), and the rules governing the evolution
of the payo¤-relevant state variables, kt+1 = K (fit ; bit ; kt; ht) and ht+1 =
H (fit ; ht). Let us denote the expected prices by Rt+1 = R (kt+1; ht+1) and
wt+1 = w (kt+1; ht+1). The partiesobjective function concerns the maxi-
mization of probability of winning elections. Furthermore, they take care of
their ideological position. Consequently their objective functions are equal
to:
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max
z<t
 q (z<t   z<) +

1
2
  t

(2.27)
max
zLt
 q (zLt   zL) +

1
2
+ t

(2.28)
where q (zit   zi) is a function measuring the distance of the proposed plat-
form, zit , from the partiesideological bliss points, zi, such that q (0) = 0.
Denition 8 (Markov Politico-Economic Equilibrium) A Markov per-
fect politico-economic equilibrium is an intertemporal competitive equilib-
rium, a sequence of policies ffit ; bitg1t=0 and elections conditional proba-
bilities fPitg1t=0 such that:
i) fit = Fit (kt; ht), bit = Bit (kt; ht) and Eq. (2.5) holds at each time t;
ii) Pit is dened according to Eq. (2.26);
ii) party <t and Lt maximize, respectively, Eq. (2.27) and (2.28), subject
to the constraints (2.4) and (2.12).
After plugging the equilibrium policy rules, Fit () and Bit (), and the
conditional probability of re-election, Pit (), into Eq. (2.12) we obtain:
kt+1 = K
 
fit ; bit ; ht; kt; R () ;Pit () ;Fit+1 () ;Bit+1 ()

(2.29)
By using Eq. (2.4) and rearranging the terms, we rewrite Eq. (2.29) as
follows:
kt+1 = K (fit ; bit ; ht; kt)
where K fully describes the evolution of private capital under the one-period
deviation.8 Since households take policies as given, due to the sequential
timing of the game, Eq. (2.11) becomes as follows:
uc
 C1it  EPit h 1  it+1Rt+1uc C2it+1i = 0
8For a detailed description of the computational procedure we make reference to Chap.
1.
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We consider two di¤erent scenario. The rst is characterized by neither
scal nor political distortions. Specically, we assume taxes are levied only
on labor income and parties do not take care of their own ideological posi-
tion. In the second case taxes are levied on both labor income and capital
return, thus generating scal distortions. We also introduce political distor-
tions due to ideological competition among parties, which internalize how
current policies a¤ect the probability of being elected also in the next-period
elections. In the following sections we study these cases separately.
2.5 No Distortionary Case
Let us rst consider the case in which parties compete by proposing a po-
litical platform in order to maximize their probability of winning elections,
without taking care of their ideological position. Consequently partiesob-
jective functions are given by Eq. (2.24) and (2.25). Furthermore there
is no capital taxation. We denote with    2
 1
the ratio of the idiosyn-
cratic ideological densities between the two cohorts of voters. The following
Proposition holds.
Proposition 4 There exists a unique Markov perfect politico-economic equi-
librium characterized by parties Lt and <t proposing the same political plat-
form, zLt = z<t = zt, which is obtained by solving the following maximiza-
tion:
maxu
 
C2 (bt; ht; kt)

+u
 
C1
 
ft; bt; ht; kt; kt+1

+u
 
C2
 
bt+1; ht+1; kt+1

under the constraint:
uc
 C1t   Rt+1uc  C2t+1 = 0 (2.30)
Proof. (See appendix).
In equilibrium the two parties propose the same scal platform. It simply
maximizes a convex combination of the utility of the current living voters,
where the weights reect the sensitivity of voting behavior to policy changes.
Therefore, in equilibrium the probability of winning elections given by Eq.
(2.24) and (2.25) is equal to one half. We can interpret the parameter  also
as a measurement of the degree of intergenerational political disagreement
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over the redistribution of public resources. If  = 0, given the unitary mass
for each cohort, the adults are the median voter and political decisions are
taken in order to maximize their intertemporal utility, without considering
the participation constraints of both young and the elderly. As soon as  > 0
a conict over the equilibrium redistribution of public resources emerges
due to the participation constraint of the elderly, which starts to bind. In
this section we explore how intergenerational political conicts, i.e.  6= 0,
may improve the overall economic e¢ ciency in an economy characterized by
productive human capital and storage technologies.
By applying envelope theorem and using Eq. (2.13), (2.14), and (2.30),
the Euler conditions with respect to the policies rules ft and bt are equal to,
respectively:9
0 =  1 + 1
Rt+1

dBt+1
dkt+1
Kft +
dBt+1
dht+1
' ~ft

+
kt+1
Rt+1

kkKft +kh' ~ft

(2.31)
0 =  

1  1
Rt+1

dBt+1
dkt+1
+kt+1kk

Kbt

uc
 C1t + uc  C2t+1 (2.32)
Let us rst refer to Eq. (2.31). At each time an interior solution for
the forward productive transfer is simply determined as an intertemporal
maximization of the current adultsutility, who reap benets and sustain
costs by a variation in the current public expenditure. No intergenerational
conicts a¤ect the setting of ft. Since tax levying on labor income makes
adults sustain the whole tax burden, the rst term captures the adultsmar-
ginal cost caused by a positive variation on the scal dimension. The second
term represents the expected marginal impact on the amount of next-period
backward pork-barrel transfer due to a current variation in productive ex-
penditure through the channels of both human and physical capital. Finally,
the third term measures the expected marginal impact of ft on the utility of
next-period elderly through the increase in the rental price of capital. The
redistributive choices are made as the outcome of a weighted bargaining
between current adults and elderly. On one hand, an increase in backward
transfers makes current adults to sustain direct costs and to either enjoy
9By dx
dz
we denote the partial derivative of x with respect to z, and with @x
@z
the total
di¤erentiation.
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benets or sustain costs from expected variation of both future pork-barrel
transfers and the return to capital through the channel of physical capital,
represented by the rst part of Eq. (2.32). On the other hand, it makes old
enjoy direct benets from a current positive variation of bt.
Even in absence of scal or political distortions, the e¢ cient allocation
is not achievable in equilibrium. Indeed, the existence of credit market con-
straints generates simultaneously two sources of distortions in equilibrium.
On one hand, it precludes young from borrowing money for education invest-
ment, inducing underaccumulation of human capital. On the other hand, it
reduces the investment portfolio for adults, determining overaccumulation of
physical capital.10 The provision of public education transfers through the
institution of electoral competition partially o¤sets the ine¢ ciency generated
by the credit market conditions. However the gains in e¢ ciency obtained
in the politico-economic equilibrium compared to the autarchic allocation
strongly depends on the voting institution which characterizes the political
environment. In order to clearly show the positive relation between inter-
generational political disagreement and economic e¢ ciency, let us consider
the following three cases.
Case I: No human capital and median voter framework, i.e. ft = 0
and  = 0.11 For simplicity suppose exogenous prices. From Eq. (2.31)
and (2.32), it is easy to show that the rst order condition to be satised
requires 1   1Rt+1
dBt+1
dkt+1
Kbt = 0. Given that Kbt < 0, in equilibrium agents
may sustain positive transfers to the elderly by coordinating on the level
of aggregate physical capital. The lower the level of savings due to income
taxes paid when adult, the higher the level of future benets when old, i.e.
dBt+1
dkt+1
< 0. The intergenerational plan implemented by the median voter
may also improve the economic overall e¢ ciency starting from a condition
of dynamic ine¢ ciency.
Case II: Human capital and median voter framework, i.e. ft > 0 and
 = 0. When the productive human capital channel is introduced the
politico-economic equilibrium outcome in the case of median voter slightly
changes. Agents no longer coordinate as to the level of physical capital. The
10See Boldrin and Montes (2005) for a complete analyses of distortions generated by
credit market constraints in three period OLG economy with human capital.
11See Azariadis and Galasso (2002) for the case of exogneous prices and Forni (2005)
for the case of endogenous prices.
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relevant state variable is now the total return to capital, which is a¤ected
by both human and physical capital. Adults have incentives to invest in
educating the young in order to accumulate human capital and increase the
next period return to capital. At the same time they do not have incentives
to transfer public resource backward in terms of pension benets. Indeed,
adults perfectly anticipate that when old they are prevented to grab public
resources by exerting political power. Furthermore, the next generations
promise concerning pension transfers are not credible because the return to
capital will be positively a¤ected by the previous period human capital in-
vestment. Consequently, in equilibrium public education investment will be
nanced by taxes paid by elderly and, if the physical capital productivity is
high enough, such transfers will be also used to subsidize adultsconsump-
tion. Because of the resulting overaccumulation of both physical and human
capital the economy will still be characterized by dynamic ine¢ ciency.
Case III: Human capital and no median voter framework, i.e. ft  0
and  > 0. When the human capital investment is feasible, the existence
of intergenerational conicts over the redistribution of public resources im-
proves the overall economic e¢ ciency. Given that elderly actively participate
to the political debate, they always gain positive transfers by exerting po-
litical power. At the same time they correct the overaccumulation of both
physical and human capital.
In the following section we derive a closed form characterization of the
politico-economic equilibrium, which solves the system of partial di¤erential
equations given by Eq. (2.31) and (2.32). Furthermore, we provide a quanti-
tative measure of how political disagreement may a¤ect economic e¢ ciency
in the long run.
2.5.1 Example Economy
Let us consider the following parametric case. Preferences are log-additive,
i.e. log
 
c1t

+  log
 
c2t+1

, and the nal good production and the human
capital technology are respectively equal to:
yt = Ak

t h
1 
t
ht+1 = Bf

t h
1 
t
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with A;B > 0 and ;  2 (0; 1). Note that in balanced growth path the
optimal education externality is simply equal to " =  (1  ).12 Solving for
the rst best allocation, according to Denition 6, the growth rate of the
economy and the rental price of capital per e¢ cient unit of time turn out to
be respectively equal to:
o  'o

~f; 

=
 
AB1 

(1 )o 

o
 1
1 (1 )
(2.33)
Ro  Ro

~k; 

= 
 
AB1 

(1 )o 
 1
o
 1
1 (1 )
(2.34)
where o  (1 )1 " and o  (1 ") (1 ) (1 )(1 ")(1 ") . Both ~k and ~f are
increasing function in the dynasty discount factor  and converge to zero
when  goes to zero.
We now evaluate how the politico-economic equilibrium, as described in
Denition 8, performs with respect to the Pareto optimal allocation resumed
by Eq. (2.33) and (2.34).
Lemma 2 If a Markov subgame perfect politico-economic equilibrium exists,
then the following condition must hold:
' ~ft  
#~k

~kt+1

#

~kt+1

  ~kt+1#~k

~kt+1
 () = 0 (2.35)
where  () = (1+)(+(1+(+(1 ))))+(+(1+(+(1 )))) > 1 and  () < 0.
Proof. (See appendix).
Lemma 2 characterizes the necessary condition for the existence of the
politico-economic equilibrium. Furthermore, Eq. (2.35) is directly com-
parable to the education optimal wedge, Eq. (2.10). Note that  (0) =
max (), which implies that the lower , the larger the di¤erence with
respect to the rst best allocation and, in turns, the ine¢ ciency.
Under Lemma 2, by applying Denition 8 the following proposition
holds.
12For detailed calculus see Appendix.
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Proposition 5 A unique Markov subgame perfect politico-economic equi-
librium which sustains the policies F (ht; kt) = fyt and B (ht; kt) = byt
exists, where f  (1 )+(1+(+(1 ))) and b  (1 ) (1+(+(1 )))+(1+(+(1 ))) .
Proof. (See appendix).
By solving via backward, taking a nite time horizon economy and mak-
ing the time goes to innite, the incentive structure of the game emerges
clearly. As long as  > 1  , in the last period of the economy the elderly
are able to grab a share of the total production through both capitalized
savings and pension contributions. As a consequence, when adults, agents
have incentives to invest a fraction of the collected taxes in public education.
Solving for the politico-economic equilibrium, the growth rate of the
economy and the rental price of capital per e¢ cient unit of time are equal
to:
p  'p

~f ;

=
 
AB1 

(1 )p 

p
 1
1 (1 )
(2.36)
Rp  Rp

~k;

= 
 
AB1 

(1 )p 
 1
p
 1
1 (1 )
(2.37)
where p  (1 )+(1+(+(1 ))) and p  (1+)(1+(+(1 ))+)+ . In order to
fully understand the role of intergenerational political disagreement mea-
sured by , let us consider the case  = 0, which is equivalent to consider a
framework where the median-voter belongs to the adultscohort.
Corollary 8 When the median voter is the adult, the rental price of capital
and the economys growth rate are respectively equal to Rm

~k

= lim!0Rp

~k;

and 'm

~f

= lim!0 'p

~f ;

, such that 'm

~f

> 'p

~f ;

and Rm

~k

<
Rp

~k;

.
Proof. (See appendix).
As argued in section 2:5, in our economy the absence of intergenerational
conicts is detrimental for the economys e¢ ciency. If the median voter is
the adult in equilibrium he will vote for a multidimensional scal platform
characterized by: i) negative transfers from the elderly, ii) possibly subsidies
to the adults consumption, and iii) high investment in public education.
Specically, if the share of capital over total production is large enough, i.e.
 2 ( (1  ))    (1 + 2) +  < 0, taxes paid by the elderly are used
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both to nance public education and to subsidize adultsconsumption. As a
consequence the economy will be characterized by overaccumulation of both
physical and human capital.
As soon as a share of political power is assigned to the elderly, the
equilibrium political platform reverses, turning out to be characterized by:
i) positive transfers to the elderly, ii) negative transfers from the adult, iii)
lower investment in public education. The participation of the elderly in the
political debate and the consequent emergence of intergenerational political
disagreement on the redistribution of public resources improves the overall
economic e¢ ciency.
Lemma 3 For any level of welfare weights,  2 (0; m) with m > 0,
Rm

~k

< Ro

~k; 

and 'm

~f

> 'o

~f; 

.
Proof. (See appendix).
Lemma 3 states that the equilibrium allocation achieved in the median
voter case is always suboptimal and induces overaccumulation of both hu-
man capital and physical capital for any welfare weight  2 (0; m). For
illustrative purpose, let us consider a specic quantitative exercise. In Fig.
9 are reported both the pair of optimal rental price of capital and economys
growth rate as a function of  (red curve), and the pair of rental price of capi-
tal and economys growth rate obtained in the politico-economic equilibrium
as a function of  (blue curve). As it becomes evident from the graphical
representation, in the case of  = 0, for any value of welfare weights the
economys growth rate in the politico-economic allocation is always larger
than the rental price of capital. Furthermore, the economy experiences a
higher level of both human capital and physical capital accumulation with
respect to the rst best allocation for any   m, consistently with Lemma
3.
Using Lemma 3 the following Proposition holds.
Proposition 6 For any  > 0, a level o 2 (0; 1) and ^ > 0 such that:
lim
!^
Rp ~k; Ro ~k; o < 
lim
!^
'p ~k;  'o ~k; o < 
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exist.
Proof. (See appendix).
Fig. 9: The parametric values are A=0:2, B=0:2, =0:4, =0:2 and =0:9530
From Proposition 6 it follows that the higher the elderly political power
and, consequently, the higher the political disagreement, the lower the ac-
cumulation of human capital, the lower the accumulation of physical cap-
ital and the higher the e¢ ciency for a given welfare weight. This gain in
e¢ ciency is reported in the Fig. 9 and is represented by the blue curve
approaching the red one to a given level of welfare weight.
2.6 Distortionary Taxation
In this section we provide qualitative insights about the impact of distor-
tionary taxation on capital on the politico-economic equilibrium character-
ized in the previous section.
Proposition 7 There exists a unique Markov perfect politico-economic equi-
librium characterized by parties Lt and <t proposing the same political plat-
form, zdLt = z
d
<t = z
d
t , which is obtained by solving the following maximiza-
tion:
maxu
 
C2 (bt; f t; ht; kt)

+u
 
C1
 
ft; bt; ht; kt; kt+1

+u
 
C2
 
bt+1; f t+1; ht+1; kt+1

82 Chapter 2
under the constraint:
uc
 C1t    1  dt+1Rt+1uc  C2t+1 = 0 (2.38)
Proof. (See appendix).
By applying envelope theorem and using Eq. (2.13), (2.14), and (2.38),
the Euler conditions with respect to the policies rules ft and bt are equal to,
respectively:
0 =  wtht
yt
uc
 C1t  Rtktyt uc  C2t | {z }
(1)
+ uc
 C2t+1dBt+1dkt+1 +kk

Kft +

dBt+1
dht+1
+kh

' ~ft

(2.39)
 uc
 C2t+1Rt+1kt+1
  
d ~Bt+1
dkt+1
+
d ~Ft+1
dkt+1
!
Kft +
 
d ~Bt+1
dht+1
+
d ~Ft+1
dht+1
!
' ~ft
!
| {z }
(2)
0 =  wtht
yt
 
uc
 C1t   uc  C2t + uc  C2t+1dBt+1dkt+1 + kt+1 (1  t+1)kk

Kbt
(2.40a)
 uc
 C2t+1Rt+1kt+1
 
d ~Bt+1
dkt+1
+
d ~Ft+1
dkt+1
!
Kbt| {z }
(3)
where ~Bt+1 () and ~Ft+1 () denote the backward and forward transfer func-
tions per e¢ cient unit, respectively. Compared to the Eq. (2.31) and (2.32),
distortionary taxation on capital a¤ects the politico-economic equilibrium
in three ways. Let us rst refer to Eq. (2.39). Now old partially sustain the
scal burden together with the adults, (1). Consequently, di¤erently from
the no distortionary case, intergenerational conicts also a¤ect the setting of
forward transfers. The main quantitative impact of distortionary taxation
on capital however concerns the next-period utility of current living adults.
In equilibrium the terms (2)might be either positive or negative, depending
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on the impact of current education transfers on next-period income tax rate.
In the case it will be negative, the incentives to invest in human capital even
when the elderly power is relatively small are dampened. Finally, in equi-
librium the terms (3) in Eq. (2.40a) is positive. Consequently, there are
higher incentives to redistribute backward. In general distortionary taxa-
tion on capital may improve dynamic e¢ ciency even when intergenerational
conict is weaker.
2.7 Ideological Competition
Finally, we consider the possibility of ideological competition among parties.
Di¤erently from the case discussed in sections 2:5 and 2:6, parties <t and
Lt maximize Eq. (2.27) and (2.28), respectively.
The Nash equilibrium is characterized by the following rst order condi-
tion for each party it:
0 =  @q (zit   zi)
@zit| {z }
ideological competition
+
 2
 1
@u
 C2it
@zit
+
@u
 C1it
@zit
(2.41)
+ E
 
@Pit
@zit
 
W 2it + t+1 +  
2
jt+1   V 2it

+ Pit
@W 2it
@zit
+ (1  Pit)
@V 2it
@zit
!
| {z }
endogenous political turnover
The equilibrium platforms do not reduce to a common political pro-
posal, which simply maximizes the weighted utility of current living voters.
Contrarily, due to ideological competition the two parties propose di¤erent
platforms. As a consequence, in equilibrium the probability of being elected
is not constant and equal to one half, but it turns out to be a function of
the relevant payo¤ state variables, Pit (kt+1; ht+1). Perfect forward look-
ing parties act strategically, choosing a platform which also maximizes the
probability of winning future elections if they will become the next-period
incumbent party. The possibility to endogenously control for the political
turnover adds another source of distortion quantied by the third term of
Eq. (2.41).
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2.8 Conclusions
In this paper we show how intergenerational conicts over the redistribution
of public resources may enhance e¢ ciency when human capital accumulation
is the main force driving the economic growth. We build a tractable dynamic
politico-economic model in a neoclassical environment and determine the
subgame Markov perfect equilibrium of a dynamic game characterized by
both ideological heterogeneous voters and o¢ ce-seeking political parties.
Three main sources of distortions characterize the theoretical environ-
ment: Incomplete credit markets, physical capital taxation, and political
uncertainty. In the rst scenario characterized by neither capital taxation
nor political distortions, the only source of ine¢ ciency comes from the credit
market constraint. In equilibrium the presence of swing voters determines
the emergence of intergenerational conicts over the redistribution of public
resources and the equilibrium political platform turns out to be character-
ized by: i) positive transfers to the elderly, ii) negative transfers from the
adult, and iii) lower investment in public education. The participation of the
elderly to the political debate with the emergence of political disagreement
on the redistribution of public resources improves the overall economic e¢ -
ciency. The elderly claim for positive transfers induces a simultaneous reduc-
tion in both physical and human capital accumulation, partially o¤setting
the dynamic ine¢ ciency. Adopting a rst order characterization, we test
the robustness of our theoretical ndings. Specically we study how distor-
tionary taxation and political distortions, which arise when parties compete
ideologically, alter the main nding about the positive correlation between
intergenerational political disagreement and e¢ ciency. We nd that both
types of distortions might be welfare improving in the sense of dynamic
e¢ ciency, dampening the positive impact of intergenerational conicts on
the overall economic welfare. In order to quantitatively assess the gains in
e¢ ciency and the loss due to distortions in this second scenario, we need to
perform numerical analyses. Future works will be directed toward this line
of research.
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2.9 Appendix A
Derivation of closed form solution for e¢ cient allocation. Due to
the log-preferences, which cancel out income and substitution e¤ects, savings
are a fraction of current variables. Furthermore, along the balanced growth
path we attain
u
c2t
(c2t )
u
c2t+1
(c2t+1)
=
c2t+1
c2t
= '

~f

.
Using the Euler conditions (2.8) and (2.9) we obtain:
#~k

~k

= '

~f

(2.42)
The condition (2.10) in balanced growth path is ' ~f

~f

=
#~k
#(~k) ~k#~k(~k)
(1  ")
where " = 1#~k

'

~f

  ~f' ~f

~f

. Using the condition (2.42) and Eq.
(??) we have " constant and equal to " =  (1  ), consequently ' ~f

~f

turns out to be equal to:
' ~f

~f

=
#~k
#

~k

  ~k#~k

~k
 (1  ") (2.43)
Using the parametric forms given by Eq. (??) and (??) and plugging the
partial derivatives into (2.43) we get ~f = 1 

1 "~k
'

~f

. Using Eq.
(2.42) we get ~f = 1 

1 "~k
#~k

~k

and nally:
~f =
 (1  )
1  " ~y
 (2.44)
Aggregate consumption along the balanced growth path is then equal to:
~C  ~c1 + ~c2 = ~y   h

t+1
ht
~k   ~f| {z }
~s
(2.45)
where h is the human capital level in steady state. After using Eq. (2.42)
and (2.44) and rearranging, we obtain that aggregate consumption is also
equal to ~C = (1 )(1 ")(1 ") ~y
. To identify how aggregate consumption is
shared between the rst and the second period let us recall (2.9) in balanced
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path:
#~k

~k

=
uc1t
 
c1t

uc2t+1
 
c2t+1
 = '

~f


~c2
~c1
then we yield ~c
2
~c1 =

 and consequently ~c
1 = + ~C
 and ~c2 = + ~C
 and
individual savings are:
Let us denote with o  (1 )1 " , o  (1 ") (1 ) (1 )(1 ")(1 ") . Then
using Eq. (2.45) we nally obtain the steady state level of ~k:
~k =

A
B
o
(Ao)

 1
1 (1 )
, ~y = A

A
B
o
(Ao)

 
1 (1 )
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
A
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o
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1 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
~k

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A

A
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o
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
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1 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Finally, using Eq. (??) and (2.44), the economys growth rate turns out
to be equal to:
o  '

~f

= B (Ao)


A
B
o
(Ao)

 
1 (1 )
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2.10 Appendix B
Proposition (4). If ideological competition is ruled out, the political com-
petition problem concerns the maximization of Eq. (2.24) and (2.25) with
respect to the proposed political platform zit for party <t and Lt, respec-
tively. Let us consider a nite horizon economy, which ends at time T = 2.
In the last period the political maximization program for each party it is
equal to:
max
zi2
 2
 1
u
 C2i2+ u  C1i2
Given that partiesobjective function is simply the probability of winning
elections, then in equilibrium they propose the same platform, z<2 = zL2
and u
 C22 = u  C12 = 0. Using Eq. (2.23) it follows that 2 = 0 and
Pr
 
2 > 2

= Pr
 
2 < 2

= 12 .
At time T = 1 the maximization program then becomes:
max
zi1
 2
 1
u
 C2i1+u  C1i1+E  Pi1  W 2i1 + 2 +  2j2+ (1  Pi1)V 2i2 (2.46)
where Pi1 = Pr
 
2 > 2j1 > 1

if i1 = <1 and Pi1 = Pr
 
2 > 2j1 < 1

if i1 = L1. Given that 2 will be always equal to 0 independently from
the incumbent party at time t = 2, then it follows that the conditional
probability of being elected will be equal to the unconditional one, i.e.:
P<1 = PL1 =
1
2
Consequently the maximization program given by Eq. (2.46) reduces to:
max
zi1
 2
 1
u
 C2i1+ u  C1i1+ u  C2i2
Replicating the argument made at time T = 2, we have z<1 = zL1 with
u
 C21 = u  C11 = 0 and V2 (k2; h2;L1) W2 (k2; h2;<1) = 0. Using Eq.
(2.23) it follows that 1 = 0 and Pr
 
1 > 1

= Pr
 
1 < 1

= 12 . Hence the
two candidatesplatform converges in equilibrium to the same scal policy
maximizing the weighted-average utility for adults and old:
max
zt
 2
 1
u
 
C2 (bt; ht; kt)

+u
 
C1
 
ft; bt; ht; kt; kt+1

+u
 
C2
 
bt+1; ht+1; kt+1

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under the constraint uc
 C1t   Rt+1uc  C2t+1 = 0.
Lemma (2). Let us consider a simple two period-economy, T = 2, and
solve backward. At the last period k2 = 0 and the politicians maximization
problem is:
max
f2;b2
u
 C12+ u  C22
In the last period f2 = 0 and the Euler condition which determines the
amount of pension is
uC12
uC22
=  which implies b2 =
(1 ) 
1+ y2. At time t = 1
the maximization program becomes:
max
f1;b1
u
 C11+ u  C22+ u  C21
After some algebra the politiciansEuler conditions turns out to be equal
to:
uC21
uC11
=
1 + 
+  (1 + )
uC21
uC11
=
1
1 + 
' ~f1
#

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
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
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
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
Recalling that ' ~f1
#(~k2) ~k2#~k(~k2)
#~k(~k2)
= k2f1
(1 )
 , solving the system we have at
time t = 1:
f1 =
 (1  )
+ (1 +  (+  (1  )))y1
b1 =
 (1  )   (1 +  (+  (1  )))
+ (1 +  (+  (1  ))) y1
Due to the specic parametric form, after only two recursions the policies
remain unchanged and the political Euler conditions becomes equal to:
uC2t
uC1t
=
1 + 
+  (+ (1 +  (+  (1  ))))
uC2t
uC1t
=
1
+ (1 +  (+  (1  )))
Fht
Fkt
' ~ft
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which implies:
' ~ft  
#~k

~kt+1

#

~kt+1

  ~kt+1#~k

~kt+1
 () = 0
where  () = (1+)(+(1+(+(1 ))))+(+(1+(+(1 )))) > 1 and 
0 () =   (1+)(1+(1 )+)
(+(1+(+(1 )+)2)) <
0.
Proposition (5). Using Lemma 2, rearranging and solving for ft and bt we
obtain:
F (ht; kt) = fAkt h1 t , B (ht; kt) = bAkt h1 t
with f  (1 )+(1+(+(1 ))) and b  (1 ) (1+(+(1 )))+(1+(+(1 ))) and, by us-
ing condition (2.5), the income tax rate is equal to t =
f+b
1  = 1  
1+
(1 )(1+(+(1 ))+) . If  >
(1+)
1    (1  ) then t > 0.
Furthermore, the laws of motion of the state variables are:
kt+1 =
A (1 + )
 (1 +  (+  (1  )) + ) + k

t h
1 
t (2.47)
ht+1 = B

A (1  )
+ (1 +  (+  (1  )))

kt h
1 
t (2.48)
In balanced growth path ~kt+1 is constant over time. Let us denote with
p  (1 )+(1+(+(1 ))) , p  (1+)(1+(+(1 ))+)+ . Then, by using Eq.
(2.47) and (2.48) and rearranging, we obtain the steady state level of the
politico-economic allocation is equal to:
~f = Ap

A
B
p
(Ap)

 
1 (1 )
, ~k =

A
B
p
(Ap)

 1
1 (1 )
, ~y = A

A
B
p
(Ap)

 
1 (1 )
Then, the economys growth rate and the rental price of capital are, respec-
tively:
p  h

t+1
ht
=
 
AB1 


(1 )
p 

p
 1
1 (1 )
, Rp = 
 
AB1 


(1 )
p  1p
 1
1 (1 )
Corollario (8). From Lemma 2, taking  = 0 and solving backward, we
obtain Fm (ht; kt) = fmyt and Bm (ht; kt) = bmyt with fm  (1 )1+(+(1 ))
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and bm   (1+(+(1 )))1+(+(1 )) . Then, by using condition (2.5), the income tax
rate is equal to t = 1  1+(1 )(1+(+(1 ))) . Furthermore, the rental price
of capital, Rm

~k

, and the economys growth rate, 'm

~k

, in the median
voter case are equal to:
Rm

~k

= lim
!0
Rp

~k;

'm

~k

= lim
!0
'p

~k;

such that 'm

~k

> 'p

~k;

and Rm

~k

< Rp

~k;

.
Lemma (3). Using Eq. (2.33), (2.34), (2.36) and (2.37), we have that
Rm

~k

< Ro

~k; 

when mo <

m
o
 1

, and 'm

~f

> 'o

~f; 

when
m
o
>

o
m
 
1 
. The joint conditions imply o < m. Plugging the val-
ues for o and m we obtain that the Lemma holds for any  <  =
min
n
1+
(1+(+(1 ))) ; 1
o
.
Proposition (6). From Lemma 2, for any level of dynastic welfare weight
 < , we have:
Rm

~k

 Ro

~k; 

< 0
'm

~k

  'o

~k; 

> 0
Furthermore, according to Corollary 1, for any  > 0Rm

~k

< Rp

~k;

and
'm

~k

> 'p

~k;

. Thus, by continuity of functions R () and ' (), for any
 > 0, there exist  <  and ^ > 0, such that
Rp ~k; ^ Ro ~k; o < 
and
'p ~k; ^  'o ~k; o < .
Proposition (7). See proof of Proposition 4 under the balanced budget
condition given by Eq. (2.5).
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Chapter 3
Self-Commitment
Institutions and Cooperation
in Overlapping Generation
Games
"Precisely because our ability to impose exogenously the institutional structure that will
e¤ectively govern society has proven to be so weak, we must open up our analysis to the
evolution of rules from games of conict to games of cooperation. Instead of designing ideal
institutional settings....we have to examine the endogenous creation of the rules by social
participants themselves. The science and art of association is one of self-governance and not
necessarily one of constitutional craftsmanship. And herein lies the contribution that
contemporary research on anarchism can make to modern political economy." - Peter Boettke
3.1 Introduction
The study of the conditions, which sustain mutual cooperation among self-
interested agents, is a milestone in the social science literature. There are
three general ways to enforce mutual cooperative agreements and to achieve
e¢ ciency: i) Competition, ii) formal contracts, and iii) informal contracts.
As extensively known, the former fails in presence of market imperfections,
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while the second collapses in the case of no ex-post veriability and in ab-
sence of a third party external to the negotiation (i.e. the court) that guar-
antees the enforcement of the contract. In these circumstances informal
contracts may instead succeed in improving e¢ ciency. These contracts con-
sist of innite repetitions of agentsinteractions over time with no court to
credibly pre-commit over cooperative behavior, where the value of future in-
teractions serves as the reward and penalty to discipline the agentscurrent
behavior. From now on we refer to informal contracts as social norms, i.e.
as customary rules of behavior that coordinate the agentsinteractions.1
Past literature has focused on two types of enforceability mechanisms
to sustain social norms: personal and community enforcement. Under per-
sonal enforcement a cheater will only face retaliation by their victim. While,
in the case of community enforcement all members of the society react to
a deviation. The former is e¤ective when the same sets of players match
each other over time (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986). However in many eco-
nomic circumstances the same players do not meet repeatedly, instead they
change over time. Nevertheless, in this scenario community enforcement
may achieve e¢ ciency. As Kandori (1992a) shows, even in the case of trade
where agents change partners over time, any feasible rational allocation can
be sustained as long as other members of the society, who are not directly
involved in bilateral trading, sanction the defection of agents. To be e¤ec-
tive, community enforcement requires the existence of an exogenous, and
not manipulable, decentralized information transmission process, which cre-
ates labels that make defeating agents recognizable by all members of the
community.
Our analysis applies in a theoretical environment in which these tradi-
tional types of enforcement rarely work in achieving e¢ ciency, i.e. overlap-
ping generation (OLG) games with imperfect public monitoring. In OLG
games di¤erent organizations repeatedly interact over time. Even if the or-
ganizations survive indenitely over time, individuals with a nite life span
manage their own governance. Each member enters the organization in an
asynchronous way and interacts with other agents for a nite time before
being replaced by another individual after death.2 Due to the nite-horizon
1See Durlauf and Blume (2011) for a more rigorous denition and characterization of
social norms.
2Remarkable examples are provided by: The relationships between boards of directors
and the shareholders committees; interactions between regulators and rms; the com-
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interactions among players, personal punishment is very limited, and in some
cases totally prevented. Furthermore, community enforcement looses its ef-
fectiveness when agents imperfectly observe past history. In OLG games the
lack of perfect monitoring introduces an element of moral hazard, which in
some circumstances prevents the achievement of full e¢ ciency.3
The purpose of this research is to investigate the existence of an al-
ternative enforcement mechanism, which we refer to as Self-Commitment
Institution (SCI). This may sustain, and improve, cooperation in a non
cooperative setting when: i) Agents are nite-living periods OLG, and ii)
imperfectly observe past history. The economy we study is populated by
OLG of homogeneous agents living up two periods: Young and Old. Each
agent imperfectly observes the past public history and takes actions only
in the rst period of life. Young are endowed with one unit of productive
time and decide whether to partially transfer consumption goods to current
living Old. The elderly agents have no endowment and are completely pas-
sive. Given the sequential nature of the game, subsequent generations are
linked through strategic interaction and payo¤s functions. Intergenerational
cooperation emerges in equilibrium as long as Young decide to transfer con-
sumption goods to Old. Clearly, in a static setting the intergenerational
cooperation is not self-enforced. On the contrary, in a repeated interaction
setting we might investigate how the di¤erent enforcement mechanisms may
succeed in achieving e¢ ciency. Given that at each time period di¤erent
generations match each other, in our environment personal punishment is
totally interdicted.
We distinguish social norms into two categories: i) Social norms with-
out SCI, based on the community enforcement mechanism, and ii) social
norms with SCI, which associate the individual self-commitment decisions
to community enforcement. Two key features characterize social norms with
SCI. First, at each time period players may decide to self-commit by self-
expropriating a share of their endowment. Such resources are not required to
munitarian and international agreements among member States; the electoral promises
between political parties and the electorate.
3The argument is qualitatively similar to those discussed by both Radner, Myerson and
Maskin (1986) and Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1986) for repeated games environment.
Imperfect public observability generates an endogenous cost of monitoring, which makes
the best sustainable equilibrium payo¤ bounded away from fully e¢ ciency. Nevertheless
in this scenario, Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994) prove that the Folk theorem applies
when the fully ranking condition holds and agents play asymmetric public strategies.
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be used neither for productive nor for redistributive purposes. In an extreme
case we might interpret the self-expropriated endowment as purely wasted
resources, or alternatively as property rights transfers, if we assume the exis-
tence of a technology, which enables their transmission. Second, we abstract
from uncertainty about the realization of self-expropriation decisions. Once
these decisions are taken, all the members of the society perfectly observe
and recall the past self-commitment actions. Consequently, agents may con-
tingent their punishment decisions not only on the basis of the history of
public signals but also on the previous playersself-expropriation actions.
Since the self-expropriation does not lead to positive economic spillover,
from an ex-ante point of view the central planner with full taxation power
would never require agents to self-commit. On the contrary, in a repeated
setting with imperfect monitoring, if agents behavior is coordinated by social
norms with SCI, then the society may achieve higher e¢ ciency compared to
the cases in which agents coordinate on social norms without SCI.
Suppose that Young only observe a noisy signal of previous playersac-
tions. This assumption seems reasonable in the OLG environment, in which
agents live for a nite time and, after having entered an organization, they
become aware of previous history through reports transmitted by previous
generations in the form of public signals.4 As a consequence, the realiza-
tion of the signals constitutes the relevant information-gathering for current
agentsstrategic behavior. Apart from previous actions, the signals are also
a¤ected by a random exogenous component, which weakens the correlation
between private decision and the signal. A social norm on intergenerational
cooperation might be enforced by a simple community punishment mecha-
nism, which requires agents to permanently punish as soon as a negative sig-
nal is realized. Clearly, this enforcement mechanism turns out to be particu-
larly e¤ective in deterring agentsdefection. Nevertheless, it cannot succeed
in achieving full e¢ ciency, because with all probability at a certain point in
time a negative signal will emerge and, as a consequence, intergenerational
cooperation will break down, even if no one has actually deviated from the
cooperative path. Therefore, in an environment characterized by highly
volatile shocks the intergenerational cooperation sustained only by commu-
4Laguno¤ and Matsui (2004) analyze an environment with a lack of prior memory by
focusing on intergenerational message instead of public signals. In the presence of higher
degrees of intergenerational altruism and small costs of intergenerational communication,
the authors demonstrate that the Folk theorem holds.
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nity enforcement mechanism achieves low level of e¢ ciency. In this scenario
suppose that agents at each time period may decide not only if transfer-
ring intergenerational consumption good but also if self-expropriating part
of their endowment. In this environment self-expropriation acts as a reduc-
tion of the productive time endowment of Young. If agents believe that no
one will coordinate their strategy on the observable self-expropriation deci-
sions, in equilibrium they decide to never self-commit and only community
enforcement will ine¢ ciently enforce intergenerational cooperation. We re-
fer to this expectational coordination as social norms without SCI. On the
contrary, allow agents to believe that all generations will base their strategic
behavior not only on the public signals but also on the previous players
self-expropriation actions, which we refer to these as social norms with SCI.
The mechanism prescribes that if agents do not self-expropriate, then they
will be punished by future generations independently from the realization of
a public signal. As a consequence, if Young prefer to smooth consumption
over time, then self-commitment becomes a necessary condition to have pos-
itive expectation on future gains. More interestingly, self-expropriation is
also su¢ cient to sustain cooperation by relaxing the opportunistic behavior
of players in the implementation of intergenerational transfers. Indeed, by
necessarily self-expropriating, agents are actually self-committing on coop-
eration. They reduce the current marginal gain from deviation and, at the
same time, decrease the probability that future generations will punish in
the case of a bad signal, i.e. players becomes endogenously more optimistic.
As a result, the actorsself-commitment fosters the coordination e¤orts and
facilitates cooperative relationships, which would otherwise not exist. In
other terms, a society that adopts social norm with SCI might signicantly
improve the overall e¢ ciency.
Clearly, as long as players are able to fully detect earlier generations
defection (i.e. perfect observability of history), SCI acquires no value and
community enforcement is su¢ cient to sustain fully e¢ cient cooperative
equilibria. The existence of an imperfect monitoring technology, along with
the possibility of endogenously modifying the marginal benets from devi-
ations, are necessary for making SCI valuable in repeated OLG settings.
This result helps to stress the role of SCI as institution able to sustain co-
operation when the moral hazard issue is a relevant feature of the economic
environment.
98 Chapter 3
Heretofore, we have stressed the role of SCI excluding the possibility of
productively allocating the self-expropriated resources. A direct extension
and application of the basic setup is to allow SCI to be productive, for exam-
ple in terms of education provision. In this scenario, the self-expropriated
resources are more appropriately treated as property right transfers, when
we consider the existence of a technology, which transforms the transferred
endowment into future productive assets. A large corpus of literature exists
on intergenerational transfers, which justify the education provision for the
sustainability of the Welfare state in a payroll pension system. Three main
theoretical justications for the investment in human capital in a context
of intergenerational cooperation have been proposed: altruistic (or bequest)
motives, endogenous asset returns, voting and political sharing rules.5 The
possibility of enhancing e¢ ciency in a context characterized by imperfect
observability through the implementation of social norms with SCI provides
an alternative justication. The application ts well with the required con-
ditions, to allow SCI to be e¤ective. First, it is plausible to assume that the
share of time used by parents to provide education to their children will be
perfectly observable, at least by the children who directly receive the par-
entsendowment. Second, more the time devoted to the children education
is, lower are the marginal benets coming from not contributing to payroll
pension transfers.
In this paper we derive the conditions under which social norms with
SCI outperform social norms without SCI. The concept of Public Perfect
Equilibrium (PPE), as developed by Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990)
is adapted to an OLG game in order to characterize the best sustainable
equilibrium payo¤s generated by both social norms and to derive the value
of SCI. We interpret education provision in terms of productive SCI and,
nally, we conclude. All the proofs are provided in the appendix.
5Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999) analyze the interaction between education and social
security by adopting an altruistic motive. Boldrin and Montes (2005) formalize public
education and PAYG system as two parts of an intergenerational contract where public
pension is the return on the investment into the human capital of the next generation. In
Lancia and Russos model (2011) selsh adults buy insurance for their future old age by
paying productive education transfers to their children to raise the labor productivity of
the next period. When old they partially grab the bigger output in the form of PAYG
transfers by exerting political power in a probabilistic voting environment.
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3.2 Past literature
This paper draws on two main research strands of literature. The rst
concerns the study of cooperative behavior in games played by overlapping
generations of agents, while the second relates to the analyses of cooperation
in a repeated interaction setting under imperfect public monitoring.
Sizeable literature has focused on the study of intergenerational cooper-
ation without considering informational constraints. Starting from the sem-
inal work of Hammond (1975), who examined a non-cooperative game ver-
sion of Samuelsons consumption-loan model showing that a Pareto e¢ cient
allocation is attained by a subgame perfect equilibrium, various Folk The-
orems have been proved by more general OLG structures (Cremer (1986),
Salant (1988), Kandori (1992b) and Smith (1992)).6 The main insights from
this branch of literature is that any mutually benecial outcome could be
sustained as long as agents are patient and/or live long enough and each
individual can perfectly observe the past. More recent papers have studied
how the introduction of informational constraints a¤ects the emergence of
cooperation and, in turns, the possibility to achieve e¢ ciency in games with
repeated interactions. Bhaskar (1998) examines the role of general infor-
mational constraints in 2-period Samuelson OLG consumption-loan games.
The author shows that if players have nite memory, then Pareto improving
transfers are not sustainable in pure strategy equilibria. Nevertheless, allow
agents to observe at least the period before their arrival, then optimal trans-
fers are sustainable in mixed strategies setting. However, cooperation turns
out to be not robust to small random perturbation.7 More severe informa-
tional constraints have been introduced in recent works that examine OLG
games where cheap-talk intergenerational communication is introduced. La-
guno¤ and Matsui (2004) proves in an OLG game with no prior memory,
costly communication and intergenerational altruism, that the Folk Theo-
6Cremer (1986) analyses a generalization of the prisonersdilemma in an OLG setting,
to show that cooperation can be sustained by the reversion to the Nash equilibrium of
the stage game, as long as agents are patient and/or live long enough. Salant (1988)
proves the Folk Theorem with particular simple equilibria in two-person games with some
restriction on the payo¤ functions. Kandori (1992b) extend Salants analysis for a general
N-person games where players in the same cohort interact for a long time, and then are
gradually replaced by the next generation of players. Smith (1992) presents a variation
and extension of Kandoris model.
7See Cole and Kocherlakota (2005) for an extension of Bhaskars nite memory setting
to the case of imperfect observability.
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rem holds when either communication costs are small enough, or individual
are su¢ ciently altruistic. Laguno¤, Anderlini and Gerardi (2005) extend
the basic setup by introducing private communication in a dynastic game.
Diverging from previous literature, although we allow agents to perfectly
recall past history, we introduce imperfect public monitoring as an informa-
tional constraint.8 As a consequence, our paper also refers to a strand of lit-
erature that has studied cooperation in repeated setting where agents adopt
public strategies. In the spirit of dynamic programming, Abreu, Pearce and
Stacchetti (1990) introduce and illustrate the ideas of self-generating set
of equilibrium payo¤s and factorization to prove a recursive formulation of
the repeated game with imperfect public monitoring. We extend the analy-
sis of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring à la Abreu, Pearce
and Stacchetti (1990) to characterize the Public Perfect Equilibria (PPE)
in the OLG setup. Several authors have investigated strongly symmetric
PPE equilibria, where players use the same strategy after every history, and
have applied this equilibrium concept in a rich class of economic problems
(Green and Porter (1984), Radner, Myerson and Maskin (1986), Abreu,
Milgrom and Pearce (1991)).9 By restricting the equilibrium allocation to
strongly symmetric strategies in contexts characterized by limited observ-
ability of past actions, the e¢ ciency cannot typically be attained. Indeed,
the equilibrium payo¤s turn out to be bounded away from the Pareto fron-
tier.10 We contribute to the previous literature by analyzing how in OLG
games with imperfect public monitoring, where agents are restricted to play
strongly symmetric public strategies, cooperation might be sustained by SCI
8 In reality long-term relationships are often plagued by imperfect monitoring. For
example, a country may not verify exactly how much CO2 is emitted by neighboring
countries. Workers in a joint project may not directly observe each others e¤ort. In
such situation, however, there are usually some pieces of information, or signals, which
imperfectly reveal what actions have been taken. Published meteorological data indicates
the amount of CO2 emission, and the success of the project is more likely with higher
e¤ort.
9Green and Porter (1984) study Cournot competition characterized by noisy demand in
a repeated setting. As main result, rms are prevented to achieve the rst-best monopoly
prots as long as price warsemerge in equilibrium. Radner, Myerson and Maskin (1986)
present an example of a repeated partnership game with imperfect monitoring in which
the set of PPE payo¤s turns out to be bounded away from the Pareto frontier even as the
discount factor tends to 1. Finally, Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) analyze in a similar
environment how changes in the timing of information may increase the possibilities for
cooperation, starting from an equilibrium allocation, which is constrained e¢ cient.
10Nevertheless, Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994) prove that under fully ranking
condition a Folk theorem applies when agents play asymmetric public strategies.
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improving ex-ante e¢ ciency.
3.2.1 Theoretical Debate on Self-Enforcing Institutions
This research also refers to a signicant and still open debate on self-enforcing
institutions, whose applications spread out from the study of self-enforcing
wage setting to the analyses of self-organization and vertical integration in
rms. The debate mainly concerns the possibility of making informal agree-
ments self-enforcing and desirable in terms of e¢ ciency from an ex-ante
point of view with respect to contractual relationship codied in a contin-
gent court-enforceable contract. As Dany Rodrik suggests:11 "I do not have
any trouble with the idea that self-enforcing agreements can sometimes sub-
stitute for third-party (i.e. government) enforcement. Such self-enforcing
agreements are maintained through the force of repeated interaction (if
you cheat me now, I will cheat you in the future,) through reputational
mechanisms (see, I am not the cheating kind of guy), and collective pun-
ishment schemes (if you cheat me, I will bring the wrath of my colleagues
on you).[...] The problem with self-enforcing agreements is that they do not
scale up. One of the ndings from Elinor Ostroms extensive case studies is
that self-enforcing arrangements to manage the commonswork well only
when the geographic scope of the activity is clearly delimited and member-
ship is xed. It is easy to understand why. Cooperation under anarchyis
based on reciprocity, which in turn requires observability. I need to be able
to observe whether you are behaving according to the rules, and if not, I
have to be able to sanction you."
Thus, xed memberships and observability of past actions are identied
as necessary conditions for making self-enforcing agreements really e¤ective.
However, several relevant economic and political situations exist where these
two main criteria cannot be met. In these cases e¤ective and costly monitor-
ing technologies are required in order to sustain cooperative behavior over
time. There exist a lot of di¤erent devices to measure the past agentsper-
formance, which have been widely studied in the previous literature, such as
labeling, trade marks or licensing. All of them however su¤er of both large
transaction costs,12 especially in highly complex relationship, and strate-
11Unbound Cato Journal, 2009.
12We refer to transaction costs as the cost of coordinating the increasingly complex
interdependent parts of an economy by acquiring the information to measure the multiple
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gic manipulability or corruption, which make self-enforceability of informal
agreement always challenging.
Self-Commitment Institution might be interpreted as an endogenous
commitment device. Agents invest in a specic asset and, by doing so,
foster cooperation even when membership is not xed and agents simply
observe a noisy measure of past performance.
3.3 The Model
In this paper we study an overlapping generation (OLG) game where agents
imperfectly observe past history. Time is discrete and indexed by t =
0; 1; 2; :::. Two ongoing organizations exist, whose members enter in an
asynchronous way and overlap for K period, where K = 1. Each organiza-
tions member is a risk-neutral selsh player living up T = 2 periods, Young
and Old, where T is the individual life span. For notational purpose let us
denote with t the generation born at time t. Fig. 1 reports the entry-exit
structure of the game.
Fig. 10: OLG Structure
Young are endowed with one unit of time and produce a non-storable
good by adopting a linear technology, while Old have an endowment, which
is normalized to zero. Agents are active only in the rst period of their
life, while they are completely passive in the second period. Consequently,
the game turns out to be characterized by one-side enforceability problem at
each time, and personal punishment is interdicted. Specically, at each time
t Young face two di¤erent actions, at 2 A  f0; ag and bt 2 B  f0; bg with
a 2 (0; 1) and b 2 (0; 1), where A and B denote the set of actions of player
dimensions of exchanges. Furthermore, transaction costs are also costs of enforcing agree-
ments and in making credible commitments across time and space. For a broad discussion
of institutions, transaction costs and production see North (1987).
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t. First, they decide the share of time to be used for production, 1   bt.
Second, they choose the amount of transfers to devote to current living
old, (1  bt) at. The remaining resources are consumed, (1  bt) (1  at).
Conditionally on at, the benets of elderly agents are d > 0 if at > 0,
otherwise, if at = 0, they get no benets.13 We can interpret the decision at
as the intergenerational consumption good transfer, while bt is identiable
as the self-expropriation decision. Since bt does not lead to any benets, if
Young choose bt > 0 then they self-expropriate a share of their resources
and use it as self-commitment device.
The preference of generation t is the mapping  := A  B  A ! R+,
and is given by:
 (at; bt; at+1) = (1  bt) (1  at) + dI (at+1) (3.1)
where I (at+1) is an indicator function, which is equal to one when at+1 > 0
and equal to zero otherwise. Thus, the autarky payo¤ is equal to aut = 1.
Assumption 7 (Payo¤ Ranking Condition) The payo¤ ranking condi-
tion requires:
 (a; bt; 0) <  (0; bt; 0) <  (a; bt; a) <  (0; bt; a)
which implies d > (1  bt) a+ bt for each bt.
By Assumption 7 we replicate the incentive structure of a prisoner dilemma
game. Intergenerational cooperation Pareto dominates autarky payo¤. Fur-
thermore, incentives for opportunistic behavior emerge, since players gain
by receiving transfers when old without paying when young.
We focus on the self-enforceability of intergenerational contracts when
agents may observe only a noisy signal of previous generationsperformance
in terms of intergenerational transfers.14 At each time agents observe a
public signal z 2 Z  fX;Y g, where X stands for good signal and Y for
bad signal. The conditional distribution, pa = Pr (Y jat), is a¤ected by the
13Note that the elderly benets do not depend on the young decision over b. See par. 6
for the extension to productive b.
14Only the current living Old directly observe the Young a-decision, but we avoid the
possibility of intergenerational communication, as Laguno¤ and Matsui (2004) do.
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a action of the previous generation, and it is denoted by:
p0 = Pr (Y j0) (3.2)
p1 = Pr (Y ja) (3.3)
Assumption 8 (Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property) Given p0 2 (0; 1)
and p1 2 (0; 1) the monotone likelihood ratio property requires p1  12  p0.
Assumption 8 guarantees that the probability of receiving a good signal
is positively correlated with the agentschoice over intergenerational con-
sumption good transfer. Let us denote with L  p0p1 the likelihood ratio.
Under Assumption 8, L 2 [1;1). If L = 1, then p0 = p1 and as a con-
sequence agents cannot detect deviations by observing signals. Vice versa,
if L = 1, then p1 ! 0 and p0 ! 1, and agents perfectly detect previous
playersdeviations.
Denition 9 (OLG game) The collection (; pa;K; T ) is referred to as
an OLG game, which is denoted by G (; pa;K; T ).
As a benchmark, we consider the e¢ cient allocation implemented by the
central planner with full taxation power, which is equal to:
 = (1  b) (1  a) + d
where b = 0 and a < d. Due to the absence of benets generated by the
self-expropriation decision, the optimality requires agents to no self-commit.
3.3.1 Public Perfect Equilibrium and Social Norms
We study the best sustainable strongly symmetric Public Perfect Equilib-
rium (PPE) of the OLG game, where agents play correlated public strategies.
We consider a public randomization device, (t)
1
t=0, as a collection of inde-
pendent random variables, uniformly distributed on the unit interval. Let
us refer to t  (0; 1; :::; t) and zt  (z0; z1; :::zt) as the vectors of public
randomization devices and public signals till time t, respectively. Further-
more, let us denote with bt  (b0; b1; :::; bt 1) the vector of b-choices taken by
agents till time t. Di¤erently from the intergenerational consumption good
transfers, the self-expropriation decisions are perfectly observable. Conse-
quently, the public history observed by generation t is ht   zt; bt; t 2 Ht,
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where Ht is the set of possible t public histories. For each s  t by zs
 
ht

,
s
 
ht

and bs
 
ht

we refer to as the realizations of zs, s and bs in the
public history ht, respectively.
For any t-generation we dene pure public strategies the mappings:
t := H
t ! A such that at = t
 
ht
 2 A
and
t := H
t ! B such that bt = t
 
ht
 2 B
Note that we assume that agents can only be distinguished through their
history. Given that all the individuals are ex-ante identical, we are restricting
ourselves to symmetric strategies, in the sense that each player uses the same
strategy after every history. Furthermore, we denote the innite vectors
  (t)1t=0 and   (t)1t=0 as the strategy proles.
Reformulating Eq. (3.1), the ex-ante payo¤ for every t-generation con-
ditionally on the history ht is given by:

 
t; tjht

=
 
1  t
 
ht
  
1  t
 
ht

+ dEt
 
I
 
t+1
 
ht+1
 jht
where Et
 jht is the expected operator conditional on information at time
t.
Denition 10 (PPE) A prole (; ) is a PPE of G (; pa;K; T ) if:
i. t and t are public strategies for each t  0;
ii. For each date t and public history ht, the strategies t and t are Nash
equilibrium from that date onwards.
A particular equilibrium strategy of the OLG game G (; p;K; T ) can be
identied as a social norm which prescribes a specic behavioral rule. After
being established, the social norm continues being in force because agents
prefer to conform to that rule, given the expectation that others are going
to conform.15 Consequently, social norms coordinate expectations reducing
transaction costs in interactions that possess multiple equilibria. We provide
the denition of social norm we will refer to in the following analyses.
15See Lewis (1969).
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Denition 11 (Social Norm) The social norm is the specication of a
particular equilibrium customary rule of behavior that coordinate interac-
tions among agents.
In a repeated interaction framework, social norms are typically sustained
by two kinds of enforcement mechanisms: Personal and community enforce-
ment. Under personal enforcement a cheater will only face retaliation by
their victim. On the contrary, under community enforcement all members
of the society react to a deviation according to specic social norms. Given
the peculiar structure of the OLG game described above, in G (; p;K; T )
personal enforcement cannot be exerted and social norms might be sustained
only through community enforcement. In this paper we introduce a third
enforcement mechanism, that we call Self-Commitment Institution, which
requires agents to self-commit by partially self-expropriating their own re-
sources, i.e. bt > 0 for some t. We distinguish two types of social norms:
Social norms without SCI and social norms with SCI.
Denition 12 (Social Norm without SCI) A social norm without SCI
is a social norm which requires agents to coordinate on the adoption of com-
munity punishment mechanism.
Denition 13 (Social Norm with SCI) A social norm with SCI is a so-
cial norm which requires agents to coordinate on the adoption of both com-
munity punishment mechanisms and self-expropriation. The following two
features characterize it:
i. Players may decide to self-commit by self-expropriating a share of their
resources, bt > 0 for some t;
ii. Punishment is contingent on the b-decisions of previous players.
For expositional purpose, we provide an automaton representation of
social norms as the collection  
n
W;w0;
 
f i

i2fa;bg ; 
o
. W is the set of
phases which characterize the strategy, w0 2W is the initial phase, f i with
i 2 fa; bg is the decision rule which associates to each phase an action prole,
fa : W ! A and f b : W ! B, and  is the transition function, equal to
the mapping  := W  Z  B !  (W ), where  (W ) is the probability
distribution over phases. Finally,  j is the nite set of equilibria payo¤s
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attained implementing the strategy j for j 2 f(a) ; (ab)g, where (a) stands
for social norms without SCI while (ab) denotes social norm with SCI.
In the analyses to follow we rst characterize the best sustainable strongly
symmetric pure strategy equilibria payo¤under imperfect monitoring, which
can be sustained by social norms without SCI. Second, we study how social
norms with SCI enable agents to attain higher e¢ ciency with respect to the
former equilibria allocations. Finally we derive the value of SCI and discuss
its extension in terms of productive SCI.16
3.4 Social Norms without Self-Commitment Insti-
tution
In this section we present an analysis that helps to determine the set of
equilibria payo¤s in the OLG game where agents coordinate on social norms
which do not require the activation of SCI, i.e.  a = [amin; 
a
max]. The analy-
sis allows us to gain insights as to the reasons why social norms with SCI
can outperform social norms, which are simply enforced by implementing
community punishment mechanisms.
We adopt the following methodology: First, we consider a particular
social norm without SCI, ~a, candidate to be a PPE of G (; pa;K; T ), and
we determine the corresponding best sustainable payo¤, ~amax. Second, we
prove that the best equilibrium payo¤ sustained by social norms without
SCI, amax, coincides with ~
a
max.
Proposition 8 The set of equilibrium payo¤s obtained by implementing so-
cial norms without SCI in the OLG game G (; pa;K; T ) is equal to the nite
set  a = [amin; 
a
max], where 
a
min = aut and 
a
max = ~
a
max.
Proof. (See appendix).
To determine ~amax let us consider the following strategy, ~
a:
t
 
ht

=
(
0 if 9 s < t such that zs
 
ht

= Y and s
 
ht
  ,
a otherwise.
(3.4)
16We refer to either social norm with SCI or without SCI as the selection of a particular
type of PPE equilibrium. The former is characterized by the common expectation that all
generations will coordinate their behavior not only on the public signal realizations but
also on the individual self-expropriation decision, while in the latter case agents expect
future generation will coordinate their strategies just on the public signals history.
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The social norm described in Eq. (3.4), has the following equivalent two-
phase automaton representation, ~a = fW;w0; fa; g, with W = fwC ; wP g,
where wC is the cooperation phase and wP is the punishment phase. Agents
start to play cooperatively, i.e. w0 = wC , and the output function at each
phase assigns the following decision rule, fa (wC) = a and fa (wP ) = 0.
By convention, we denote with  (w; z) the transition probability to the
phase wC given the current phase w and the public signal z. The transition
function of ~a prescribes:
 (w; z) =
8><>:
1 if w = wC ; z = X
 if w = wC ; z = Y
0 if w = wP ; 8z
We can interpret  as the probability each t-generation assigns to future
generationsdecision to switch to cooperative phase even if a bad signal will
be realized. Fig. 11 provides a graphical representation of ~a.
Fig. 11: ~a automaton for the OLG game.
The strategy ~a is then characterized by two possible phases: a coop-
erate phase and a punishmentphase. Players start in the cooperate
phase, and stay there until they observe a bad signal and a su¢ ciently high
realization of . After that they start playing a permanent punishment
and intergenerational cooperation is no longer sustained.17 Since wP is acti-
vated on the equilibrium path as soon as a bad signal is realized and agents
cannot exit this phase, ~a implies loss of e¢ ciency and induces boundedness
of the strongly symmetric PPE payo¤s. To determine the maximum pay-
o¤ attainable implementing the strategy ~a, let wC and wP be the value
17 It follows that ~a is similar to a grim-trigger strategy played in a game with perfect
monitoring. The major di¤erence concerns the fact that wP is activated on the equilibrium
path as soon as a bad signal is realized and agents cannot exit this phase.
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functions in the cooperative and punishment phases, respectively. They are
given by:
wC = (1  a) + d [p1+ (1  p1)] (3.5)
and
wP = 1
For the strategy (3.4) to be an equilibrium, it must be true that in the
cooperative phase players prefer to play t
 
ht

= a rather than to deviate
to t
 
ht

= 0:
wC  1 + d [p0+ (1  p0)] (3.6)
By solving for  we get:
  1  a
d (p0   p1)   (3.7)
 is clearly strictly less than one. Furthermore, it is non negative as long as:
p1  p0   a
d
On the other side, it must be true that in the punishment phase players
prefer to play t
 
ht

= 0 rather than to deviate to t
 
ht

= a:
wP  1  a
which is trivially satised. Moreover, for wC to be the best sustainable
equilibrium payo¤ of strategy ~a, the condition (3.7) must be satised with
equality. Otherwise, we can increase  and thereby wC implied by the Eq.
(3.5) without violating the equilibrium condition (3.6). Plugging  =  into
wC allows us to determine the max payo¤, ~
a
max:
~amax = 1  a+ d  Ca (p0; p1)
where Ca (p0; p1)  aL 1 with a = a.
The ine¢ ciency due to the presence of imperfect monitoring is fully
captured by the term Ca (p0; p1), which represents the endogenous cost of
monitoring. The higher the likelihood ratio (i.e. the higher the probabil-
ity to detect deviations), the lower the cost of monitoring. Furthermore,
the function Ca () is increasing in the current gain from deviation, a.
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Consequently, by using strongly symmetric public strategies, the equilib-
rium payo¤ is necessarily bounded above and full e¢ ciency can never be
attained.18
From Proposition 8 we have that the best sustainable equilibrium payo¤
achieved by the strategy ~a is also equal to the highest payo¤ attained by
social norms without SCI, i.e. by equilibrium strategies in which agents
dont coordinate their behavior on the self-expropriation decisions of the
other players.
Corollary 9 If amax > 
a
min then the equilibrium strategy that delivers 
a
max
is equal to ~a.
Proof. (See appendix).
The result in Corollary 9 is equivalent to that achieved by Abreu et al.
(1990) in innite repeated game with imperfect public monitoring. The main
di¤erences are that we consider an OLG game and one-side enforceability
at each period.
3.5 Social Norms with Self-Commitment Institu-
tion
In this section we introduce SCI as an alternative enforcement mechanism,
which enables agents to attain higher payo¤ even if PPE are restricted to
strongly symmetric strategies. We determine the nite set of equilibrium
payo¤ achieved by social norms with SCI, i.e.  ab =

abmin; 
ab
max

. Equiv-
alently to the previous analyses on social norms without SCI, we rst con-
sider a particular social norm with SCI, ~ab, candidate to be a PPE of
G (; pa;K; T ), determining the corresponding best sustainable payo¤, ~abmax.
Second, we prove that the best equilibrium payo¤ sustained by social norms
with SCI, abmax, coincides with ~
ab
max.
Proposition 9 The set of equilibrium payo¤s obtained by implementing so-
cial norms with SCI in the OLG game G (; pa;K; T ) is equal to the nite
set  ab =

abmin; 
ab
max

, with abmin = aut and 
ab
max = ~
ab
max.
18Kandori and Obara (2006) showed in a prisonersdilemma game how players can some-
times make better use of information by adopting private strategies and how e¢ ciency in
repeated game with imperfect public monitoring can be improved. In the intergenerational
game described so far, because of the one-side enforceability structure and the timing of
the game, private strategies do not succeed in improving e¢ ciency.
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Proof. (See appendix).
To determine ~abmax let us consider the following strategy, ~
ab:
 
t
 
ht

; t
 
ht

=
8><>: (0; 0) if 9 s < t such that
(
zs
 
ht

= Y and s
 
ht
  
bs
 
ht

= 0 8z
(a; b) otherwise.
(3.8)
Fig. 12 provides a graphical representation of ~ab.
Fig. 12: ~ab automaton for the OLG game.
Di¤erently from the strategy reported in (3.4), the activation of SCI
allows the players to coordinate punishment not only on the realization
of public signal but also on the self-expropriation decisions taken by the
previous generations. The social norm (3.8) has the following equivalent
three-phase automaton representation: ~ab =
n
W;w0;
 
f i

i=a;b
; 
o
. W is
equal to the vector fwC ; wP1; wP2g, where wC is the cooperation phase
and wP1 and wP2 are di¤erent punishment phases generated by the two
possible deviations. The initial phase is w0 = wC , and the decision rules
are
 
fa (wC) = a; f
b (wC) = b

and
 
fa (wPi) = 0; f
b (wPi) = 0

for each i =
1; 2. By  (w; z; b) we denote the transition probability to wC given the cur-
rent phase w, the public signal z and the self-commitment decision b. The
transition function of ~ab prescribes:
112 Chapter 3
 (w; z; b) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if w = wC ; z = X; b > 0
 if w = wC ; z = Y; b > 0
0 if w = wC ; 8z; b = 0
0 if w 2 fwP1; wP2g ; 8z; 8b
Di¤erently from ~a, the strategy ~ab requires the activation of a second type
of punishment phase. The two punishment phases are distinguished because
of the possible deviations, which might be exerted by previous generations.
As in ~a, if zs
 
ht

= Y then wP1 is activated with probability (1  ).
In addition, agents are now punished also if bs
 
ht

= 0 for any possible
realization of public signals.
Let wC , wP1 and wP2 be the value functions in the cooperative and
punishment phases, respectively. They are given by:
wC = (1  b) (1  a) + d [p1 + (1  p1)]
and
wP1 = wP2 = 1
As in ~a, the strategy ~ab is an equilibrium if and only if in each phase
the prescribed actions satisfy the incentive requirements. For the strategy
(3.8) to be an equilibrium, it must be true that in the cooperative phase,
wC , agents prefer to play 
 
ht

= a and 
 
ht

= b rather than either to
deviate to t
 
ht

= 0 and t
 
ht

= b:
wC  (1  b) + d [p0 + (1  p0)] (3.9)
or, alternatively, to deviate to t
 
ht

= 0 and t
 
ht

= 0:19
wC  1 (3.10)
By simultaneously solving the inequality (3.9) and (3.10) for , we get
 2 M  ;  where   a+b(1 a)dp1   1 p1p1 and   1   a(1 b)d(p0 p1) . To be
19Note that the deviation 
 
ht

= a and 
 
ht

= 0 is dominated by inequality (3.10)
and thus disregarded.
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feasible, i.e. M 6= ?, we require:
p1  d  b  a (1  b)
d  b p0 (3.11)
 is clearly strictly less than one. Furthermore,  is non negative as long as:
p1  p0   a (1  b)
d
(3.12)
On the other side, it is trivial to prove that, for each a or b, the incentive
constraints in punishment phases are always satised.
To determine the maximal element of  ab we look for the appropriate
 which maximizes the individual payo¤ without violating the incentive
constraints (3.9) and (3.10), i.e.  = . Note that b positively a¤ects .
Remark 7 The larger the amount of the self-expropriated endowment, the
higher the probability that, if a bad signal is realized, future generations will
decide to not punish.
Plugging  =  into wC allows us to determine best sustainable payo¤s,
abmax, equal to:
~abmax = (1  b) (1  a) + d  Cab (p0; p1)
where Cab (p0; p1)  abL 1 with ab  a (1  b).
As before, the ine¢ ciency arising out of imperfect monitoring is captured
by the term Cab (p0; p1), which turns out to be negatively a¤ected by the self-
expropriation decision, i.e. @C
ab()
@b < 0. The implementation of SCI reduces
the endogenous cost of monitoring and under particular conditions attains
higher e¢ ciency with respect to social norms which do not activate SCI.20
Note, even if the two punishment phases appears to be very similar in nature,
they are substantially di¤erent. While wP1 is activated on the equilibrium
path as in ~a, wP2 is an out of equilibrium punishment path. Since b-
decision is perfectly observable and agents are immediately punished if they
decide to not self-commit, in equilibrium they will always choose to self-
expropriate. However, the existence of such o¤ the equilibrium punishment
path reduces the need of on equilibrium punishment: The self-commitment
decision reduces the current gain from deviation, i.e. ab < a, then agents
20See par. 3:5:1.
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cheat future generations over the intergenerational transfer decision with
lower probability. As a consequence, intergenerational cooperation under
imperfect monitoring is easier sustained, achieving ex-ante higher e¢ ciency.
Proposition 9 states that the highest payo¤attained by social norms with
SCI is exactly equal to the best sustainable equilibrium payo¤ achieved by
the strategy ~ab.21
Corollary 10 If abmax > 
ab
min then ~
ab is one of the equilibrium strategies
that delivers abmax.
Proof. (See appendix).
3.5.1 Value of Self-Commitment
What is the price that agents were willing to pay for SCI? Here, we determine
the gain in e¢ ciency attained by implementing social norms that adopt SCI,
compared to social norms that do not require SCI.
Proposition 10 Under the conditions (3.11) and (3.12), if p1  (1  a) p0
then there exists a non-empty parametric space, P , where for each (p0; p1) 2
P , ~ab leads to higher e¢ ciency w.r.t. ~a, i.e. ~ a  ~ ab.
Proof. (See Appendix).
For each (p0; p1) 2 P , the equilibrium strategy ~ab succeeds in sustaining
PPE and attains higher individual maximal payo¤s, i.e. abmax > 
a
max. In the
parametric space P the benets coming from the implementation of SCI in
terms of reduction in the endogenous monitoring cost are larger with respect
to the costs generated by the self-expropriation of personal endowment.
Let us denote with   abmax  amax the value of SCI, which is equal to:
 = b

a
L
L  1   1

(3.13)
21Note that ~ab prescribes to reverse to the worst sustainable equilibrium as soon as
a player decides not to self-commit. In other terms the out-of-equilibrium beliefs, which
sustain ~ab as PPE of the game G (; pa;K; T ), requires zero continuation values in the
case of bs
 
ht

= 0 for some s < t. This is actually just one of the possible equilibrium
strategies, which delivers the best sustainable payo¤ among social norms with SCI. Indeed,
it is possible to relax such out-of-equilibrium beliefs, introducing an additional correlation
device, we denote (t )
1
t=0, which enables agents to not be punished both after a bad signal,
 = Y , and a good signal,  = X, if the realization of t is su¢ ciently high.
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The marginal impacts of (p0; p1) on  are @@p1 > 0 and
@
@p0
< 0 with
 @@p1  > @@p0 .
Fig. 13 plots the feasibility space, P , and the corresponding SCI-value,
, considering the upper envelope of the triangle ABC and plotting over p0.
Fig. 13: Value of Self-Commitment Institution
The point A =

1
2 +
a(1 b)
d ;
1
2

represents the maximum value achievable
by . Let us take p1 = 12 and plug p0 = p1  a(1 b)d into Eq. (3.13), then we
obtain that for d > 2 (1  b) (1  a) the maximum value of SCI is equal to:
max =
(d  2 (1  b) (1  a)) b
2 (1  b)
Whereas = 0 in the two extremesB =

1
2(1 a) ;
1
2

and C =

1 b
d ;
(1 b)(1 a)
d

.
Note that the SCI value decreases when the monitoring becomes perfect.
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This result helps to stress the role of self-commitment as institution, which,
if implementable, might sustain e¢ cient cooperation when the moral hazard
issue is explicitly considered as a relevant feature of the economic environ-
ment.
3.6 Productive Self-Commitment: The Role of Ed-
ucation
In this section we extend the basic environment to test the robustness of
the theoretic results presented in the previous paragraphs, and to show
relevant policy implications. We consider the more realistic case of using
the self-expropriated resources to productive investment for future genera-
tions. Obviously, the positive impact of SCI is further magnied by growth
motives. Adopting this slight change of the theoretic environment we can
easily explain the emergence of education provision for the sustainability of
intergenerational contracts, out of the traditional altruistic and asset return
arguments.
Let us now consider a more general setting, where agents are risk ad-
verse and live up to three periods: Young, Adult and Old. The utility is
represented by the following separable additive function:
 (c1t; c2t+1) = u (c1t) + u (c2t+1)
where u (0) = 0, u0 (c)  0 and u00 (c)  0.  2 (0; 1) represents the in-
dividual discount factor. c1t and c2t+1 are consumption of Adult and Old,
respectively. Young do not consume. For notational purpose let us denote
with     cu00(c)u0(c) the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. As in the previous
sections, at each time t Adults face two di¤erent actions, at 2 A and bt 2 B,
where A and B denote the nite set of actions of the players. They decide
the share of time to be used for production, while the remaining time is
devoted for children education, bt. Furthermore, they choose the amount
of consumption good to be transferred to current living Old. In the mean-
while, Young transform the received endowment in human capital, which is
used for next period production. We assume the existence of a technology
F := B ! R+ which has the following properties:
Assumption 9 (Technology) F (0) = 0, F 0 (bt)  0, and F 00 (bt)  0.
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Let  (b 1; b )  1+F (b 1) b , which under Assumption 9 is greater
than 1 for any level of b . The individual resource constraints must hold at
each time t, and are equal to:
c1t   (bt 1; bt) (1  at)
c2t+1   (bt; bt+1) at+1
Now the OLG game resembles the classical intergenerational games, which
have been widely studied in earlier literature, preserving at the same time
the main features of the game described in the previous sections.
The rst best allocation attained by the central planner with full taxation
power is equal to:
 = u ((1 + F (b)  b) (1  a)) + u ((1 + F (b)  b) a)
where the optimal choices a and b solve the following rst order conditions,
respectively:
at : u
0 ((1 + F (b)  b) (1  a))  u0 ((1 + F (b)  b) a) = 0
bt : F
0 (b)  1 = 0
Note that, due to the positive spillover e¤ects generated by the self-expropriation
decision, an optimal level of b > 0 exists.
Under perfect monitoring, the allocation (a; b) can be sustained as a
subgame perfect equilibrium of the intergenerational game, as showed by
Rangel (2003). He proves that the existence of at (i.e. backward transfers)
sustains the investment in bt (i.e. forward transfers). Without the former
the productive investment turns out to be ine¢ ciently low due to hold-
up problems. We revert Rangels perspective by providing a new justica-
tion for education investment. Moving in a more realistic imperfect mon-
itoring environment we show how, and under which conditions, the self-
expropriation transfers (forward transfers) plays a relevant role in sustain-
ing optimal intergenerational cooperation reducing players opportunistic
behavior.
We limit the analyses to stationary equilibria, such that at each time
at 2 f0; ag and bt 2 f0; bg with a and b greater than zero. Public signals are
generated by the stochastic process given by Eq. (3.2) and (3.3). If agents
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coordinate on the social norm (3.4), i.e. without activating SCI, then they
attain the following best sustainable payo¤:
amax = u (1  a) + u (a) 
a
L  1
where a  u (1)   u (1  a). Implementing SCI by adopting the social
norm described in (3.8), intergenerational cooperation might attain as best
sustainable payo¤ the following value:
abmax = u ( (b) (1  a)) + u ( (b) a) 
ab
L  1
where ab  u ( (b))   u ( (b) (1  a)). Note that the productive SCI
generates two e¤ects. The rst is related to technological reasons and is
quantify by the gain:
DT (b)  1 + 2 (3.14)
where 1  u ( (b) (1  a))   u (1  a) and 2  u ( (b) a)   u (a). Under
Assumption 9, DT (b) is always greater than zero. The second e¤ect is
instead related to strategic reasons as widely discussed in section 3:5, whose
impact is given by:
DS (b)  a  ab (3.15)
where ab = a if b = 0.
Proposition 11 Social norms with productive SCI improve ex-ante e¢ -
ciency in the strategic component, DS (b)  0, in the following cases:
i) dynamic ine¢ ciency and relative risk aversion greater or equal to one,
i.e. 0 (b) > 0 and   1;
ii) dynamic e¢ ciency and relative risk aversion lower than one, i.e. 0 (b) 
0 and  < 1.
Proof. (See appendix).
Proposition 11 provides simple, and potentially testable, implications.
Society characterized by a dynamic e¢ cient growth path (i.e. 0 (b)  0), in
which agents cannot increase their intertemporal utility by reducing their
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consumption and by increasing investment in human capital, may support
the implementation of social norms that coordinate on productive SCI de-
cisions in order to reduce opportunistic behavior on the dimension of inter-
generational cooperation. Indeed, by providing education they reduce their
marginal gain from deviation on unobservable backward transfers. When
the economy is instead characterized by dynamic ine¢ cient growth path
(i.e. 0 (b) > 0) and community coordinates on social norms with SCI, op-
portunistic behavior on the intergenerational cooperative dimension might
be even exacerbated, partially reducing the overall ex-ante e¢ ciency. How-
ever social norm with SCI are still desirable in the case of dynamic ine¢ -
ciency as long as agents have su¢ ciently high relative risk aversion, which
partially reduces the gain from deviation.22
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper we have focused on OLG games characterized by imperfect
public monitoring, where agents are restricted to play strongly symmetric
public strategies. We have studied how the implementation of social norms
with SCI improves ex-ante e¢ ciency compared to social norms without SCI.
When agents coordinate their strategies on the self-expropriation actions of
other players, society attains higher welfare.
There are two main features we require to be satised in order to achieve
this stark result. First, self-expropriation decisions must be fully observable
by future generations. Second, by self-expropriating agents endogenously
change their perceived current marginal gain from deviation. If all players
coordinate on both community and self-commitment enforcement mecha-
nisms, agents are more willing to cooperate even after bad signalsrealiza-
tions and, consequently, higher ex-ante e¢ ciency is supported in equilibrium.
A wide range of economic settings exists in which our theoretic results
may be conveniently applied. Stochastic environments characterized by high
volatility and repeated interactions among organizations, whose members
22To provide quantitative insights, let us consider an economy characterized by expo-
nential utility, u (c) = 1  e c , and decreasing return to scale technology, F (b) =
p
b,
where c   (b) (1  a). The rst best allocation is b = 14 . The coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion is equal to   c = 

1 +
p
b  b

(1  a). As result, the social norms with
SCI attain higher e¢ ciency in the strategic component if: i) b < 1
4
and   1
(1+
p
b b)(1 a) ,
and ii) b  1
4
and  < 1
(1+
p
b b)(1 a) .
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have x-term mandates, are particular adapt to explore the positive im-
pact of social norms where agents coordinate their expectations on the self-
expropriation decisions of the other players. Real applications will be in
the context of self-enforcing intergenerational risk sharing and self-enforcing
international agreements.
In this study we have limited our analyses to the comparison between
two types of social norms, which are distinguished because of the di¤erent
enforcement mechanisms on which agents are expected to rely to sustain
a particular customary rule. Future research will focus on the study of
the endogenous emergence of social norms. Specically, by adopting an
evolutionary approach, we may wonder if and how a community, which has
initially relied on social norms without SCI, may have incentives to switch
to social norms with SCI.
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3.8 Appendix
Proposition (8). We determine the set of payo¤,  a, in the OLG game
G (; pa;K; T ) when agents are restricted to playing strongly symmetric pure
public strategies. Let t be equal to:
t = (1  bt) (1  at) + d [pag (Y ) + (1  pa) g (X)]
where g : Z ! [0; 1]. g (Y ) and g (X) denotes the t-generation continuation
values in the case of bad and good signal realizations, respectively. Note
that individual continuation values are not a¤ected by the b-decisions. The
vector (at; bt; g (zt)) identies a recursive strategy prole. Recall that pa =
Pr (Y jat) which is a decreasing function of at. We have to solve the following
maximization program:
max t
s.t.: 8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
a = argmax
at2f0;ag
t
b = argmax
bt2f0;bg
t
pa = Pr (Y jat)
g (Y ) ; g (X) 2 [0; 1]
Clearly b = 0, given that it simply makes agents able to sustain a cost with
no benets. Under the feasibility condition p1  p0   ad where a = a,
then we discuss the two possible cases of a = 0 and a = a.
Case I
Suppose a = a, then the promise keeping constraint turns out to be
equal to:
t = 1  a+ d [p1g (Y ) + (1  p1) g (X)] (3.16)
To be an equilibrium the following incentive constraint must hold:
t  1 + d [p0g (Y ) + (1  p0) g (X)]
The above inequality implies:
g (X)  
a
d (p0   p1) + g (Y ) (3.17)
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According to Eq. (3.16), the maximum payo¤ requires g (X) and g (Y ) being
maximum. As a consequence:
g (X) = 1 and g (Y ) = 1  
a
d (p0   p1) (3.18)
Note that g (Y ) cannot be equal to one. Indeed, if g (Y ) = 1 then from
constraint (3.17) it follows g (X) > 1, which cannot be. Thus, in order to
play cooperatively in the rst period, i.e. a = a, agents must expect with a
probability,  = 1   ad(p0 p1) , that future generation will cooperate even if
a bad signal will be realized. Plugging condition (3.18) into Eq. (3.16) we
obtain:
t = 1  a+ d  
a
p0
p1
  1
Case II
Suppose a = 0, then the promise keeping constraint is equal to:
t = 1 + d [p0g (Y ) + (1  p0) g (X)] (3.19)
The incentive compatible constraint requires:
t > 1  a+ d [p1g (Y ) + (1  p1) g (X)]
By solving for g (X) the above inequality implies:
g (X) <
a
d (p0   p1) + g (Y ) (3.20)
From Eq. (3.19) to attain the maximum payo¤ we require g (X) and g (Y )
subject to (3.20) to be maximum. First we consider the case (g (X) ; g (Y )) =
(1; 1), which implies that, for any signalsrealization, agents will cooperate.
This implies a 6= 0 that is a contradiction. Second, we consider the cases
(g (X) ; g (Y )) 6= (0; 0). It follows that with some positive probability future
generations will cooperate after the realization of either bad signal, if g (Y ) 6=
0, or good signal, if g (X) 6= 0. As a consequence a 6= 0 with some positive
probability, which is again a contradiction. Then it follows that, if a = 0
the unique equilibrium continuation values are (g (X) ; g (Y )) = (0; 0) and
t = 1.
We conclude that the set of equilibrium payo¤ sustained by social norms
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without SCI is equal to  a = [amin; 
a
max], where 
a
min = aut = 1 and
amax = 1  a+ d  
ap1
p0 p1 .
Corollary (9). Let (a1; g (z1)) be a recursive strategy prole of the rst
period which supports 1 2  a, as derived in Proposition 1. For each z1,
g (z1) 2 [0; 1], which implies 9 (a2 (z1) ; g (z1; z2)) that support g (z1) and
2 2  a. The recursion process can continue. Let  = (a1; a2 (z1) ; a3 (z1; z2) ; :::).
 is PPE and the payo¤ of  is  2  a.
Proposition (9). We determine the set of payo¤ associated to social norms
with SCI,  ab, when agents are restricted to play strongly symmetric pure
public strategy. Let t be equal to:
t = (1  bt) (1  at) + d [pag (Y; bt) + (1  pa) g (X; bt)] (3.21)
where g : Z  B ! [0; 1]. g (Y; bt) and g (X; bt) denotes the t-generation
continuation values in the case of bad signal and good signal realizations,
respectively. The vector (at; bt; g (zt; bt)) denes a recursive strategy prole.
Note that, di¤erently from Proposition 8, here the continuation values are
also a¤ected by the self-commitment decisions taken in the previous period.
Note that pa = Pr (Y jat) is not a¤ected by the action bt. We need to solve
the following maximization program:
max t
s.t.: 8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
a = argmax
at2f0;ag
t
b = argmax
bt2f0;bg
t
pa = Pr (Y jat)
g (Y; bt) ; g (X; bt) 2 [0; 1]
Under the feasibility conditions p1  p0   abd and p1  d 
a ab
d b p0 we
discuss the four possible cases:
Case I:
Suppose a = a and b = b then the promise keeping constraint is equal
to:
t = (1  b) (1  a) + d [p1g (Y; b) + (1  p1) g (X; b)] (3.22)
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To be an equilibrium the following incentive compatible constraints must
hold:
t  (1  b) + d [p0g (Y; b) + (1  p0) g (X; b)] (3.23)
t  (1  a) + d [p1g (Y; 0) + (1  p1) g (X; 0)] (3.24)
t  1 + d [p0g (Y; 0) + (1  p0) g (X; 0)] (3.25)
We need to determine the corresponding continuation values g (zt; bt) for
zt 2 fX;Y g and bt 2 f0; bg. Note that Eq. (3.22) is an increasing function
in both g (Y; b) and g (X; b), while it is not a¤ected by g (Y; 0) and g (X; 0).
Since the RHS of Eq.(3.23) is an increasing function in both g (Y; b) and
g (X; b), then constraint (3.23) must hold with equality, implying:
g (X; b) =
ab
d (p0   p1) + g (Y; b)
where ab = a (1  b). Plugging the maximum values:
g (X; b) = 1 and g (Y; b) = 1  
ab
d (p0   p1) (3.26)
into constraints (3.24) and (3.25) and solving by g (X; 0), we obtain:
g (X; 0) 

1  
ab
d
p0
p0   p1

1
1  p1  
p1
1  p1 g (Y; 0) (3.27)
g (X; 0) 

1  
ab
d
p0
p0   p1  
a
d

1
1  p0  
p0
1  p0 g (Y; 0) (3.28)
Let us denote with   f[0; 1] [0; 1] j s.t. Eq. (3.27) ; (3.28)g. It fol-
lows that for g (X; b) and g (Y; b) equal to condition (3.26) and (g (X; 0) ; g (Y; 0)) 2
, we attain the value:
t = (1  b) (1  a) + d  
ab
p0
p1
  1
Case II:
Suppose a = a and b = 0 then the promise keeping constraint is equal
to:
t = (1  a) + d [p1g (Y; 0) + (1  p1) g (X; 0)] (3.29)
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To be an equilibrium the following incentive compatible constraints must
hold:
t  (1  b) (1  a) + d [p1g (Y; b) + (1  p1) g (X; b)] (3.30)
t  (1  b) + d [p0g (Y; b) + (1  p0) g (X; b)] (3.31)
t  1 + d [p0g (Y; 0) + (1  p0) g (X; 0)] (3.32)
Di¤erently from Case I, Eq. (3.29) is increasing in both g (Y; 0) and g (X; 0).
Since the RHS of Eq.(3.32) is an increasing function in both g (Y; 0) and
g (X; 0), the constraint (3.32) must hold with equality, implying:
g (X; 0) =
a
d (p0   p1) + g (Y; 0)
Plugging the maximum values g (X; 0) = 1 and g (Y; 0) = 1   ad(p0 p1) into
constraints (3.30) and (3.31) and solving by g (X; b), we obtain:
g (X; b) 

1 +
ab
d
  
a
d
p1
p0   p1

1
1  p1  
p1
1  p1 g (Y; b) (3.33)
g (X; b) 

1 +
b
d
  
a
d
p0
p0   p1

1
1  p0  
p0
1  p1 g (Y; b) (3.34)
Subject to constraints (3.33) and (3.34), it follows that for the maximum
level of g (X; b) and g (Y; b) we attain the value:
t = 1  a+ d  
a
p0
p1
  1
which is the best sustainable payo¤ in the case of social norms without SCI.
Case III:
Suppose a = 0 and b = b then the promise keeping constraint is equal
to:
t = (1  b) + d [p0g (Y; b) + (1  p0) g (X; b)] (3.35)
To be an equilibrium the following incentive compatible constraints must
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hold:
t  (1  b) (1  a) + d [p1g (Y; b) + (1  p1) g (X; b)] (3.36)
t  (1  a) + d [p1g (Y; 0) + (1  p1) g (X; 0)] (3.37)
t  1 + d [p0g (Y; 0) + (1  p0) g (X; 0)] (3.38)
Similarly to Case I, Eq. (3.35) increasing in both g (Y; b) and g (X; b). Thus,
constraint (3.36) must hold with equality, implying:
g (X; b) =
ab
d (p0   p1) + g (Y; b) (3.39)
Under the condition (3.39), g (X; b) > 0 and g (Y; b) > 0 that implies that
agents expect with positive probability that future generations will supply
consumption good transfer, a > 0, which is a contradiction. It follows that
the promise values must be g (X; b) = g (Y; b) = 0, which implies t = (1  b)
and, consequently, the constraint (3.38) is never satised. a = 0 and b = b
is not part of an equilibrium strategy.
Case IV:
Finally, suppose a = 0 and b = 0 then the promise keeping constraint is
equal to:
t = 1 + d [p1g (Y; 0) + (1  p1) g (X; 0)] (3.40)
The same argument proposed for Case III holds here. g (Y; 0) = g (X; 0) = 0
and g (Y; b) and g (X; b) are subject to:
g (X; b)  b+
ab
d (1  p1)  
p1
1  p1 g (Y; b)
The value (3.40) is equal to 1:
To conclude, the set of equilibrium payo¤s sustained by social norms
with SCI is equal to  a =

abmin; 
ab
max

, where abmin = aut = 1 and 
ab
max =
(1  b) (1  a) + d  abp0
p1
 1 .
Corollary (10). Let (a1; b1; g (z1; b1)) be a recursive strategy prole in the
rst period, which supports 1 2  ab, as derived in Proposition 9. For each
z1 and b1, g (z1; b1) 2 [0; 1], which implies that 9 (a2 (z1; b1) ; g (z1; b1; z2; b2))
that support g (z1; b1) and 2 2  ab. The recursion process can continue.
Let  = (a1; a2 (z1; b1) ; a3 (z1; b1; z2; b2) ; :::) and  =(b1; b2 (z1; b1) ; b3 (z1; b1; z2; b2) ; :::).
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(; ) is PPE and the payo¤ of (; ) is  2  ab.
Proposition (10). To prove that ~ a  ~ ab it is su¢ cient to show that
abmax > 
a
max, which requires:
p1  (1  a) p0 (3.41)
Then under the conditions (3.11), (3.12) and (3.41) the proposition is proved.
Proposition (11). To determine whether social norms with SCI might
have a positive impact also from a strategic point of view, i.e. DS (b) > 0.
Given that DS (0) = 0, it is su¢ cient to nd out the conditions under which
@DS(b)
@b > 0, that implies
@ab
@b < 0.
@ab
@b
= 0 (b) q (b; a)
where q (b; a)  u0 ( (b))   (1  a)u0 ( (b) (1  a)). Note that q (b; 0) = 0
for each b, then to determine the sign of q (b; a) we simply have to evaluate
the relative impact of the a-decision:
@q (b; a)
@a
= u0 ( (b) (1  a)) + (1  a) (b)u00 ( (b) (1  a)) (3.42)
Let c   (b) (1  a) and denote    u
00(c)c
u0(c)
the coe¢ cient of relative
risk aversion, then Eq. (3.42) can be rewritten as follows:
@q (b; a)
@a
= 1  
It follows that, there are four possible economy congurations which depend
on: i) Dynamic ine¢ ciency (or e¢ ciency), i.e. 0 (b) > () 0, and ii) relative
risk-aversion greater (or lower) than one, i.e.   (<) 1, as follows:
1. If 0 (b) > 0 and   1, then DS (b)  0;
2. If 0 (b)  0 and   1, then DS (b)  0;
3. If 0 (b) > 0 and  < 1, then DS (b)  0;
4. If 0 (b)  0 and  < 1, then DS (b)  0.
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